Arkansas Law Review
Volume 70

Number 4

Article 5

January 2018

Originalism’s Claims and Their Implications
André LeDuc

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/alr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
André LeDuc, Originalism’s Claims and Their Implications, 70 Ark. L. Rev. 1007 (2018).
Available at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/alr/vol70/iss4/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Arkansas Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact
scholar@uark.edu.

ORIGINALISM’S CLAIMS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
André LeDuc*
In this article I explore six of the most fundamental
disagreements between originalism and its critics over
originalism’s implications.
These implications—and the
implications of the critics’ alternatives—figure prominently in the
arguments advanced in the debate. Reconstructing these
arguments in their strongest possible form permits the confusion
and misdirection in the debate over originalism to emerge.
First, originalism argues that it best comports with our
republican democracy. Judicial review, performed by unelected
judges with lifetime appointments, may appear inconsistent with
the fundamental principles of our democratic republic.
Originalism argues that deference to the original understandings
or expectations with respect to the Constitution answers this
challenge. The critics offer three principal replies to that claim.
First, the originalist strategy of finding the original understanding
and intentions with respect to the Constitution is rejected as
undoable. Second, even if and to the extent that such intentions
and understandings existed, the originalist project of finding
meaning is rejected as blinkered and mechanical. Third, Bobbitt
argues that the originalist premise is flawed: there is no need to
reconcile judicial review and constitutional interpretation with
democracy.
Second, originalism claims that it offers the only neutral
method of constitutional interpretation. Critics deny the argument
from discretion on a number of grounds. Third, originalism
claims to offer a better account of the textuality of the written
Constitution. Critics reject the arguments for that claim. Fourth,
I examine how originalism limits constitutional change. Critics
* © André LeDuc 2018. I am grateful to Stewart Schoder, Kristin Hickman, and Laura Litten
for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft and to Dennis Patterson, the late Jeff Greenblatt,
and Charlotte Crane for helpful comments on some related material. Errors that remain are
my own.
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argue that the originalists fail to provide a plausible account of
constitutional flux. Fifth, I assess the claim that originalism is
necessary, and therefore any other inconsistent theory of
constitutional interpretation is necessarily impossible. The critics
rightly deny this singularly bold and implausible claim. Sixth, I
examine the claim that originalism can restore the Lost
Constitution, and, in so doing, radically change our constitutional
law. Critics of originalism, and even some defenders, have
questioned whether originalism can accomplish the mission set
out for it. This skepticism is misplaced, at least on the terms on
which originalism makes its constitutional argument.
When the claims advanced by originalism and by its critics
are examined, they generally prove implausible or uninteresting.
The debate over originalism has reached a stalemate on these key
issues. The exchanges with respect to these claims offer no reason
to rehabilitate or even to continue the originalism debate.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Originalism and its critics disagree not only about the
claims of originalism but also about originalism’s most
fundamental implications.1 By claims I mean the central, express
tenets of originalism. The implications of originalism are the
inferences that may be derived from these claims—or the indirect
arguments that may be made for or against originalism from those
claims or from critics’ competing claims. The two aspects of
originalism are closely related. Originalism and its critics each
make important arguments for their claims from the implications
of those claims. If the debate has been more fruitful and
productive than I have earlier claimed,2 it is likely with respect to
these claims and implications. This article addresses those
readers who may be intrigued by the argument of the earlier
articles in this series but believe that the debate about originalism
has developed important and fruitful arguments about neutrality,
judicial review, and the textuality of the Constitution, for
example. Looking at these core claims about originalism, I will
argue that the debate displays the same fruitlessness—and many
of the same confusions—that I have previously described more
generally. The exchanges with respect to these central originalist

1. I have previously explored originalism’s claims about meaning, interpretation, and
constitutional reasoning in some detail, along with the critics’ response. See André LeDuc,
Making the Premises about Constitutional Meaning Express: The New Originalism and Its
Critics, 31 BYU J. PUB L. 111, 113-23 (2016) [hereinafter LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning];
André LeDuc, Competing Accounts of Interpretation and Practical Reasoning in the Debate
over Originalism, 16 U.N.H. L. Rev. 51, 51-61 (2017) [hereinafter LeDuc, Interpretation
and Practical Reasoning]. In that account, I emphasize the performative and inferential
elements in our constitutional texts and decisions. I don’t revisit those concepts, which have,
at least in the case of the performative analysis, caused some readers some confusion, here,
but I certainly employ the fruits of that analysis. To repeat, the performative analysis I
endorse, following an all-too-casually smushed together Austin and Grice, emphasizes what
the Constitution does as more important than what it says—and calls into question the tacit
assumption that authoritative propositions of constitutional law have non-trivial truth
conditions.
2. André LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel: Originalism, Its Critics, and the Promise of
Our American Constitution, 26 WM & MARY BILL OF RTS. L.J. 101 (2017) [hereinafter
LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel]; see also Eric J. Segall, A Century Lost: The End of the
Originalism Debate, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 411, 412 (1998) (“This essay argues that the
academic debate over the legitimacy of originalist and non-originalist constitutional
interpretation has not progressed materially [over the past century].”).
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claims and implications provide no reason to try to salvage or
rehabilitate the debate.
Originalism, most fundamentally, claims that certain
original facts about the constitutional text—intentions,
expectations, or linguistic understandings—generate privileged
interpretations of that text that determine constitutional
controversies. In its recent formulation as the New Originalism,
the theory asserts that the linguistic understanding of what the
constitutional text meant when it was adopted or amended is the
authoritative interpretation that must be applied in constitutional
cases today.3 It is, admittedly, an appealing and seemingly
plausible claim. It is appealing because it appears to assimilate
constitutional interpretation and application to paradigms of
linguistic behavior that are common and compelling.4
Originalism’s critics have nevertheless challenged this account
with a number of arguments and from an array of stances.5 The
debate continues to rage.
In this article I explore the fundamental disagreements
between originalism and its critics over six key claims and
implications of originalism, including the recent statement of
originalism offered by the New Originalism.6 These implications
3. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
599, 609-10 (2004) [hereinafter Whittington, New Originalism] (arguing as a matter of
semantics that certain provisions of the Constitution require mere interpretation while other
provisions require the democratic political tools of construction to determine their meaning);
see generally Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 65 (2011); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013) (again distinguishing the processes of interpretation and
construction without allocating the construction function to the legislative branch); Lawrence
B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010).
4. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING
COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 56-59 (2005) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, RADICALS]
(cleverly—if misleadingly—invoking the analogy of following a friend’s direction in
choosing a birthday present for him).
5. See, e.g., id. (defending a minimalist, consequentialist critique); Lawrence Lessig,
Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 400-01
(1995) [hereinafter Lessig, Understanding] (arguing that constitutional law accommodates
change without requiring constitutional amendment through changed readings of the
constitutional text).
6. See, e.g., Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 3, at 607-12. Certain claims
are neither explored here nor in the companion articles in the series. Originalism
occasionally claims to be a scientific method. For example, Justice Scalia began his Tanner
lectures by offering a contribution to “the science of construing legal texts.” Antonin Scalia,
Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in
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are of particular importance for originalism and for the debate.
The implications of originalism—and the implications of the
critics’ alternatives—figure prominently in the arguments
advanced in the debate. Reconstructing these arguments in their
strongest possible form is an important part in recreating the
ideopolises of the participants in the debate.7
Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia, Interpretation;
INTERPRETATION]. Another part of his published lectures is titled “The Science of Statutory
Interpretation.” Id. at 14. Bork invoked science in comparing non-originalist theories of
constitutional interpretation to building perpetual motion machines. ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 251 (1990) [hereinafter
BORK, TEMPTING]. That is, the truth of originalism is analogous to the truths of physics. It
is possible, of course, that these claims are only rhetorical. What did Justice Scalia mean
here by science? Is it a natural science or a social science? It is undoubtedly the alleged, preKuhnian crystalline clarity and certainty of natural science that Justice Scalia sought to
invoke. It is the paradigm of natural scientific knowledge that is invoked. The obvious
tension, perhaps inconsistency, between Justice Scalia’s invocation of science, and Bork’s
apparently casual dismissal of the Ninth Amendment because of its difficulty, should not go
unremarked. Scientific knowledge has often been invoked as a model to be followed with
respect to other kinds of inquiry, on the basis that it provides a firmer basis on which to know
things. After reason and science replaced faith and philosophy in the seventeenth century,
scientific knowledge has been repeatedly invoked as a model in the social sciences. The late
Richard Rorty outlined how the aspiration to science had shaped philosophy and, generally,
all of Western culture after the rise of the secular state. See generally RICHARD RORTY,
PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979) (arguing that the model of scientific
inquiry is seductive but misleading for philosophy). Yet, to the extent that the scientific
method involves fundamentally controlled, replicable experiments, it is unclear that anyone
has ever seriously considered legal experiments. Indeed, to the extent such experiments
would result in checkerboard laws, Dworkin has criticized such a regime as unconstitutional.
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 179-84 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, EMPIRE].
The claim to scientific knowledge with respect to originalism would appear to be rooted in
the philosophical premises of originalism. Foremost among these are models of language,
truth, and a positivist distinction between facts and values. For the originalist, interpretive
law operates within the domain of facts. Values may be embodied in legislative choices
made by democracies or other legal choices by other sovereigns, but a judge’s role is to
determine the facts, at trial, and the law at trial and on appeal. The best methodology for
exploring facts—including textual facts—is science. Thus, the claim to the mantle of science
is the expression of other philosophical commitments inherent in originalism. Do the
originalists make the case that their method is scientific? Very little effort went into
defending that claim. Ironically, the claim by originalism to scientific methods and
knowledge appears more expressive than empirical. In the originalists’ own space of reasons
the claim to science appears a matter of value, not fact. Neither Judge Bork nor Justice Scalia
explained what was scientific about their interpretive theory. Without such an explanation
or defense, that claim would appear to reduce to an expressive statement that their
originalisms are good and the methods are neutral, not political or based upon subjective
values.
7. See Jonathan Lear, An Interpretation of Transference, 74 INT’L J. OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS 739 (1993), reprinted in JONATHAN LEAR, OPEN MINDED: WORKING
OUT THE LOGIC OF THE SOUL 56, 69-73 (1998) (defining an ideopolis as the pathological,
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First, one of the most forceful and engaging arguments for
originalism is that it best comports with our republican
democracy. This is simply the statement of the originalist
argument from Alexander Bickel’s countermajoritarian
challenge.8 Federal judicial review has been challenged as
undemocratic.9 Judicial review, performed by unelected judges
with lifetime appointments, may override otherwise valid
democratically-enacted legislation.10
That may appear
inconsistent with the fundamental principles of our democratic
republic.11 Originalism argues that deference to the original
understandings or expectations with respect to the Constitution
provides a uniquely powerful answer to this challenge because
judges are obligated to follow the directives of the Founders,
ratifiers, or other relevant actors, without exercise of independent
value choices or other judicial discretion.12
The critics offer three principal replies to the originalists’
claim. First, the originalist strategy of finding the original
understanding and intentions with respect to the Constitution is
rejected as undoable. Those understandings and intentions simply
did not, and do not, exist, the critics assert.13 Second, even to the
extent that such intentions and understandings existed, the
originalist project of finding meaning is rejected as blinkered and
mechanical.14 To interpret those understandings and intentions,

idiosyncratic polis within which a patient constructs and lives his conceptual life); see
generally LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel, supra note 2, at 11-12 (exploring the concept of
constitutional ideopolises and the notion of therapy for the originalism debate).
8. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962) [hereinafter BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS]
(arguing that the fundamental challenge of constitutional theory is to explain the role and
legitimacy of judicial review in our democratic republic).
9. Id. at 16-17; Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 9 (broadening Bickel’s concerns
to encompass traditional common law methods of judicial decision).
10. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 139-41.
11.
Id. at 139 (characterizing the task of reconciling judicial review with the
democratic principles as the fundamental challenge of constitutional theory); BICKEL, LEAST
DANGEROUS, supra note 8, at 16-23.
12. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 139-41.
13. See RONALD DWORKIN, The Forum of Principle, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 33,
34-57 (1985) [hereinafter Dworkin, Forum of Principle]; Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in
INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 68-71 [hereinafter Tribe, Interpretation].
14. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 73; John Hart Ely, Constitutional
Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 412-448, 445 (1978)
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the critics assert, a different interpretative methodology is called
for. Those critics reject the facile assimilation of the originalist
interpretative methodology to historical research and analysis.15
Dworkin, in particular, described a bolder, more expansive and
more imaginative interpretive project.16 Third, and perhaps most
controversially, Bobbitt argues that the originalist premise is
flawed: there is no need to reconcile judicial review and
constitutional interpretation with democracy.17
The originalism debate has reached no resolution with
respect to the originalists’ argument from democracy and judicial
review. Moreover, the debate has made no progress; the two sides
do not appear to have engaged with respect to each other’s
positions. The reason for that failure is that originalism tacitly
adopts an ontological characterization of the Constitution that
makes it independent of the judicial determination of its
consequences with respect to constitutional controversies. They
believe that there is an objective constitution-in-the-world that
judges are to find and apply.18 As a result, constitutional
arguments must be measured by the extent to which they produce
results that are congruent with that objective Constitution.19 The
concept of the objective Constitution as the benchmark for
decision is often clearest in originalist discussion of precedent,

[hereinafter Ely, Allure and Impossibility] (“The point of all this is this: you cannot be an
interpretivist.”).
15. See, e.g., Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal
Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87, 92-93 (1997) (emphasizing the differences between
historical research and scholarship and historical argument in constitutional argument and
adjudication); Suzanna Sherry, The Indeterminacy of Historical Evidence, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 437 (1996).
16. DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 225-75 (describing the process of adjudication
as based upon a comprehensive interpretative project with respect to law and moral theory).
17. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 181
(1982) [hereinafter BOBBITT, FATE]. I explore that argument in André LeDuc, The AntiFoundational Challenge to the Philosophical Premises of the Debate over Originalism, 119
PENN ST. L. REV. 131 (2014) [hereinafter LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge] (concluding
that an anti-foundational account of our constitutional law and decisional practice is plausible
and compelling). For an important recent statement of the problem of judicial review, see
Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006)
(arguing that certain forms of judicial review are improper in democratic politics).
18. André LeDuc, The Ontological Foundations of the Debate over Originalism, 7
WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 263, 269-74 (2015) [hereinafter LeDuc, Ontological Foundations].
19. Id.
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where the originalists often characterize existing doctrine and
precedent as erroneous.20
Many of originalism’s critics share that same commitment
to an objective Constitution, however.21
Because the
constitutional text appears to the originalists generally to state
positive law, arguments from democracy that justify judicial
review operate at a level that seems conceptually quite different
from arguments that go directly to the originalists’ interpretative
mission of determining the meaning of the constitutional text.22 I
will explore some of the ways in which these arguments have
unfolded in the debate—and how they have failed to advance the
competing claims of the debate.
Originalists also claim that because originalism offers the
only neutral method of constitutional interpretation and
adjudication, all of the other methods permit judges to substitute
their personal preferences and discretion for the rule of law. This
neutrality thesis is advanced to discredit other theories of
constitutional interpretation and decision. This claim, like the
first argument for originalism from democracy, has its origin in a
critical response to the jurisprudence of the Warren Court. For
originalists, the Warren Court committed the twin sins of
overturning democratic legislation and upending the democratic
process on the one hand and substituting its values and
preferences for those of the Congress and state legislatures on the
other.23 Thus, these claimed implications of originalism reveal
both the power and the provenance of originalism.
20. See Antonin Scalia, Response, in INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 129, 13940 [hereinafter Scalia, Response]; BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 155-59; Lawrence B.
Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and
the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 205 (2006) [hereinafter
Solum, Constitutional Bondage] (adopting a quite Borkian stance on non-originalist
precedent and concluding: “This means that isolated precedents contrary to original meaning
will have a limited effect on constitutional adjudication.”); Randy E. Barnett, Trumping
Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257,
258-62 (2005) [hereinafter Barnett, Trumping] (arguing that non-originalist precedent must
fall to the theoretical claims of originalism).
21.
DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 355-99 (describing an open-ended
interpretative methodology that gives a fundamental role to philosophical analysis).
22. See Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 37 (characterizing constitutional
interpretation as like textual interpretation but of a distinctive text).
23. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 69, 131-32; Scalia, Interpretation, supra
note 6, at 149 (sarcastically mocking the “glorious days” of the Warren Court); RAOUL
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The critics, however, sometimes make a strong objection,
denying that the appeal of neutrality is coherent.24 If neutrality is
not a coherent concept or virtue for constitutional jurisprudence,
then the originalist claim that originalism must be adopted as a
method of constitutional interpretation because it alone satisfies
the requirement of neutrality fails.25 Critics also sometime make
a conceptually weaker claim, accepting the standard of neutrality
but arguing that originalism makes no stronger claim to neutrality
than competing theories.26
The debate over neutrality is similarly fruitless. The
failure to engage and to make progress arises from differing
accounts of the nature of the Constitution and constitutional
argument. Neutrality cannot play the simple, self-evident role
that Judge Bork sought.
Third, I explore the originalist claim to offer a better
account of the textuality of the written Constitution. Originalism
has, to a greater or lesser degree, tied its claims to the written
nature of the American Constitution.27 Barnett, for example,
claims that the Republic’s decision to have a written Constitution
has implications for constitutional interpretation and decision that
support originalism.28 Critics dispute that claim.29 They argue
that nothing about the text of the Constitution or the
understandings and intentions on its adoption and amendment
require that it be applied as the originalists interpret it.30

BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1977) [hereinafter BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY].
24. Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 804-06 (1983) [hereinafter Tushnet,
Following the Rules].
25. Id.
26. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 72.
27. See, e.g., Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 40-41; Randy E. Barnett, An
Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 629-35 (1999) [hereinafter Barnett,
Originalism] (emphasizing original understanding as the starting point for constitutional
interpretation by analogy with the law of contract interpretation).
28. See Barnett, Originalism, supra note 27, at 617; see also Scalia, Interpretation,
supra note 6, at 40-41 (describing the lock-in function of a written constitution).
29. See, e.g., Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional
Interpretation, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1025, 1029-30 (2010) (arguing that the narrow originalist
definition of interpretation assumes away the hard questions about how constitutional cases
ought to be decided).
30. Id. at 1047-59.
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Here, too, the protagonists in the debate appear to
overstate their claims and to talk past each other. The existence
of a constitutional text makes possible textual arguments and
enriches and enhances the force of historical arguments. Justice
Scalia was not wrong when he claimed that there are important
implications for our constitutional law from the decision to adopt
a written Constitution.31 How could there not be?
Again, the failure for a more productive exchange arises
from the shared assumption about the nature of the Constitution,
its meaning, and constitutional interpretation and argument.32
The textuality of the Constitution is central to our constitutional
practice, but is neither a necessary33 nor sufficient condition for
originalism to establish itself as the uniquely proper method of
constitutional interpretation or mode of constitutional argument.
Fourth, I examine how originalism accounts for
constitutional change. Originalism aspires to give us a more
stable Constitution, yet must interpret and apply a text largely
written in the eighteenth century in the twenty-first. To do so
requires an account of the kinds of change that constitutional
theory may incorporate, as well as the kinds that it may not. The
unchanging dimension of the Constitution is often described by
originalists as normative or expressing value choices.34 The
theories offered by originalism rely on the distinction between
changing empirical facts and unchanging values,35 but even with
that well-accepted distinction, it is not clear that the originalists
have offered a plausible account of constitutional flux. On the
31.

Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 40-41; RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING
THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 100-03 (2004) [hereinafter

THE LOST CONSTITUTION:
BARNETT, LOST].

32. LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 1 (arguing that semantic and even
linguistic accounts of meaning defended by the New Originalists and their ilk fail to capture
the pragmatics and inferentialist content of our constitutional practice); LeDuc,
Interpretation and Practical Reasoning, supra note 1 (arguing that originalist descriptions
of constitutional interpretation and reasoning fail to capture much of our constitutional
practice).
33. See generally Stephen E. Sachs, Essay, Originalism Without Text, 127 YALE L.J.
156 (2017).
34. See, e.g., Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 146 (describing the Bill of Rights as
embedding the moral values of America in 1791); BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 25152 (characterizing the Constitution as furnishing the moral premises for judicial decision).
35. See Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 146 (describing moral principles as
unchanging).
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other hand, critics of originalism, with their metaphors of the
Living Constitution and the Unwritten Constitution, often fail to
recognize the power of historical and textual arguments. They
sometimes appear to discount the certainty that arises regarding
many issues from the constitutional text, exaggerating the sense
of constitutional flux. As a result, the claims on both sides of the
debate as to the nature of constitutional change appear overstated.
Moreover, there is a sense that the premises about the
Constitution, constitutional argument, and constitutional decision
endorsed by the protagonists in the debate fail to capture key
elements of constitutional flux—and the correlative elements of
constitutional certainty.
Fifth, I assess the modal claim made by some originalists
that originalism is necessary, and therefore any other inconsistent
theory of constitutional interpretation is necessarily impossible.
Bork suggests that such impossibility is analogous to the physical
impossibility of theories that violate fundamental laws of physics
or chemistry (like the alchemical project to transmute lead into
gold or the pre-Newtonian physicists’ project to design a
perpetual motion machine).36 That analogy is misleading, if
rhetorically powerful. Until recently, other originalists have
ignored this claim, but it has recently been restated.37 The critics
had generally ignored this singularly bold claim by Bork, but, as
it has been restated and defended, the critics have begun to
engage.38 It is a claim that is particularly controversial with the
past 50 years or so of the debate over originalism; on Bork’s
account, the critics of originalism are not merely wrong, they are
necessarily wrong.
The claim of necessity for originalism does not warrant
rehabilitation and a more central place in debate. It is important,
however, for what it reveals about certain strands of originalism
36.
BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 251; see also Frank H. Easterbrook,
Alternatives to Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 479, 479 (1995) [hereinafter
Easterbrook, Alternatives to Originalism].
37. See generally William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
2349 (2015) [hereinafter Baude, Our Law] (making a positivist defense of the necessity of
originalism).
38. Cass R. Sunstein, There is Nothing That Interpretation Just Is, 30 CONST.
COMMENT. 193, 193-98 (2015) [hereinafter Sunstein, Nothing] (arguing that the concept of
interpretation cannot determine the nature or methods of constitutional interpretation).
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and its implications for the debate. The claim of necessity reveals
Bork’s commitments to an account of the nature of the
Constitution and the nature of constitutional reasoning. Those
premises informed his originalism.39 Originalists’ critics do not
share those commitments about constitutional reasoning.40 The
failure to share common ground on these issues prevents a more
meaningful and productive debate over these questions.
Sixth, I examine the claim that drives much originalist
thinking that originalism can restore the Lost Constitution, and,
in so doing, radically change our constitutional law.41 The Lost
Constitution is that original Constitution before corruption.42
Corruption, on this account, is the disregard for the interpretation
of the Constitution based upon its original understanding. 43 It is
fair to speak of this error as constituting corruption, rather than
mere error, because the consequences are both that judges
deciding cases on non-originalist arguments or grounds have
arrogated power to themselves and that the most fundamental,
foundational legal authority for the Republic has been cast aside.44
The merits of the results under alternative constitutional
decisional approaches—in terms of social utility, wealth
maximization, fairness, or justice—are irrelevant, as are the good
faith or good intentions of the judges committing such error. At
the very least, the original Constitution is that which existed
before corruption by the Warren Court.45 For many, however, the
corruption that must be excised started much earlier with the
creation of the liberal state under President Franklin Roosevelt.46
39. See LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 18, at 269-74, 285-88; LeDuc,
Interpretation and Practical Reasoning, supra note 1, at 93-96.
40. LeDuc, Interpretation and Practical Reasoning, supra note 1, at 103-07.
41. See BARNETT, LOST, supra note 31, at 354-55.
42. See id. at 356.
43. As Sunstein has pointed out, the originalists sometimes treat non-originalists as
lawless. See SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 54.
44. Id.
45. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 69-100. Thus Judge Bork wrote: “The
Court headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren from 1953 to 1969 occupies a unique place in
American law. It stands first and alone as a legislator of policy, whether the document it
purported to apply was the Constitution or a statute.” Id. at 69. Originalism cannot be
understood as a matter of intellectual history except as a reaction to the jurisprudence of the
Warren Court. See DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE 232-35 (2011).
46. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 3; see BARNETT, LOST, supra note 31, at
354-57.
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For some, indeed, it began with Chief Justice Marshall and the
doctrine of judicial review.47 Critics of originalism have
questioned whether originalism can accomplish the mission set
out for it.48 They argue that the originalist arguments either fail
to establish the substantive constitutional law conclusions that the
originalists defend49 or, more radically, that the originalist
arguments support very different substantive constitutional law
conclusions.50 In the context of originalism, these claims are
admittedly counterintuitive.
Here, the shift in the debate is sufficiently recent and
sufficiently novel that it is difficult to assess the competing
claims. But it is safe to predict that few originalists will be easily
persuaded by the claim that there is a compelling originalist
argument for a woman’s right to an abortion. So, at least to that
extent, the debate will not move forward on this front. In fairness
to the originalists, however, it does not appear that they ought to
be persuaded by these arguments. The argument that the
originalist mission fails does not account for the power traditional
originalist arguments have had in expressing the reasons to reach
traditional originalist conclusions about substantive constitutional
questions and in the opinions supporting originalist decision of
constitutional cases. As so often with the theoretical argument for
substantive constitutional results, theory is often impotent.51
The six claims and implications explored here are of
particular importance in the debate and in assessing the
47. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 19-28.
48. David A. Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn’t Be Originalists, 31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 969, 975 (2008) [hereinafter Strauss, Why] (arguing that originalist arguments
may be made for decidedly non-originalist constitutional results). That bold claim
underestimates the conservative force of arguments based upon original intentions,
expectations, and understandings of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
49.
Id. (“originalism’s characteristic features . . . makes it a decidedly nonconservative rhetorical weapon”).
50. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291
(2007) (arguing that the original meaning of the Constitution creates a woman’s right to an
abortion). See generally JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN,
LIVING ORIGINALISM] (adapting originalist arguments to support traditionally liberal
constitutional results).
51. LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 18; André LeDuc, The Relationship
of Constitutional Law to Philosophy: Five Lessons from the Originalism Debate, 12 GEO.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 153-54 (2014) [hereinafter LeDuc, Relationship of Constitutional Law
to Philosophy].
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importance of constitutional originalism.52 The power and appeal
of originalism should at once be apparent upon stating these six
theses. After the relatively bitter, partisan battles that have
surrounded the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence,53 a
theory that promises a neutral method makes a powerful claim on
our loyalty. Finally, the power of that theory—if required by
democracy—could certainly survive mere subtle philosophical
criticism. I will explain why the originalists fail to establish this
powerful claim. The critics do not establish their claims or most
of their criticisms of originalism. They fail to establish that the
Lost Constitution cannot be recovered by originalism; it very
likely can.

52. There is, of course, a certain arbitrariness in the selection of these six theses.
Others before me have attempted to identify the key theses of originalism, both as proponents
and as critics. See, e.g., Barnett, Originalism, supra note 27, at 629-43 (defending
originalism’s claims); Cass R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 311, 311-13 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Five Theses] (arguing that a weak version
of what he terms soft originalism is a valuable constitutional theory, preferable to the nonoriginalism of Dworkin and the Warren Court or to more ambitious strong originalisms).
There are other important theses in originalism. Originalism is presented, at least
metaphorically, as a scientific method. Justice Scalia began his essay Common-Law Courts
in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the
Constitution and Laws: “The following essay attempts to explain the current neglected state
of the science of construing legal texts, and offers a few suggestions for improvement.”
Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 3 (emphasis added). Additionally, originalists claim
that attention to the original meaning is the only honest method of interpreting the
Constitution. Bork wrote, for example, that the literature of constitutional interpretation
challenging originalism and offering alternatives “is in effect coded . . . .” BORK, TEMPTING,
supra note 6, at 135. Elsewhere he characterizes such authors’ projects as “nothing less than
the subversion of the law’s foundations.” Id. at 136. Strong words. The claim that
originalism is an honest creed with which to interpret the Constitution—and that the
competing theories are not—is thus also a powerful and compelling thesis. Moreover, by
implicitly accusing opponents of dishonesty—least in the matter of constitutional
interpretation—it is necessarily a polarizing and divisive claim. See SUNSTEIN, RADICALS,
supra note 4, at 3-7, 54. Nevertheless, there is reason to suspect that most originalists don’t
really believe those bold claims. If to depart from originalism were to abandon the
Constitution and subvert the laws, then mere claims of stare decisis would be hardly
compelling. Yet, as noted below, even strong proponents of originalism like Justice Scalia
acknowledge the legitimacy of such deference. Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 139-140
(arguing in response to criticism from Tribe that all theories allow for deference to
theoretically questionable precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis).
53. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Not as Bad as Plessy. Worse., in BUSH V. GORE: THE
QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 20, 34 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002) (exploring the Supreme
Court’s decisive role in the 2000 presidential election and concluding that the decision was
“utterly indefensible”); BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 9-11, 11 (characterizing the
academic constitutional criticism of originalism as a “heresy”).

1022

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 70:4

With respect to the other four core claims, the arguments
are more complex and subtle than either side generally
acknowledges.
The debate thrives on simplistic and
oversimplified premises and unstated assumptions. From within
the framework within which the debate has unfolded the
arguments have been largely inconclusive. The originalists
generally believe that originalism is more consistent with our
democratic republic and their critics dissent; the claim of
neutrality made by the originalists is rejected by their critics; and
the claim to hew more closely to the written nature of the
constitutional text advanced by the originalists is also rejected by
their critics. Moreover, there is little progress occurring in the
debate; there is no sense that we are moving toward a resolution
of these issues. The debate appears at an impasse on these central
issues and the arguments fruitless. Companion articles have
explored the sources of this impasse.54 This article confirms that
the stalemate of the debate has also occurred with respect to the
debate over these six central claims and implications of
originalism.

II. SIX CLAIMS AND IMPLICATIONS OF
ORIGINALISM
A. The Originalist Argument from Democracy
One of the most powerful and complex arguments for
originalism is that all of its alternatives are undemocratic.55 If that
were true, it would be a compelling argument for originalism.
Describing common law adjudication, Justice Scalia concludes:
“This is preeminently a common-law way of making law, and not

54. See generally LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 18; LeDuc, AntiFoundational Challenge, supra note 17; André LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism and
Pragmatism in the Debate about Originalism, 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 613 (2016) [hereinafter
LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism]; LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 1.
55. See Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 40; BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at
143. Dworkin characterized this argument as Justice Scalia’s “most basic” argument for
originalism. Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 115, 127
[hereinafter Dworkin, Interpretation].
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the way of construing a democratically adopted text.”56 That is,
the degrees of freedom in a democracy with respect to the
construction or interpretation of a legal text are fewer than in
adjudication in a common law tradition. Bork made a similar
point more forcefully: “[O]nly the approach of original
understanding meets the criteria that any theory of constitutional
adjudication must meet in order to possess democratic
legitimacy.”57 Here, Bork apparently made the point that, in a
democracy, the supremacy of the legislative will of the people
requires that sources of law not derived from the democratic
exercise of that will be rejected
The Borkian argument from democracy is simple and
direct. The Constitution is the pre-eminent democratic law.58
Judges and justices have sworn oaths to uphold it.59 Its choices
and directives are controlling, not to be subverted or amended by
an appointed judiciary in derogation of the democratic will.60
56. Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 40. Justice Scalia does not pause to explore
the definition of democracy or otherwise analyze the elements of democracy that implicate
constitutional interpretation and adjudication. It is likely that he thinks that the
commonsensical notion of democracy does not require more careful analysis. The
fundamental notion is that citizens make the fundamental choices about what their
government does. But see generally RICHARD A POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND
DEMOCRACY 130-57 (2005) [hereinafter POSNER, LAW AND DEMOCRACY] (arguing that the
legal academy has been cavalier in its invocation of concepts of democracy in ways that
conflate two very different visions).
57. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 143. Earlier, in Neutral Principles, Bork had
made the same point: “If I am correct so far, no argument that is both coherent and respectable
can be made supporting a Supreme Court that ‘chooses fundamental values’ because a Court
that makes rather than implements value choices cannot be squared with the presuppositions
of a democratic society.” Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 6 (1971) [hereinafter Bork, Neutral Principles].
58. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
59. ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 163-64 (Steven G. Calabresi
ed., 2007) [hereinafter ORIGINALISM] (remarks of Judge Easterbrook); see also Easterbrook,
Alternatives to Originalism, supra note 36. The significance of the judicial oath to uphold
the Constitution goes largely unremarked in this debate. But see JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 12 (1980) [hereinafter ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST]. Judges may take the oath more seriously than the
commentators suggest and, to the extent that they do not, that may properly be a matter of
concern. The oath does not answer the relevant decisional questions, however; it leaves open
the question of what it means to uphold the Constitution. Dworkin might have said that it
means to uphold it with fidelity to its highest aspirations. But the task of upholding the
Constitution is arguably a different task than to interpret it faithfully.
60. Two comments are in order. First, the import of appointment is not entirely clear.
Since the Progressive movement, many Midwestern states (among others) have elected their
judges. I am unaware of any suggestion that selecting judges by popular election solves, or
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Originalism claims to offer the best interpretation of the meaning
of the Constitution and the best bulwark against interpretative
subversion or de facto amendment. I have previously canvassed
originalism’s argument to offer the best interpretation.61 Most
fundamentally, originalism and many of its critics accord a
priority to interpretation in constitutional adjudication that is
misplaced, and problems of interpretation are more complex than
many originalists acknowledge.62 Originalism also claims to
offer the best bulwark against judicial adventurism because it
purports to limit the sources of law to which judges may look,
thereby limiting the possibility that a judge might import her own
subjective preferences into the decision process.
Sunstein captures the intuitive appeal of this argument.63
He compares it to a friend’s request for music of Barbra Streisand
as a birthday present from one who dislikes such music.64 The
manifestly proper response is to make the gift of the music of
Barbra Streisand, not the gift of the “better” music enjoyed by the
donor.65 “Fundamentalists believe courts should think in the
same way, as agents of the people, implementing their

would solve, the countermajoritarian objection. Elected judges, performing their judicial
roles, either re-elected or turned out of office, appear fully consistent with democracy in a
democratic republic. This case, so prevalent in the states since the Progressive Era, casts
substantial doubt that the countermajoritarian difficulty is, fundamentally, a problem in
democratic process and institutions—not a problem of the subversion of democracy itself.
But even very careful thinkers about judicial review have missed this point. See Waldron,
supra note 17, at 1353. So exploring that dimension of judicial review is a topic for another
day. Similarly, there is generally no suggestion that the problem of judicial review was
exacerbated by the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment and its requirement of direct
election of United States Senators or the democracy-reinforcing decisions of the Warren
Court that have enhanced the democratic nature of the Republic. The second point to
highlight is the importance of the reference to will in the formulation of the objection.
Because it is the democratic will that is preeminent, mere argument or reason, in which a
court might legitimately claim institutional competence, if not expertise, is discounted.
Dworkin’s strategy to challenge originalism (and also to solve the problem that judicial
review appears countermajoritarian) is to elevate the role of reason and argument, and their
place in comparison to will.
61. See generally LeDuc, Interpretation and Practical Reasoning, supra note 1
(concluding that the reduction of constitutional decision to interpretation is mistaken);
LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 17 (introducing my arguments about the
foundations of the interpretative claims in the debate).
62. See id.
63. See SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, 56-59.
64. Id. at 57.
65. See id.
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commands.”66 That is an intuitive way to think about law,
grounded in the positivist model of law as the command of the
sovereign67 and the classical liberal political theory of
democracy.68 John Hart Ely, before criticizing originalism, also
acknowledges its fundamental appeal in the context of our
classical democratic theory.69 But Sunstein is mistaken because
the performative mission of the Constitution is very different from
the performative role of a friend’s report of what she would like
as a birthday present.70 In the social context of selecting a friend’s
birthday present, what his personal preferences are is very close
to controlling, in the weak sense of being determinative of what a
friend should do. That sensitivity to another’s preferences is part
of what makes one a good friend.71 In the context of our practice
of applying the Constitution to resolve controversies presented in
constitutional cases the original understanding of the text is not,
as a matter of that practice, controlling.72 Other kinds or modes
of argument have often proved decisive. Originalists may argue
against the practice, but in doing so they are pitting theory against
practice.
The analysis of originalism’s argument from
democracy—and the critics’ response—requires three principal
steps. First, originalism’s tacit account of the linguistic meaning
66. Id. Note also how clearly positivist such an originalist account of the law is. See
generally LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism, supra note 54 (exploring the positivist and nonpositivist themes in the originalism debate, emphasizing the relative absence of consequential
differences that arise from positive and natural commitments in the debate).
67. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 18-22 (1st ed. 1961) [hereinafter HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW] (describing the jurisprudential theory of John Austin, but
characterizing it as overly simplistic).
68. See generally André LeDuc, Political Philosophy and the Fruitless Quest for an
Archimedean Stance in the Debate over Originalism, 85 UMKC L. REV. 1 (2016) [hereinafter
LeDuc, Fruitless Quest] (criticizing the invocation of political philosophy to play a
foundational role in constitutional interpretation and decision).
69. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 59, at 4-5.
70. See generally SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 57.
71. See DANIELLE ALLEN, OUR DECLARATION: A READING OF THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE IN DEFENSE OF EQUALITY 250-52 (2014) [hereinafter ALLEN, OUR
DECLARATION].
72. See generally BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17 (describing the alternative modes of
constitutional argument including prudential, doctrinal, and structural arguments that do not
derive from the original understandings or intentions with respect to the constitutional text).
To avoid possible misunderstanding, I should emphasize that I am here making a descriptive
claim about our constitutional practice, not a prescriptive claim about what that practice
ought to be.
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of the Constitution must be expressly articulated. That meaning
provides the linguistic force that originalism seeks to capture.
Second, the originalist account of the authority of the
Constitution—which emphasizes the Constitution’s democratic
provenance—must be articulated. It is the democratic legitimacy
of that authority that is at the core of the argument for originalism
from democracy. Third, the relationship of originalism’s
theoretical arguments from democracy with our constitutional
practice must be highlighted. I will explore each in turn.

1. The Appeal to Meaning
To make the argument from democracy, originalism must
first establish the meaning of the Constitution that is to be
faithfully followed. Originalists argue that it is only that
constitutional meaning that has democratic legitimacy. Critics of
originalism, after all, do not dispute that the Constitution is
paramount or that judges and justices are bound to uphold it.73
The disagreement is generally with respect to the claim that
originalism is the best interpretation of what the Constitution
means and occasionally as to how interpretation fits into
constitutional adjudication. The disagreement is over what it
means to uphold the Constitution.74 For example, Dworkin’s
reply to Justice Scalia claimed to offer a more faithful reading of
the Constitution.75 Both he and Justice Scalia endeavored to
determine what the Constitution means about what it says.76 Yet
73. See, e.g., Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 55, at 122. Martha Nussbaum noted
this recently almost in passing: “Textualists and their critics typically differ over how to find
the meaning of the constitutional text, not over its relevance.” Martha C. Nussbaum,
Foreword, Constitutions and Capabilities: “Perception” Against Lofty Formalism, 121
HARV. L. REV. 4, 58 n.210 (2007). Nussbaum has, however, overstated the role of
interpretation in constitutional adjudication.
74. LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 17, at 133; see also Ronald
Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1262 (1997) [hereinafter Dworkin, Arduous] (arguing that Justice
Scalia’s originalism is not faithful to the Constitution).
75. Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 55, at 122-23 (“I said, for example, that,
subject to the constraints of integrity which require judges to keep faith with past decisions,
‘The Constitution insists that our judges do their best collectively to construct, reinspect, and
revise, generation by generation, the skeleton of freedom and equality of concern that its
great clauses, in their majestic abstraction, command.’”).
76. Nevertheless, Justice Scalia accuses Tribe and Dworkin of misinterpretation and
Dworkin levels the same charge against Justice Scalia. Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at
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it is surely fair to acknowledge, as with respect to the closely
related argument from neutrality, that the apparent tension with
democracy is clear. There is something about a theory that claims
judges should be merely interpreting the constitutional text based
upon special expertise and a judicial demeanor that appears to
comport with the proper role of judicial review in a democracy.
Whether this promise can sustain the challenges from its critics,
we ought to begin by acknowledging the appeal of this theory.
If we analyze the theory and its intuitive appeal more
closely, we can identify several strands of the argument. First, the
model of adjudication—following the rule—is an intuitively
engaging account of how we are bound by legal rules. The appeal
of this model emerges if we look more generally at our ordinary
notions about the nature of following rules more generally. But
the model of rule following also emerges as more complex and
ultimately somewhat misleading. Wittgenstein explores the
psychological and theoretical elements in following rules in the
Philosophical Investigations.77 Wittgenstein’s analysis, although
controversial, is generally understood to defend rule following as
a social practice and to reject the claim that following a rule
begins with an interpretation of the rule.78 He rejects the common
assumption that we can understand how we follow rules
expressed by our language without understanding the behavior in
a social context.
The role of legal rules in adjudication presents a more
complex problem than the kinds of rule following that
Wittgenstein focuses upon. Most legal cases—at least most
appellate cases—present questions as to exactly how we are to
proceed under the relevant rule or rules. The cases may be

143 (“Professor Tribe’s methodology [of constitutional interpretation] and mine are poles
apart.”); Dworkin, Arduous, supra note 74, at 1262 (“Scalia wants to be seen to embrace
fidelity, but he ends by rejecting it.”). So too Tribe: “Let us . . . take Justice Scalia at his
word and assume that . . . he does indeed believe, as I do, that it is the text’s meaning . . . that
binds us as law.” Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 13, at 66.
77. See generally LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. reprt. 1986) (1953).
78. SAUL A. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE (1982);
G.P. BAKER & P.M.S. HACKER, SCEPTICISM, RULES & LANGUAGE vii-xiii (1984) (rejecting
Kripke’s reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s argument as developing and rebutting an account
of rule skepticism).
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described, at least in part, as presenting the question of how to
follow the relevant rule. That is, in a sense, the nature of a
question of law. Whether that question is helpfully viewed as a
semantic question or something else is central to Dworkin’s
theory of law. So if we are to invoke the notion that the judicial
mission is to determine how to follow a rule, we are going to have
to do so having acknowledged that we are operating in the
borderlands of the rules. Constitutional adjudication generally
arises when the parties disagree about how to follow the rule or
whether there is a rule.
The concepts of meaning, interpretation, and
constitutional reasoning tacitly adopted by originalism are more
complex and problematic than they—and many of their critics—
acknowledge.79 As a result, the premises for the debate are more
problematic than is generally acknowledged, too.
79.
LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 1; LeDuc, Interpretation and
Practical Reasoning, supra note 1. To the extent that the constitutional text ought to be read
performatively, along lines suggested by the pragmatics of Austin and Grice, the originalist
approach to constitutional meaning is inadequate. See LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning,
supra note 1, at 150-78. I have previously explored the apparent puzzle about the question
whether the Vice President may preside over her own impeachment trial and shown how a
performative and inferentialist analysis helps explain why she may not. See LeDuc,
Constitutional Meaning, supra note 1, at 152-53 (emphasizing the inferentialist
commitments inherent in the constitutional text); LeDuc, Interpretation and Practical
Reasoning, supra note 1, at 73 n.114 (emphasizing the performative dimension of the text).
Another example arises with respect to the limitation on the ability to amend Article I
to change the equal representation of each State in the Senate. Article V provides that such
representation may not be changed for a State without its express agreement. U.S. CONST.
art. V (“[N]o state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.”).
But, by the express terms of Article V, no amendment to the restrictive terms of Article V
itself require each State’s consent. Thus, according to the public understanding of the
linguistic meaning of the Constitution on its adoption, a two-step process could change the
undemocratic charter of the Senate. The first step would simply repeal the requirement of
consent, without actually stripping any state of its equal representation in the Senate. Again,
a performative analysis that recognizes what the restrictive provision of Article V was
doing—rather than merely what it was saying—demonstrates rather powerfully why such an
approach would be impermissible. (I think this example also highlights the fallacy of the
infinite regress argument made by Tribe and Dorf.) LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C.
DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 73-80 (1991) [hereinafter TRIBE & DORF,
READING] (arguing that determining the level of generality at which a constitutional
provision is to be applied requires interpretations relying upon premises outside the text); see
also Robert Brandom has also rejected of the problem of infinite regress. Robert B.
Brandom, A Hegelian Model of Legal Concept Determination: The Normative Fine Structure
of the Judges’ Chain Novel, in PRAGMATISM, LAW, AND LANGUAGE 19, 21–22 (Graham
Hubbs & Douglas Lind eds., 2014) [hereinafter Brandom, Hegelian Model] (expressly
invoking Lewis Carroll’s logic fable of Achilles and the Tortoise to deny that a legal rule
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Second, there is a very important strand of political theory
to the originalist claim. Because of the enormous direct power
accorded judges over particular persons in the particular context
of their lawsuits, we are anxious to cabin and constrain that
power. That implicit concern with power, and with its potential
abuse, is one of the sources of originalism’s appeal. If we can
assimilate the judge’s role to that of an honest umpire, in Chief
Justice Roberts’s formulation,80 we have denied her the authority
to do more. The model of rules appears to offer a path to do so.
Appellate judges simply resolve disagreements about what the
rules are or how they apply in particular cases.
Third, related to the second consideration with respect to
the requirement that judicial power be legitimate, is the collateral
needs an interpretation before it can be applied); LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra
note 18, at 320–22.
80. “Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them.”
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the
United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of
John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be C.J. of the United States). Implicit and important in this
metaphor, but unarticulated or acknowledged is the premise that there is a fact of the matter
with respect to what the rules of the game are. On this matter, the judge confronts the rules
of the game with an internal point of view, but passively, accepting the rules as they are
without regard to whether they make sense, or are defensible. I explore both why the notion
that there is a fact of the matter with respect to propositions of constitutional law is an initially
seductive notion of what makes propositions of constitutional law defensible or, in other
terms, true, as well as why it is a misleading approach to the performative texts of the
Constitution in three companion articles. See generally LeDuc, Ontological Foundations,
supra note 18; LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 12; LeDuc, Constitutional
Meaning, supra note 1. Leading defenders of contemporary accounts of constitutional claims
as true and what makes them so, like Christopher Green, seem to take the truth value of
authoritative propositions of constitutional law as so obvious as not to need any defense.
Christopher R. Green, Constitutional Truthmakers, 32 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y (forthcoming 2018) (available at https:// papers.ssrn.com / sol3/ papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2901157 [https://perma.cc/SEB8-H67X]) [hereinafter Green, Truthmakers]
(devoting an entire article to the competing accounts of the truthmakers for propositions of
constitutional law without addressing the question whether any such truthmakers exist). That
is a surprising omission, in the light of the philosophical and constitutional literature that has
called that premise into doubt. Bob Brandom’s formulation of the distinction between our
pure and practical reason is perhaps most helpful. That is, we make propositions of
constitutional law true (to the extent that’s a helpful notion) rather than take them as true.
This formulation probably best captures the fundamental thrust of the alternative to a
representational theory of constitutional texts that accounts for the truth of constitutional
texts by their correspondence with facts about the Constitution-in-the-world.
For my more complete analysis of the tacit and express use of political philosophy in
the originalism debate and my assessment that political philosophy cannot provide the
Archimedean stance from which to resolve the debate see LeDuc, Fruitless Quest, supra note
68.
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concern that, in our Republic, the power to make laws is vested in
our democratically-elected representatives. Any lawmaking by
the judiciary would appear to challenge this premise of our
democracy. This, of course, is the celebrated countermajoritarian
difficulty;81 courts appear undemocratic, perhaps even
antidemocratic, as and to the extent that they strike down
otherwise properly enacted democratically enacted laws.
The critics’ responses to this democracy-preserving
defense of originalism are made in stronger and weaker forms.
The strong form challenges the notion that texts have meanings
independent of readers and interpretive communities.82 This
skeptical challenge is most clearly associated with the Critical
Legal Theorists83 and with Stanley Fish.84 These radical,
skeptical arguments may be rebutted a number of ways.85 More
powerful is a weaker form of the challenge to original meanings.
The weaker form of the challenge to originalist claim to rely upon
original meaning simply denies that the meaning of the provisions
answers the concrete questions of modern times.86 Even
committed originalists sometimes make this argument.87 All that
I want to reiterate here is that those challenges to the implicit
premise of a self-interpreting Constitution and the claim of an
81. BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS, supra note 8, at 16-17.
82. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519,
519-21 (2003).
83. See generally Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100
YALE L.J. 1515 (1991); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement,
96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983).
84. See generally STANLEY FISH, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law
and Literature, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 87 (1989) [hereinafter FISH, Chain
Gang; DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY]; STANLEY FISH, Wrong Again, in DOING WHAT
COMES NATURALLY, supra, at 103 [hereinafter FISH, Wrong Again].
85.
See DENNIS J. PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 99-127 (1996) [hereinafter
PATTERSON, TRUTH] (arguing that the interpersonal social world is constructed not by
interpretation but by shared understanding of social practice); see also Martha Nussbaum,
Sophistry About Conventions, 17 NEW LITERARY HIST. 129, 129-30 (1985) reprinted in
LOVE’S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 220, 220-211 (1990)
[hereinafter Nussbaum, Sophistry] (arguing that Fish’s radical skepticism is sophistical
because the truth of what we say matters, even if we reject realism).
86. See, e.g., Dworkin, Arduous, supra note 49.
87. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 420 n.3 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“The Court suggests that something like this might have occurred in 1791, but
this would have required either a gigantic coach, a very tiny constable, or both—not to
mention a constable with incredible fortitude and patience.”).
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unambiguous statement of abstract provisions are powerful
objections, even if not as dispositive as their proponents might
sometimes suggest.88 In the face of those criticisms, the
originalists’ appeal to the meaning of the Constitution, without
more, probably fails.

2. The Authority of the Constitution
An implicit premise of the argument from democracy is
that the Constitution, as a text, has an authoritative status by virtue
of actions taken by white males, generally of Northern European
extraction, in the eighteenth century.89 That limited class
comprised the relevant political actors. Their actions in revolting
against England in the 1770’s and then overthrowing the Articles
of Confederation of the thirteen states90 are now, still, binding
upon all American citizens and residents. How does that work?
One model of explanation often employed is the model of laws.
Properly adopted laws under the federal and the states’
constitutions are binding laws. The Constitution proposed, and
ratified by its own terms, may appear to be binding in a similar
way. But how is such a constitution distinguished from the
possible constitutions of otherwise non-authoritative groups, such
as the posse comitatus?

88. See infra Section II.C; see also Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 40
(asserting, without argument, his claim as to the inherent conservative mission of
constitutions).
89. See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 171-76; Baude, Our Law?, supra
note 37, at 2352.
90. Under the Articles of Confederation, the mission of the Philadelphia convention
in 1787 was only to propose amendments to the Articles of Confederation. The convention
far exceeded its authority, effectively overthrowing the Confederation established under the
Articles of Confederation. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:
A BIOGRAPHY 29-38 (2005) [hereinafter AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION]; MICHAEL J.
KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
(2016); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at
471-75 (new ed. 1998) (describing a “Federalist revolution”). Thus, the original legitimacy
and force of law of the Constitution cannot be explained easily in terms of conformity with
then existing positive law, a point that appears to go unaddressed by Bork and Justice Scalia.
Tribe explores the source of the legitimacy of the Constitution. His argument, of course, is
that the legitimacy of the Constitution is a clear demonstration of the powerful “dark matter”
of the invisible Constitution. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 6-7,
149-51 (2008) [hereinafter TRIBE, INVISIBLE].
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Bork acknowledged the criticism that the Constitution,
adopted by our forefathers—or at least, some of our white
forefathers—cannot bind citizens of a heterogeneous democracy
today, and, in his customary style, purports to address it head on.91
He suggested that the argument questioning the legitimacy of the
Constitution is confined by its proponents to the provisions
guaranteeing rights.92 Second—and the relationship of these two
restatements is not clear—the objection challenging the
Constitution may be restated as a claim that judges may go
beyond the text of the Constitution in creating rights, because of
the limitations on the democratic process inherent in the
Constitution’s formation.93 Once the argument for expanded
judicial powers was so reformulated, Bork offered the reply that
alleged defects in the Constitution’s formation cannot ground an
anti-majoritarian defense of judicial activism.94 The power of the
judiciary, created by the Constitution, to strike down otherwise
legitimate laws, cannot be expanded by flaws in the adoption of
the constituting authority. Thus, for Bork, the challenge based on
the provenance of the Constitution was seemingly beside the
point. The failure to define a broader spectrum of protected rights
entitled to constitutional protection could not justify a court
striking down otherwise duly enacted statutes to protect other
rights not protected by the dead white men’s Constitution. Thus,
Bork concludes, the attack on the legitimacy of the Constitution
cannot be an argument for greater judicial authority (under that
Constitution) nor for judicial activism.

91. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 170-76.
92. Id. at 170. Bork’s claim was both too broad, and too narrow. It was too broad
because many rights in the Constitution are uncontroversial. No one is today much
concerned about the Third Amendment—prohibiting the quartering of troops in private
homes—notwithstanding its provenance. That could change in time, of course. Nor,
contrary to Bork’s implicit suggestion, is the controversy limited to the need for greater reach
for the rights assured by the Constitution. The Second Amendment assuring the right to bear
arms has long been a bête noir of liberals. See generally Sanford Levinson, Comment, The
Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989) [hereinafter Levinson,
Embarrassing Second Amendment]. So the formulation is too narrow, too.
93. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 172-75; Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism
in Practice, 87 IND. L.J. 1183, 1230 (2012). But see AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION,
supra note 90, at 15-19 (arguing that the process of ratification of the Constitution was
democratic to an unprecedented degree at that time).
94. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 170-76.
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While Bork appears right to deny that the assault on the
provenance of the Constitution cannot expand the powers of the
judiciary under that same Constitution, it would also appear that
Bork and his critics have failed to engage. The claim of the critics
of the Constitution ought not—at least under the principle of
charity—be construed as one that the Constitution is invalid or
illegitimate, but rather as a claim that the validity of the
Constitution as a source of law, and the legitimacy of that law,
derive from something more than the historical events of the late
18th century along the east coast of the United States. The
emphasis upon the limitations of that historical process and its
distance from the present merely serves to lay the foundation for
an inquiry into the rest of the story of how we are today to
interpret and apply the Constitution. The claim that the historical
origin of the Constitution is insufficient to explain how it applies
today as a source of legal obligation can be restated abstractly as
an example of the claim that no text can be self-interpreting. Each
text must be interpreted within the context of linguistic and, often,
other social practices.
We can acknowledge these claims without committing
ourselves to the strong claims made about reading and
interpretation by some.95 Once we do acknowledge that a text
cannot be self-interpreting, or, indeed, self-referential in any
controlling way, we understand why the authority of the
Constitution is fundamentally different than the authority of a law
enacted in conformity with the Constitution. A corollary of this
difference explains why the sanctions for violating the
Constitution are different from the sanctions for violating other
laws. As important as the force of the Constitution is, it
nevertheless implicates fundamental choices in our democratic
republic. Imposing individual sanctions, whether criminal or
civil, would potentially constrain the expression of views and the
making of political decisions and thereby impair the robust
95. Some critics have argued that texts are fundamentally empty and that all meaning
is brought to them by their readers and interpreters. That claim has achieved a certain
currency, in certain circles, but has not played a prominent role in the debate over
originalism. For leading commentary on an important element of the interpretation
controversy, see Fish, Chain Gang, supra note 84, at 87; Fish, Wrong Again, supra note 84,
at 103; Ronald Dworkin, On Interpretation and Objectivity, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE,
supra note 13, at 167 (1985); Nussbaum, Sophistry, supra note 85.
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democratic political life contemplated and intended by the
Constitution.
That historical story leads, on the best account of the
critics of originalism, to an account of the social practices
surrounding the Constitution; our government officials’ pledges
to maintain and defend it, our veneration of it within the
community, and, far from least, our practice of construing it and
interpreting it, in the courts and in the academy.96 When we look
at how those practices contribute to the force of the Constitution
we are necessarily looking beyond the four corners of the text.
That, I take it, is the better interpretation of the criticism of the
origin of the Constitution, not the reconstruction offered by Bork.
That better interpretation is not adequately rebutted by Bork’s
arguments.

3. The Place of Constitutional Practice in a
Democracy
Bobbitt argues that the existence of our constitutional
practices establishes the legitimacy of judicial review.97 If that is
96.
The classic account of this practice-based anti-foundationalist analysis is
BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17; see also LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note
12 (developing Bobbitt’s analysis in the context of the originalism debate).
97. BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17, at xix n.1. Bobbitt’s modalities, and the role that
he ascribes to them, have often been misunderstood. Bobbitt himself describes the reader
who thought the subtitle of the work ought to have been “Theories of the Constitution,” not
understanding Bobbitt’s notion that it is the very articulation and argument with and through
these theories that gives meaning to the Constitution and legitimates judicial review; no one
of these theories can itself be dominant and the modes themselves are incommensurable—
there is no formula for when a prudential argument trumps a structural or historical argument.
Thus, Bobbitt’s theory is a meta-theory of how these constitutional theories legitimate the
practice of judicial review. See PHILIP C. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION xi
(1991) [hereinafter BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION]. In his first statement of those modes, their
logical status was not made nearly so clear as in his later work. Compare BOBBITT, FATE,
supra note 17, at 10-11 with BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra, at 11-22. Thus, he did not
generally characterize the type of arguments as modes, instead terming them types or
archetypes. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra, at 7-8. Bobbitt’s presentation and style was
clearly considered; much like Wittgenstein, Bobbitt was committed to showing, rather than
stating, his claims. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 77, §§ 198-240. Bobbitt’s admiration
for Wittgenstein expressed itself in the choice of publisher for Constitutional Interpretation.
BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra, at xi. The pedagogical or therapeutic foundation for this
choice would appear to be that describing the richness of constitutional argument and
discourse more accurately than merely characterizing that discourse. Moreover, as therapy,
the goal was to induce the reader to experience the grip of the modes of argument. There is,
especially in Constitutional Fate, a very Wittgensteinian presentation. Even many of

2018

ORIGINALISM’S CLAIMS

1035

true, then there is no countermajoritarian problem, and no
reconciliation of judicial review with democracy required. Has
Bobbitt successfully rebutted to claim that originalism is
necessary to rebut the countermajoritarian challenge? According
to Bobbitt, there cannot be an argument for the primacy or
exclusiveness of the historical mode, the doctrinal mode, the
prudential mode, or any of the other three modes. The
deployment of such arguments by the courts—and their
acceptance by the citizens of the republic and the professorial
commentariat—establish their legitimacy and legitimating
function and power. Such an argument as to how we ought to
interpret the Constitution has no force in the context of an inquiry
into how we do interpret the Constitution. Bobbitt’s novel claim
is that the Constitution is how we interpret and apply it. The
aspiration to a radical, Archimedean critique of our practice is
illusory. From this perspective, two insights emerge. First,
because judicial review is a central part of our practice of
constitutional construction—a keel, not a plank, in Neurath’s
boat,98 it needs little, if any, defense. Its defense and legitimation
arises from its pride of place in our constitutional practice. From
this perspective, Bobbitt’s claim to have legitimated judicial
review appears at least plausible.99 Second, given how radical an
approach to constitutional interpretation Bobbitt is proposing, it
is hardly surprising that his claims have largely been ignored or
misunderstood. Nevertheless, to the extent he has a strong
argument to have disarmed Bickel’s countermajoritarian
challenge, he has eliminated one of the classic best arguments for

Bobbitt’s astute and sophisticated readers did not get the point. See, e.g., Patrick O.
Gudridge, False Peace and Constitutional Tradition, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1969 (1983)
(reviewing BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17); see also Mark Tushnet, Justification in
Constitutional Adjudication: A Comment on Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L. REV.
1707, 1707 (1994) (pessimistically predicting that “the insights in [Bobbitt’s] work are likely
to be ignored or transformed by the larger scholarly community”).
98. See WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 3 (1960) (citing Otto
Neurath’s holistic metaphor of science as a boat at sea that can only be rebuilt in stages if it
is to remain afloat and extending that metaphor to ordinary talk and knowledge of the world).
99. Bobbitt’s rejection of doubts about judicial review—in our constitutional world—
thus parallels modern philosophy’s rejection of radical Cartesian doubt as untenable and
misguided—quite intentionally, I suspect.
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originalism. Because of the radical nature of this challenge and
because I have explored it elsewhere, I will put it aside here.100

4. Conclusion
Returning, then, to the claim that originalism is the only
theory of interpretation that is compatible with constitutional
democracy, it would appear that such a claim is implicitly
premised on a claim that the Constitution derives its legitimacy
solely from historical events and its text. Missing, however, is an
account of the political theory that underlies this premise.101 In
the absence of such an account, originalism cannot refute theories
of the Constitution that explain its legitimacy on a different
political theoretical account.
Originalism must therefore
necessarily import sources beyond the text itself, and do so
consistently with our republican democracy. If originalism is the
theory of interpretation most consistent with, or perhaps, the only
theory consistent with, democracy, that claim has yet to be made
persuasively.
The New Originalists sometimes suggest that their
arguments from positivism and from the nature of language and
interpretation are independent of arguments like the argument
from democracy of classical originalism. They can therefore
claim indifference to the power of the argument from democracy.
But to the extent that the New Originalists abandon the
rhetorically powerful classical argument from democracy in favor
100. See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 12; LeDuc,
Fruitless Quest, supra note 68. The problem of judicial review continues to be thought of as
a live question in constitutional theory, of course. See Waldron, supra note 17; TARA SMITH,
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AN OBJECTIVE LEGAL SYSTEM (2015) [hereinafter SMITH, JUDICIAL
REVIEW] (defending judicial review on an analysis derived from Ayn Rand’s libertarian
theory). The arguments made in that literature are not made from within our constitutional
decisional process, however. They are made as a matter of political philosophy. Moreover,
the premises expressly adopted by Waldron, at least, in making his criticism would be
potentially problematic for some of the proponents of judicial review. In any case, I think
philosophical arguments will be inadequate to reverse Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137
(1803) and that resilience ought perhaps to be explored by the philosophical critics of judicial
review. See LeDuc, Relationship of Constitutional Law to Philosophy, supra note 51.
101. See generally LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism, supra note 54 (exploring the
surprising little importance of the distinction between positive and natural law theories in the
debate); LeDuc, Fruitless Quest, supra note 68 (arguing that the efforts of the protagonists
to employ arguments from political philosophy to win the originalism debate have been, and
will remain, fruitless).
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of arcane arguments about linguistic philosophy, some of the
political power of originalism’s appeal is forfeit.
More fundamentally, critics who argue (as do I) that our
existing constitutional practice is prior to our theoretical accounts
of that practice, easily dismiss the argument from democracy.
Our democracy has fit remarkably comfortably with our practices
of constitutional argument and adjudication. In making that
claim, I do not mean to make a strong, normative claim about the
quality of our democracy, either with respect to the power or
equitable allocation of the franchise or the presence of corrupting
elements in our democracy. I instead mean only to assert that the
Republic has not faced serious constitutional crises over the
Court’s practice of constitutional decision.
The lack of resolution or even progress with respect to the
debate over originalism’s claim from democracy reflects the
failure of the protagonists to work through and make express the
premises of their argument. There are likely inherent puzzles in
the concept of democracy to which appeal is made.102 For
example, it appears unlikely that originalists would view the
democratic election of judges as responding to the
countermajoritarian problem, but it is unclear why such a change
would not solve the problem. My focus has instead been on the
gaps in the premises about the Constitution and its import that
figure in the arguments from democracy. Those gaps and
ambiguities prevent the goal of assuring democratic choice in the
Republic from translating into a conclusion as to the way the
courts should approach the Constitution in adjudication.

B. The Promise of Neutrality
Originalism also claims to offer a neutral method of
constitutional jurisprudence.103 The neutrality to be sought is
102. POSNER, LAW AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 56, at 130-57 (describing the
ambiguities inherent in different concepts of democracy).
103. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1184-85 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Rules]; Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 57, at 1-8.
New Originalists like Larry Solum do not employ the older terminology of neutrality but
emphasize much the same concept when they make the constraint thesis a central tenet of
originalism and assert that originalists are committed to the consistency of their interpretation
with the original meaning of the adopted text. See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and
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usually an absence of bias that might otherwise arise from the
particular moral or political views of the judge applying and
interpreting the constitutional law and deciding the constitutional
case at bar.104 As in our ordinary usage, neutrality is generally
understood contextually, in reference to other, generally
adversarial, or competing or alternative, persons or things.105
Neutrality is often contraposed against partiality or partisanship.
Understanding the claims made for neutrality also requires
understanding the relationship between neutrality and objectivity.
Neutrality requires acting without reference to subjective
preference.106
Bork may have made the strongest statement of the
neutrality thesis, but he was not alone in making that claim for
originalism.107 Noting that neutral application of legal principles
has long been identified as a good, Bork asserted that such
neutrality is not sufficient and that the principles themselves must
also be neutral in their derivation and in their definition.108 “The
philosophy of original understanding is capable of supplying
neutrality in all three respects—in deriving, defining, and
applying principle.”109 In this section I want to address three
elements of this claim. First, I will argue that the nature of the
neutrality that originalism claims to offer is not well defined and
that the resulting debate is confused. Second, I argue that the
contrast between the promised neutrality and the alternative of
unfettered judicial discretion that originalism seeks to foreclose is
an illusory dualism. Some of Robert Brandom’s insights are
Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 461-62 (2013) [hereinafter Solum,
Constitutional Construction]. With consistency to the original meaning, as with neutrality,
the discretion of the constitutional judge is cabined.
104. See Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 46.
105. Thus, in international relations, we speak of nations being neutral as between
warring countries and in our intellectual discourse we speak of being neutral as between
competing theories or claims.
106.
See Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 46 (criticizing non-originalist
approaches to constitutional interpretation and decision and concluding that “it is up for each
judge to decide for himself (under no standard I can discern . . .)”).
107. Scalia, Rules, supra note 103, at 1183-85; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The
Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Lesser Evil].
108. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 146; Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note
57, at 7.
109. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 146. Bork apparently first articulated this
trinity of neutrality in 1971 in Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 57, at 7.
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particularly helpful,110 along with Bobbitt’s pluralist modal
account of constitutional argument. We can (and do) have
constraints within our constitutional decisional practice without
either eliminating the power and freedom that judges have—or
their need for judgment. Third, and finally, I argue that the
promise of neutrality cannot be delivered by an originalism that
also preserves non-originalist precedent. But I will also show that
the criticisms leveled against originalism often misunderstand the
nature of constitutional argument and decision. They often
exaggerate the role—and the power—of constitutional theory.

1. The Meaning of Neutrality
Neutrality has long been sought in constitutional
interpretation.111 Herbert Wechsler sharpened our focus on its
importance in the aftermath of Brown.112 It has been less often
defined with precision, perhaps in part because it appears such an
ordinary, commonsensical notion.113 It is seductively simple, we
think, like the related concept of equality.114 The desideratum of
neutrality is, generally, expressly or implicitly contrasted with the
expression of personal preferences and occasionally with policy

110. See generally Brandom, Hegelian Model, supra note 79 (highlighting, in
Hegelian terms, the interrelationship of authority and responsibility in adjudication).
111. See, e.g., BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS, supra note 8, at 49-65 (acknowledging
the limitations of neutral principles in the resolution of difficult political issues); ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 59, at 54-55; see generally LeDuc, Interpretation
and Practical Reasoning, supra note 1 (arguing that the role accorded interpretation and the
formal account of constitutional reasoning is inadequate as a description of our constitutional
law decisional practice). Express critics, outside the Critical Legal Studies movement, are
relatively few. See, e.g., Tushnet, Following the Rules, supra note 24, at 804-06 (arguing
that liberalism’s commitment to individual autonomy ensures disparate sources of
constitutional meaning and precludes the existence of neutral principles of constitutional
law).
112. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 7 (1959) [hereinafter Wechsler, Neutral Principles].
113. The apparent simplicity of the concept of neutrality is at best exaggerated. See
Tushnet, Following the Rules, supra note 24, at 804-05 (arguing that the requirements for
the construction of linguistic meaning are inconsistent with the liberal principles grounding
the claims for the value neutrality of constitutional law).
114. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-78 (1977)
[hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING] (distinguishing treating persons equally and treating them
as equals).
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judgments.115
Understanding Bork’s claim requires
understanding the concept of neutrality and the related concepts
of derivation, definition, and application.
Neutrality for Bork was Kantian; it was to treat all like
cases alike116—that is, to apply principles “to all cases that may
fairly be said to fall within them.”117 “Fairly” may carry a great
deal of weight. But its meaning is never articulated. It may
import the standards of the community of language users, and the
standards they would acknowledge. Or it may be seeking to
articulate a purportedly more objective standard; that is, what
really, truly would be fair. The choice of verb may be inartful.
Or it may be acknowledging the uncertainty. That which only
“may” be said to be fair, may also not be fair—or merely said to
be unfair. “Fairly” might acknowledge that inclusion within a
rule is not a mechanical phenomenon. That is, whether a rule or
a principle applies to a particular case is not necessarily a given,
not a matter merely of “looking.” (Whether that means the rule
needs an interpretation,118 or whether the concept of following a
rule can admit of uncertainty,119 and, if so, how,120 probably does
not need to delay us.) Once that uncertainty is recognized,
however, Bork needed to explain how it was to be resolved and,
115. Thus, for example, in writing about such non-neutral decision making, Justice
Scalia proclaimed:
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments says
that no person shall be deprived of life without due process of law . . . .
No matter. Under The Living Constitution the death penalty may have
become unconstitutional. And it is up to each Justice to decide for
himself (under no standard I can discern) when that occurs.
Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 46.
116. See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 44, 45
(Robert Paul Wolf ed., Lewis White Beck trans., 1969) (1785) (arguing that ethical principles
must be universally applicable); see also Paul Dietrichson, Kant’s Criteria of
Universalizability, in KANT, supra, at 163.
117. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 146.
118. For a discussion of this question see WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 77, §§ 198-240.
While Wittgenstein’s remarks on following a rule are far from direct and straightforward
(and have been, as noted below, very controversial), Wittgenstein appears to be challenging
the paired positions that (1) the application of a rule is premised upon the prior interpretation
of that rule and (2) when a rule is unclear in its application that uncertainty can be removed
by articulating a fuller or more precise interpretation of that rule.
119. Id. See generally LeDuc, Interpretation and Practical Reasoning, supra note 1
(denying that a rule must be first interpreted before it can be applied).
120. Id. The interpretation of Wittgenstein’s comments has been controversial.
Compare KRIPKE, supra note 78, with BAKER & HACKER, supra note 78, at viii.
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in particular, how it was to be resolved without involving judicial
discretion. It is also possible that I am reading Bork too closely
here. He may simply have meant that we know how to work with
a principle when we encounter it. But that practical account
would strip the concept of neutral principles of the apparent force
to play the jurisprudential role Bork sought.
Bork invoked the concept of neutrality, and used it,
without adequately explaining and defending it. A claim to
neutrality is admittedly an engaging and intuitive position, of
course, especially in the case of adjudication. We expect our
judges to be disinterested and neutral between the parties.
Moreover, at least intuitively, we often know whether a principle
covers a case, and we also often know when it would be unfair to
claim that a principle covers a particular case. But that is not
enough to ground a claim to neutrality in general, or neutrality in
interpretation in particular, in the conceptual content of the neutral
principle. Those understandings might simply be rooted in a
mastery of a shared practice, of knowing how to go on in the
relevant circumstance.121
Bork needed an account that showed that the source of the
neutral application is in the conceptual content or linguistic
meaning of the neutral principle. It is not enough to be neutral;
the interpretation and decision must follow the original
understanding. He also likely needed to account for the hard case
where the application of the principle to the particular case is not
so obvious.122 Bork needed his account to have that explanatory
force because many constitutional controversies arise from such
hard cases. Moreover, he needed to defend the position that such
application, even in the hard cases, could be established as
neutral.
Finally, he needed such a case to rebut those theorists, like
Hart and Dworkin, who believe we need a theory or an
interpretation of the principle in order to know whether and how
121. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 77, §§ 198-240.
122. See DWORKIN, TAKING, supra note 114, at 81 (arguing that each legal question
has a unique answer). Even without endorsing Dworkin’s theory, it does seem that if Bork
asserted that constitutional principles figure in constitutional interpretation and decision, he
needed to explain how with some precision, since the text of the Constitution does not appear
to state principles expressly.
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to apply it in such hard cases. That, of course, is just what Bork
wanted to, and did, deny.123 But what tells us how to apply the
principle neutrally? We begin to ask questions that sound as if
they came from the interlocutor of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical
Investigations.124 These questions do not have apparent or
satisfying answers. The promise of Bork’s neutrality remains
unarticulated and ultimately unfulfilled. Bork’s claim that the
application of a principle can be explained by some feature of
neutrality in the principle is misleading. Principles—as shorthand
for the conclusion of constitutional arguments (by no means
necessarily deductive or syllogistic in form)—are compelling
because of the content and nature of the underlying argument.
Debating an account of constitutional decision that emphasizes
formulation and application of principles is misleading and
unhelpful—for the originalists and for their critics.
The neutral derivation of principle is another concept
Bork invoked, and used, without much explanation.125 He
appears to have assumed that principles may be found in the
Constitution, and that such finding constitutes a derivation.126
That is problematic because the Constitution comprises
provisions, not principles.127 How do provisions yield principles?
Bork did not offer much explanation, but we might conclude that
provisions yield principles by a variety of kinds of reasoning,
including analysis and synthesis. Together those methods provide
the articulation of the force of provisions. That approach may
capture the inferential content of the constitutional text, but it does
not capture the performative content of the text. When we think
of the pragmatics of performative content, the usual logic of
declarative utterances and texts is not very helpful.
123. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 251-57 (mocking the state of modern
moral philosophy and dismissing such philosophical theory and argument as a source of
constitutional law); Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 45 (same).
124. Thus, for example, the complex and controversial discussion of following rules:
“Then am I defining ‘order’ and ‘rule’ by means of ‘regularity’?—How do I explain the
meaning of ‘regular[,]’ ‘uniform[,]’ ‘same’ to anyone?” WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 77, §
208. “But do you really explain to the other person what you yourself understand? Don’t
you get him to guess the essential thing?” Id. § 210. “How am I able to obey a rule?” Id. §
217.
125. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 143-47.
126. Id. at 146.
127. Id. at 150.
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One potentially dramatic example of the derivation of
constitutional principle can be seen in Griswold v. Connecticut.128
In that case, Justice Douglas analyzed the First Amendment,
Fourth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment to identify and
extract the principle of a right to privacy, protected from the
interference of the governments, state and federal.129 The
principle, once constructed from the “penumbras” formed by
“emanations” of the specific provisions, was deployed with
independent force to protect the activities of Doctor Griswold.130
Justice Douglas’s opinion captures the non-deductive methods of
constitutional argument.131 Yet Griswold, for Bork, was an
example of improper constitutional interpretation.132 He did not
expressly object to the tools employed in constructing the
argument. His objection was that this derivation of principle fails
the neutrality standard because it tacitly privileges sexual freedom
over other freedoms.133 But Justice Douglas’s opinion also ranges
far from the linguistic meaning of the constitutional text.
Other examples in which more expansive principles were
derived from narrower provisions raise the question why Bork
thought he needed principles and what role they play in an
originalist theory of interpretation. For example, Bork was
comfortable extending the protections of the Fourth Amendment
against new technology and the protections of the First
Amendment for new technologies like television and radio. The
extension of the Fourth Amendment to new techniques of
electronic surveillance was not automatic or free from difficulty.
Indeed, when the Supreme Court first considered electronic
surveillance, it sought to analyze the Fourth Amendment issues in
terms of physical intervention.134 Only in 1967, in Katz v. United

128. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
129. Id. at 482-85.
130. Id. at 484.
131. See LeDuc, Interpretation and Practical Reasoning, supra note 1.
132. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 95-100, 257-59.
133. Id. at 258-59.
134. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (warrantless wiretap of
bootlegger’s telephone did not violate Fourth Amendment because there was no search or
seizure of a material thing). Brandeis’s dissent, emphasizing the protection of privacy
interests in light of changing conditions and purposes, was rejected by the Court. See id. at
471-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Instead, the Court adopted a common law analysis,
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States,135 did the Supreme Court formally recognize that the
Fourth Amendment was about persons, not places or things.
Accordingly, with Katz electronic surveillance was brought
within the ambit of the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment.
Even with hindsight, we can understand why a physical
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of
warrantless searches and seizures was not an obvious wrong turn.
Grounding the protection of the Fourth Amendment on the
established tort law concepts would provide a clarity and certainty
that alternative approaches would not obviously provide, or, at the
least, provide immediately. Moreover, Justice Brandeis’s dissent
would have extended the protection of the Fourth Amendment on
the basis of a theory that privileges the right of privacy.
Originalists like Bork could perhaps endorse that approach to the
extent that it finds and applies a neutral principle found in the
constitutional text. But the principle so derived would perhaps
fail the test of neutrality because it privileges expectations of
privacy over other expectations.136 If the principle passes the
neutrality test then it may be a permissible source of new law in
the face of new technologies. Originalism would not endorse
change arising from evolving purposes or the application of nonneutral principles–-that would make ours a living Constitution.137
More fundamentally, the creation of a principle as a matter
of originalist constitutional interpretation would appear to raise
its own fundamental questions.138 After all, the meaning of the
words of the provisions themselves would seem to require no

focusing upon the absence of a physical invasion of the defendants’ property or a physical
taking of their property. Id. at 466.
135. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
136. To the extent such a principle privileges privacy it would appear vulnerable to
Bork’s objection to Griswold that it improperly privileges sexual freedom over other
freedoms. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 258-59.
137. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-13 (2012) (adopting an originalist
approach to the Fourth Amendment that purported to return to the requirement of tortious
trespass); see generally infra Section II.D.
138. See LeDuc, Interpretation and Practical Reasoning, supra note 1, at 106
(describing the complexities inherent in Justice Scalia’s casual characterization of the
express language of the First Amendment as a “sort of” synecdoche and the role of that
characterization in his account of constitutional interpretation and reasoning). Justice
Scalia’s easy invocation of synecdoches and principles is all the more puzzling because of
his criticism of common law methods of judicial decision.
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principles for interpretation.139 If the task of interpretation is to
determine the import of the meaning of the specific words of a
specific provision, then a digression into the articulation of
unexpressed principles would appear misguided. Indeed, from
Bork’s originalist perspective it might appear that the originalist
Occam’s razor would dispatch the excrescence of principle.
Bork, after all, wanted to distinguish very clearly between the
Supreme Court’s decisional constitutional jurisprudence and the
constitutional text.140 Once derivative principles are recognized
as authoritative, it is a small step to acknowledging precedent.
The text of the Constitution is its provisions which, by their
express terms, do not state principles.141 So the place of derived
principle in an originalist constitutional jurisprudence is not so
simple as initially appears.
It may be that the principle to be extracted from the
Constitution arises out of its structure or its architecture. But it is
seemingly a small step from such a derivation to the forbidden
territory of penumbra and emanations142 and unenumerated
rights. It is simply not clear what principle beyond the literal text
of the Constitution that Bork would have wanted to derive.
One possible reconciliation of Bork’s concept of the
derivation of principle with his originalism is to read the notion
of derivation narrowly. If derivation means no more than to find
the principle stated expressly in a constitutional provision, it may
be possible to identify a role for principle to play in Borkinian
jurisprudence. Thus, for example, the First Amendment may be
described as stating the principle of free speech or the principle of
freedom of expression.143 So clarified, derivation would be no
more than the restatement of the imperatives of the Constitution
into declaratives that can figure as the major premise of a
139. Dictionaries, after all, generally define words; they do not state principles first
to provide the foundation or theory underlying the definitions. Accounts of linguistic
meaning do not begin with interpretations of words or sentences.
140. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 69 (characterizing the Warren Court as
standing “first and alone as a legislator of policy”).
141. Originalists like Robert Bork somehow seem to assume that the provisions do
state principles that are naturally part of the decisional law. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra
note 6, at 146. An inferentialist account of the constitutional texts would support such a
conclusion, but the inferentialist approach is not part of the originalist canon.
142. Id. at 97.
143. See id. at 147-48.
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syllogism or other argument. Justice Scalia appears to take the
formulation of constitutional principles in just this way, finding
the principles of the Constitution stated in the Constitution.
I . . . believe that the Eighth Amendment is no mere
“concrete and dated rule” but rather an abstract principle. If
I did not hold this belief, I would not be able to apply the
Eighth Amendment (as I assuredly do) to all sorts of tortures
quite unknown at the time the Eighth Amendment was
adopted.144

On this interpretation, the principle derived from the Eighth
Amendment is that cruel and unusual punishments are prohibited.
While we may quibble with characterizing that principle as
derived from the Eighth Amendment (there’s not much to the
derivation) it is a use of principle that fits with the originalist
methodology.
But Bork endows the derivation of principle with more
import and power than this description provides. The derivation
of principle extends the express linguistic meaning of the
constitutional text; it can also excise provisions of the
Constitution that would otherwise appear to have substantial
import.145 Thus, the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First
Amendment can be extended without hesitation to the electronic
media,146 and the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment can be
extended to preclude warrantless wiretaps.147 The principleconstructing power that Bork sometimes claims goes far beyond
those types of instances, however.148 In interpreting the First
Amendment, Bork looks first to the text and history of the

144. Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 145.
145. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 166.
146. Id. at 168.
147. Id. at 169-70.
148. We are, then, forced to construct our own theory of the constitutional
protection of speech. We cannot solve our problems simply by reference to
the text or to its history. But we are not without materials for building. The
first amendment indicates that there is something special about speech. We
would know that much even without a first amendment . . . . Freedom for
political speech could and should be inferred even if there were no first
amendment.
Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 57, at 22-23.
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provision.149 Finding little guidance,150 he then looks to what he
refers to as “the entire structure of the Constitution.”151 That
structure creates a representative democracy, “a form of
government that would be meaningless without freedom to
discuss government and its policies.”152 It is on this foundation
that Bork constructed a First Amendment theory powerful in its
protection but narrow in its scope.153
For all of the rhetoric of original understandings and
expectations with respect to the constitutional text, the method of
neutral principle took Bork very far from that underlying text.
The power of that method of deriving and applying principles
from the text explains why the need to constrain the method by
the requirement of neutrality. Whatever other questions might be
raised as to Bork’s description of following the original semantic
or linguistic understandings, the purported channeling of the
derivation and application of constitutional principles with a
requirement of neutrality seems strangely ill-defined.
Other originalists appear more cautious in their derivation
of principles from the provisions of the Constitution. Harry Jaffa
was not entirely mistaken when he characterized Meese’s
Constitution as “without overarching principles.”154 Jaffa
undoubtedly meant that description as a criticism, but there is a
practicality in Meese’s approach to constitutional originalism—
and no express natural law commitments. Nevertheless, Jaffa was
unfair in part to Meese because Meese’s Constitution had a
prominent place for principle, too.155 Meese believes that the
Constitution’s principles are fundamentally those of federalism

149. Id. at 22.
150. “The framers seem to have had no coherent theory of free speech and appear not
to have been overly concerned with the subject.” Id. at 22. Despite the lacunae that Bork
recognized in the original understanding, Bork was generally able to extract an application
of the law. See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 976-79 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
151. Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 57, at 23.
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. Harry V. Jaffa, What Were the “Original Intentions” of the Framers of the
Constitution of the United States?, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 351, 358 (1987) [hereinafter
Jaffa, What Were the “Original Intentions”].
155. Id. at 360-61.
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and separation of powers.156 It may therefore be more accurate to
acknowledge that Meese’s fundamental constitutional principles
were simply different from those of Jaffa.157 Jaffa’s originalism
committed him to legal principles reflecting the natural law
beliefs of the founders. Natural law originalists, of course, are
highly committed to what they characterize as a principled
reading of the Constitution’s provisions.158 The techniques for
the derivation of such principles, informed by natural law
commitments, are as ambitious as Judge Bork’s—and lead as far
from the linguistic meaning of the text.
Bork was also prepared effectively to excise constitutional
provisions. Bork gave the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment very short shrift.159 Effectively, Bork
156. See Edwin Meese III, Speech Before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society
Lawyers Division, in ORIGINALISM, supra note 59, at 71, 77 [hereinafter Meese, Speech]
(asserting without argument that Chief Justice Taney did not follow the original
understanding of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Dred Scott).
157. See HARRY V. JAFFA WITH BRUCE LEDEWITZ ET AL., ORIGINAL INTENT AND
THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION: A DISPUTED QUESTION 13-22 (1994) (arguing that
Chief Justice Taney employed a mistaken form of originalism in his Dred Scott opinion).
158. Jaffa, What Were the “Original Intentions”, supra note 154, at 359-60 (“It cannot
be too greatly emphasized that the people’s will, properly so called, is a rational will, whose
inherent right to be obeyed is attenuated to the extent that it becomes merely arbitrary or
despotic.”); see also Clarence I. Thomas, Toward a “Plain Reading” of the Constitution:
The Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HOW. L.J. 983 (1987).
Having laid out his constitutional method, Jaffa is remarkably circumspect in expressly
articulating its doctrinal consequences. See Bruce Ledewitz, Judicial Conscience and
Natural Rights: A Reply to Professor Jaffa, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 449 (1987).
159. The judge who cannot make out the meaning of a provision is in exactly
the same circumstance as a judge who has no Constitution to work with. There
being nothing to work with, the judge should refrain from working. A
provision whose meaning cannot be ascertained is precisely like a provision
that is written in Sanskrit or is obliterated past deciphering by an ink blot. No
judge is entitled to interpret an ink blot on the ground that there must be
something under it. So it has been with the clause of the fourteenth amendment
prohibiting any state from denying citizens the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States.
BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 166. Bork’s formulation with the simile of an ink blot is
presumably intentionally confrontational. Certainly it has drawn a response by other
defenders of a more holistic Constitution who are troubled by the seemingly cavalier
disregard of the text. See TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 79, at 53; TRIBE, INVISIBLE,
supra note 90, at 147. Farber reminds us of the differences between the skills of lawyers and
judges and those of historians. Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1089 (1989). The moral is that judges are not particularly
well qualified to undertake historical research—and that no responsible historian would
simply discard an important historical document or text merely because of the difficulties
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eliminated this provision. Bork’s important and complex
reductive claim warrants careful scrutiny, and his claim must be
distilled from its overly exuberant rhetoric.160 What did Bork
claim a judge must do when confronted by a difficult text like the
Privileges and Immunities Clause? Perhaps the most notorious
example of Bork’s willingness to excise constitutional provisions
is the Ninth Amendment, which he appeared willing to delete in
its entirety.161
He asserted that it was as if the provision were written in
Sanskrit or covered by an inkblot.162 Bork could not really be
committed to the proposition that a Sanskrit text could not be
distinguished from an inkblot. Admittedly, we read both the
Bhagavad Gita and Rorschach tests, but few (none?) think the
process remotely similar. Moreover, to face a difficult text is not
to face no text. Even on Bork’s account, a judge facing an
incomprehensible text (perhaps a statute void for vagueness) must
offer an explanation why the text is unintelligible.
What makes a text difficult for an originalist? 163 The
Ninth Amendment’s text, like that of the Fourteenth, is simple and
direct upon its face: “The enumeration in the Constitution of
certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people.”164 Twenty-one words; the longest,
“enumeration,” contains no more than five syllables. The
Privileges and Immunities Clause: “No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
presented. Perhaps the model is more the archaeologist confronting an inscription in an
unknown language; but even in that context the search for a Rosetta Stone goes on.
160. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 183-84 (“There is almost no history that
would indicate what the ninth amendment was intended to accomplish. . . . [T]he claim that
the Founders intended judges to make up rights not specified in the Constitution itself is
obviously inconsistent with the historical record. . . . Thus, the enumeration of certain rights
in the federal Constitution was not to be taken to mean that the rights promised by the state
constitutions and laws were to be denied or disparaged.”).
161. Id. at 166. For a description of the criticism of this position, see, e.g., BARNETT,
LOST, supra note 31, at xii.
162. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 166.
163. Scott Soames distinguishes linguistic difficulty and legal difficulty in his analysis
of the specific features of legal texts, arguing that understanding the elements of linguistic
content makes many of the texts treated as difficult in constitutional theory easily
interpretable. See 1 SCOTT SOAMES, Interpreting Legal Texts: What Is, and What Is Not,
Special about Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS: NATURAL LANGUAGE: WHAT IT MEANS
AND HOW WE USE IT 403, 404-05, 408-09, 417-20 (2009) [hereinafter SOAMES, Legal Texts].
164. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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of citizens of the United States . . . .”165 Even simpler, it is also
only twenty-one words. What makes reading or applying them
difficult?
Turning first to the Ninth Amendment, the source of the
difficulty is, first, the verbs and, second, the direct object of the
sentence. The verbs are “deny” and “disparage” and the direct
object is “others.” The concept of denial is straightforward
enough; a right is denied when a government prohibits its
exercise, or burdens or regulates it in a manner that makes its
exercise difficult. The concept of disparage is seemingly broader.
A right may be disparaged without being denied: shareholders’
voting rights in modern, publicly-held corporations rarely have
significant import or value.166 If shareholders are unhappy with
corporate management the typical response is to sell their
shares.167 So one issue is what the prohibition on disparagement
means in this context. Most naturally, it likely means to limit the
scope of the rights protected, to limit the kinds of rights protected,
or the persons entitled to claim the rights, or to impose procedural
limits on claims to the substantive rights.168
A second textual issue is what the reference or meaning of
“others” is. What other rights are not to be denied or disparaged?
The rights retained might be rights under natural law, or under
common law. They might be rights under the various states’ laws
or constitution. The language of the Constitution offers no
express guidance. Third, and finally, by whom are the other rights
not to be denied or disparaged? The two candidates, of course,
are the states and the Federal government.169 Again, however, the
165. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
166. See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 407, 416-20 (2006).
167. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970)
(describing the competing strategies of voicing criticism within an organization and choosing
to exit).
168. See generally THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND
MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (Randy Barnett ed., 1989); KURT T. LASH, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN
CITIZENSHIP (2014).
169. They are the sovereigns with the authority to deny or limit citizens’ rights under
traditional political philosophy and as a matter of political and legal realpolitik. Nothing in
the text sheds any light on the choice among the alternative readings of the scope of the
provision, although the context might suggest that it is the Federal government whose power
is limited.
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text of the Constitution offers no guidance on the answer to this
question. At the end of the day, therefore, we are left with
fundamental questions about what is being protected and how it
is being protected. Bork was surely right that this is a difficult
text.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause presents some
similar difficulties. The first clause is relatively clear. The
subject, at least, is clear: any “State.” The verbs, too, are clear:
“make or enforce.” Finally, the object, “laws,” is hardly
ambiguous, except in the ordinary sense that many words and
concepts have a fringe of potential meaning with respect to which
the application of the word or concept is contestable.170 The
dependent clause brings the principal difficulties. The verb
“abridge” presents some difficulty. But the heart of the difficulty
arises from the object: “privileges and immunity of citizens of the
United States.” What are the privileges and immunities of a
citizen of the United States? For Bork, the Ninth Amendment was
limited to the proposition that the rights expressly enumerated in
state constitutions were not to be limited or denied by the state
protection of a more limited set of rights in the federal
constitution.171 The two arguments Bork made for this conclusion
are grammatical and contextual, with the latter based upon the
proximity of the text to the Tenth Amendment.172 In the case of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Bork dismissed Ely’s
assertion that no legislative evidence supports the view that the
clause is meaningless.173
He further dismissed Ely’s
interpretation, but offered no interpretation of his own.174 Thus,
Bork at least believed that the process of constructing ordinary
170. Thus, for example, the text leaves open the questions of whether a regulatory
agency of a state could make such a regulation and what qualifies as state action. The notion
of legal rules as open textured with a core as to which application is clear and a fringe,
penumbra or neighborhood as to which the application is unclear or uncertain figured
prominently in Hart’s statement of position in the Hart-Fuller debate and, more generally, in
The Concept of Law. See, HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 67, at 124-36; H.L.A. Hart,
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607-09 (1958)
[hereinafter Hart, Positivism]; see generally TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, VAGUENESS 36-95
(1994).
171. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 184-85.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 180 (citing ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 59, at 22).
174. Id.
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principles of interpretation then gives judges the power to go
beyond the words of the text, but also, at least in rare cases, the
surprising authority to disregard seemingly meaningful language
of the Constitution. Other originalists have not followed Bork in
that approach to the Ninth Amendment.175
Third, Bork also championed the neutral application of
principles. (This is the “from neutral principles” for constitutional
decision making part of his theory.) It is not clear what he
intended here, or why principle would be invoked. It may be, of
course, that Bork was here again speaking only loosely, and that
the neutral application of principle is nothing more than the
neutral application of a constitutional provision. Often stated in
more general terms, there is certainly a traditional task of applying
such general provisions to the facts of a particular case properly
presented to the Court. In his all-too-brief discussion of this
critical issue, Bork offered only one paragraph explaining what
neutral application is, and six paragraphs with an example,
Shelley v. Kraemer.176 The one paragraph and the six are not
easily harmonized. In the initial explanation, Bork noted that such
neutrality “requires a fair degree of sophistication and selfconsciousness . . . .”177 That suggests that the principles to be
applied are the general rules or statements of constitutional law
that are inferred from the constitutional text along the lines
explored above. Moreover, he further conceded that the “only
external discipline . . . is the scrutiny of professional observers
who will be able to tell over a period of time whether he is
displaying intellectual integrity.”178
Bork described the demonstration of the integrity of a
series of decisions (and associated series of opinions) as unfolding
175. See BARNETT, LOST, supra note 31, at 235-42.
176. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
177. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 151.
178. Id. (emphasis added). The importance of the temporal dimension reveals
adjudication, including the legitimation of adjudication through the articulation of reasons,
as a social practice. It is an activity, bounded in part, by rules (broadly defined) but with
room for creativity and innovation. It can only be fully assessed, as an activity and social
practice over time. An example of such a check, presumably, would be works like
Wolfman’s Dissent Without Opinion, in which Justice Douglas’s tax opinions were shown
to be thoroughly ends-oriented through a comparative analysis. BERNARD WOLFMAN,
JONATHAN L.F. SILVER & MARJORIE A. SILVER, DISSENT WITHOUT OPINION: THE
BEHAVIOR OF JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS IN FEDERAL TAX CASES (1975).
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over time. The temporal dimension of this process went
unremarked by Bork, but is significant. The evolution of a corpus
of decisions is more instructive, and more revealing, of its
integrity and consistency than any one atemporal snapshot
precisely because, over time, a theory is presented with novel,
often unanticipated facts. How those facts are incorporated into
the pre-existing authority is particularly revealing. By focusing
upon the development of a judge’s interpretive canon over time,
Bork was perhaps implicitly invoking the constraints of a
practice. It is the practice of judging, over time, that can best be
evaluated and tested for conformity to rules. With the addition of
a temporal dimension Bork may have moved from doctrine or
theory to practice. Nevertheless, if present, that strategy is only
implicit, and was never articulated or acknowledged by Bork and
would not be easily harmonized with the usual self-descriptions
of originalism.
In discussing Shelley, Bork offers no contextualization or
comparative study; his criticism of that decision, while focusing
upon the expansive interpretation of state action, does not explain
how the Court’s interpretation is ends-oriented.179 Such an
explanation might involve, for example, similar restrictive
covenants barring transfers to individuals who were not
minorities. But the Court anticipated this objection, noting that
“[e]qual protection of the laws is not achieved through
indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.”180 Moreover, Bork’s
criticism that the Shelley Court did not properly sustain its
determination of state action warrants scrutiny. Bork noted that
the state courts were not the source of the racial discrimination,
they merely enforced it.181 Bork went on to characterize the
enforcement of such discriminatory private agreements as
“pursuant to normal, and neutral, rules . . . .”182
Bork supported this characterization of Shelley with the
discussion of a hypothetical case in which a guest in a private
home speaks abusively about political matters and is ejected by

179.
180.
181.
182.

BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 152-53.
Shelley, 334 U.S. at 22.
BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 152.
Id.
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his host.183 The guest sues—Bork did not expressly indicate the
relief sought, but it is apparently the right to return to the host’s
home and continue his abusive harangue. Bork claimed that the
Shelley Court is committed to the view that the denial of such
relief is state action contravening the First Amendment.184 First,
the example seems to confuse action with inaction, commission
with omission. The hypothetical court has merely denied relief,
refused to deploy the power of the sovereign on behalf of the
haranguing guest, against the hapless host. That distinction may
or may not make a difference. But, in fairness, we can rehabilitate
Bork’s example by adding a call to the police to assist the host in
removing the guest, or making the host the moving litigant with a
petition for a restraining order, for example. In such cases the
state action would appear affirmative, rather than a mere failure
to act. In such a case, nevertheless, it is far from clear what First
Amendment violation is alleged to occur. Bork’s example
characterizes the guest as “abusive”; the conduct occurs by a guest
in a host’s home. It is well-settled First Amendment law that
speech is not protected everywhere, and in every way.185 So an
alternative analysis is not that there is no state action, but that
there is no infringement of a constitutional right. Outside the
public sphere, in a private home, the protection of speech under
the First Amendment may well be less robust (other associational
rights may be more robust).
Bork failed to deliver a compelling argument for his
strident assertion that Shelley constitutes a political decision
imposing non-neutral principles. While it is clear that Bork

183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Bork himself understood the limits of the First Amendment. Thus, in Neutral
Principles, Bork noted some of the obvious limits of the protections of the First Amendment
casting some doubt on the absolutist view. Bork noted that no one believes that the federal
government cannot prohibit urging mutiny on naval vessels engaged in action or shouted
harangues in the visitors’ gallery in either chamber of the United States Congress. Bork,
Neutral Principles, supra note 57, at 21. The cases, of course, confirm Bork’s understanding
of the limits of the right of free speech protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Barnes
v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 501 U.S. 560, 570-72 (1991) (upholding Indiana statute barring nude
dancing); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951) (upholding conviction for
advocating overthrow of the United States government by force and violence); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 84-89 (1949) (upholding a Trenton, New Jersey ordinance regulating
soundtrucks).
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agrees with the result but disagrees with the finding of state
action, the issues are fundamentally more complex than he
acknowledges. Bork offers no analysis or explanation of his
criticism of the finding of state action. Instead, he assumes that a
private contract, enforced by the agents of the sovereign state,
does not involve state action. While that is neither a novel nor a
ludicrous view, it is neither self-evident nor true by definition. It
warrants a defense, not a mere assertion.
Justice Scalia also asserted the Neutrality Premise in his
defense of originalism.186 The absence of neutrality with respect
to the various critics of originalism can be confirmed for Justice
Scalia by the absence of agreement or consensus.187 The absence
of such a consensus confirmed, for Justice Scalia, that the critics
are relying, at least tacitly, upon their own subjective preferences
and values.188 Originalism, by contrast, is neutral. To uphold that
claim of neutrality, Justice Scalia’s originalism must address
Tribe’s challenge that originalism imports subjective preferences
sub rosa through its selective invocation of the doctrine of stare
decisis.
In response to Tribe’s suggestion that the uncertain role of
stare decisis imports judicial discretion and non-neutrality,
Justice Scalia made two arguments. First, he acknowledged that
originalism does not preclude willfulness. He would appear to
have acknowledged that there remains some judicial discretion
under originalism, but he did not explore the nature of that
discretion or how it differs from discretion in a non-originalist
constitutional theory and practice. Second, Justice Scalia asserted
that stare decisis is not part of originalism, but is instead “a
pragmatic exception to it.”189 I now turn to these two arguments
and the critics’ response.

186.
Thus, Justice Scalia wrote, “Perhaps the most glaring defect of Living
Constitutionalism, next to its incompatibility with the whole antievolutionary purpose of a
constitution, is that there is no agreement, and no chance of agreement, upon what is to be
the guiding principle of the evolution.” Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 44-45.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 46. Justice Scalia takes the disagreement with respect to the substantive
alternatives to originalism to evidence that the theories encompass judicial discretion
because, tacitly, neutral principles are self-evident.
189. Id.
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2. Neutrality, Will, and Discretion
Justice Scalia conceded that originalism offers no
inoculation against willfulness.190 When Justice Scalia implicitly
characterized other interpretative doctrines as “cater[ing]” to
willfulness and originalism as not “inoculat[ing] against it” what
are the relationships he was describing, in non-metaphorical
terms?191 Beginning with the particular, what Bork had in mind
as an exemplar of the method to be avoided was that of the Warren
Court’s jurisprudence.192 The outcomes, interpretations, and
interpretative methods of that constitutional jurisprudence were
all to be avoided and condemned.
More abstractly, how did Bork seek to distinguish the
implications of the two methods as a matter of discretion? To
cater to willfulness, an interpretative theory or method
presumably has to provide doctrinal or technical support for the
judge who inclines toward deciding cases as seems just to him,
regardless of constitutional arguments to the contrary, precedent,
or other law.193 So, for example, a judge who is a perfectionist in
Sunstein’s terms would be reinforced in her willingness to
construe the Constitution on terms different from the original
understanding in order to secure a more perfect interpretation and
better outcomes, so interpreted. Similarly, a judge who believes
that constitutional interpretation is informed by considerations of
the structure of the Constitution and of the Republic that it creates,
is likely to interpret the Constitution in ways that may depart from
the original understanding.194
Critics may question whether those inclinations or
predispositions are properly characterized as willfulness. Even
conceding that the interpretative doctrine one holds either
supports or militates in favor of a given particular interpretation,
how is that a matter of willfulness? Choice of constitutional
190. Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 140 (“I have never claimed that originalism
inoculates against willfulness; only that . . . it does not cater to it.”).
191. Id.
192. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 69-100; Scalia, Response, supra note 20,
at 149.
193. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 69-70.
194. Bobbitt’s modalities of constitutional argument capture the richness of the
arguments available. BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17, at 7-8.
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interpretation may be a matter of will (choosing an interpretation
that enriches one’s brother in law, for example) but it would seem
equally possibly a matter of reason (holding a different view of
language or the role of prefatory clauses, for example).
The concept of the dualism between will and reason, and
its place in classical democratic political theory, is complex.195
Fortunately, because of the thinness of the concepts deployed in
the debate, we do not need to understand these concepts very
deeply here. At a risk of oversimplification, democratic
republicanism sought to harness and channel the will and the
passions for the public good.196 Unfettered will apparently poses
a fundamental general challenge to that regime. The goal of the
democratic republic is to provide institutions for the reasoned
expression of the public’s values in an ordered way, and in so
doing, to channel will into the form of reasoned expression.197 If
judges could exercise their own will in derogation of the
democratic choices of the citizens then democracy would be
subverted. In particular, if a judge were to exercise judgment
based upon her own values or preferences—according to her own
will—she would not be acting in furtherance of the people’s
collective will expressed by their democratic choices.198
Justice Scalia adopted a concept of willfulness and the
articulation of the risk it poses to the democratic republic like that
articulated by Dean Landis.199 Willfulness refers to the
imposition by judges of their own substantive views—political,
moral, economic, whatever—in deciding cases presented to them,
195. See generally Paul W. Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins of American
Constitutionalism, 98 YALE L.J. 449 (1989) (arguing that in pre-Reconstruction
constitutional theory, reason was understood within a technical, rational space and will was
understood to operate within a larger, organic space).
196. “The psychological virtue required by republican government is not simply wellformed habit. Rather, it is precisely the capacity to act on the basis of reason . . . . The virtue
required is the capacity to overcome passion, or appetite, in both reason and will.” Id. at 459
(footnotes omitted).
197. See Jaffa, What Were the “Original Intentions,” supra note 154, at 359 (citing
President Jefferson’s First Inaugural Address).
198. Brandom describes this as the tension in our judicial system between authority
and responsibility. Brandom, Hegelian Model, supra note 79, at 38. The focus on the role
of discretion and will emphasizes the place of authority and loses sight of the mechanisms of
responsibility.
199. James M. Landis, A Note on “Statutory Interpretation,” 43 HARV. L. REV. 886,
887-91 (1930).
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in derogation of the substantive judgments on such matters made
by the enacting legislative or constitution-adopting authorities.200
Will, by implication, is contrasted with deference, reason, and
principle.201 More fundamentally, the contrast between principle
and will follows classical Lockean political theory.202
With this gloss in mind, it is perhaps a little difficult to
identify the theorist or theorists against whom Justice Scalia was
writing. Who, after all, speaks or writes in favor of judicial
willfulness—even among Scalia’s biggest bugaboos? For
example, Dworkin argued that there is discretion in judicial
decision making, in the sense that the applicable rules often do
not determine the outcome of cases. But he asserted that
discretion is circumscribed and, more importantly, informed by
the duty to decide the case in a manner that can be reconciled with
making the law best. Best in this context is not unfettered, to be
determined by the values of the judge but, like the analogy of the
chain novel, must remain truest to the preceding chapters of the
law.203 The answer can be found less in the target theorists of The
Tempting of America than in the defenders of the Warren Court
engaged in Bork’s earlier Harris lectures.204 Skelly Wright of the
D.C. Circuit was a principal target for allegedly endorsing the
view that the defense of the Constitution required the making of
substantive value choices by the federal judiciary.205 According
to the argument Bork attributed to Wright, those fundamental
value choices are required to fill in, or complete the gaps of, the
Constitution.206
Justice Scalia’s and Judge Bork’s dualism can also be
restated in terms of objective rules or principles and subjective
preferences. Originalism promises objective rules or principles
(no Dworkinian dualism is intended here). Competing theories
appear to leave no alternative to judges’ imposition of their own
subjective preferences, detached from the words of the
200. See, e.g., Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 46-7.
201. Kahn, supra note 188, at 450.
202. See id. at 463 n.57.
203. See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 245-50; DWORKIN, TAKING, supra note
114, at 28-39 (describing the role of legal principles in adjudication).
204. Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 57.
205. Id. at 4-5.
206. Id. at 5-6.
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Constitution or the will of the people. Several of the leading critics
of originalism would acknowledge the role of the judge’s
choice.207 They would plead necessity as a defense; the
determining authority claimed by originalism is insufficient to
determine decision.208 The originalists would accept that plea
neither as defense nor excuse.
The contrast Bork thus sought to make is between a
judiciary that makes its own substantive value choices in deciding
cases and a judiciary that neutrally implements those value
choices made by the Founders in the Constitution.209 Whether
that contrast can be sustained, the apparent contrast is clear.
Equally clear is the promise of a theory of constitutional decision
making that can deliver such neutrality in a democratic republic.
With neutrality the allocation of power and legitimacy to the
legislature and the executive is given effect, not to be subverted
by alternative or competing values of the judiciary. Thus, the real
advantage originalism offers its advocates is a limitation on
judicial discretion.210 In contemporary constitutional language
we more typically speak in terms of discretion than will. In so
doing, I don’t mean to endorse the view that willfulness equates
discretion, only that the ongoing debate about positivism and
legal rules are, at least in part, couched in terms of judicial
discretion,211 and that Bork’s argument can be translated into
more contemporary terms. A judge can willfully act effectively
only if one has discretion, but not all exercises of discretion are
willful. A judge may exercise her discretion in a particular way
207. See, e.g., TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 79, at 98-101; Dworkin, Forum
of Principle, supra note 13, at 34-38; SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 247-49
(embracing a judicial strategy of minimalism in constitutional adjudication).
208. See, e.g., Dworkin, Forum of Principle, supra note 13, at 34-38 (the original
understandings and intentions on which originalism claims to rely do not exist as a matter of
linguistic philosophy); TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 79, at 98-101 (because texts are
not self-interpreting, judges charged with interpreting and applying the constitutional text
must import extra-textual sources of law); TRIBE, INVISIBLE, supra note 90 (describing the
myriad non-textual sources of constitutional law); SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 7173 (arguing that originalism is indefensible because of the consequences of following its
methods).
209. See Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 57.
210. Id. at 4. But see William Baude, Originalism as a Constraint on Judges, 84 U.
CHI. L. REV. 2213, 2219-28 (2017) (arguing that originalism can provide only a weaker,
internal constraint, not an external constraint, on judicial decision).
211. See generally DWORKIN, TAKING, supra note 114, at 14-80.
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because of a reasoned belief in a very abstract proposition.
Originalism circumscribes judicial discretion through a decision
process that permits, indeed, provides for, the resolution of
constitutional cases by appeal to rules without the addition or
substitution of the judge’s personal values or preferences. The
preferences and values imbedded in the Constitution trump.
Why, then, did Justice Scalia qualify his claim that
originalism limits will or discretion? What residual role does
discretion play in his originalism? Justice Scalia did not answer
this question clearly. At first impression, discretion would not
appear to have any place in the originalist theory of constitutional
appellate adjudication. As described above, the inquiry into
meaning, coupled with the application of the principles uncovered
to the facts determined by the trial court, completely describes the
process. In that process, there is no apparent place for discretion.
Discovering the meaning of the constitutional provisions may
present a difficult historical or linguistic problem, but the task
does not call for judicial discretion. Determining the relevant
facts found by the lower court may not be as simple as reading the
decision and underlying record, but, again, while the
determination of the legally relevant facts found may be difficult,
no call would appear for the exercise of judicial discretion. The
concession of a role for discretion may therefore be another deus
ex machina for originalism, like stare decisis (as described
below), to avoid the consequences of its theory in the real world.
Bork also did not speak directly to the problem of judicial
discretion, what to do when the original meaning of a
constitutional provision is unclear or when two provisions
conflict. Indeed, those possibilities almost seem precluded by
Bork’s account of constitutional interpretation.212 Bork did admit
of a place for discretion and judgment when the originalist
confronts non-originalist precedent, but his account is murky.213
212. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 155-60; Charles Fried, On Judgment, 15
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1025 (2011) [hereinafter Fried, On Judgment].
213. Indeed, he sets the stage by denying that the doctrine of stare decisis has ever
been clearly articulated: “The law . . . has no very firm theory of when precedent should be
followed and when it may be ignored or overruled.” BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 157.
The theory of precedent is much less critical to many of those other theories of constitutional
interpretation, however, particularly to the extent that they acknowledge a place for prudence
and doctrine in their interpretative arsenal. Prudential and doctrinal arguments are the usual
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He merely described a series of factors to be taken into account in
the decision whether to respect such precedent: whether the
precedent has “become . . . so embedded in the life of the nation,
so accepted by the society, so fundamental to the private and
public expectations of individuals and institutions . . . .”214 To the
untutored, this might sound like a defense of Roe, but Bork
immediately went on to distinguish Roe because of the ongoing
public dissent from it.215 The extent of doctrinal deviation from
the original understanding also seems a factor.216 Finally, the
vitality and potential implications of a decision also appears to be
a factor, the extent to which a prior erroneous precedent may
engender further error.217 The application of these factors appears
complicated, if not difficult, and to require seemingly non-legal
judgments. For example, how does a judge assess the extent to
which a judicial decision has become embedded in public and
private expectations?218 Similarly, how does a judge determine
the extent to which the public originally dissented from a
decision? How does she determine how potentially powerful a
precedent may be in engendering further doctrinal departure from
the original understanding? This enumeration of factors or
considerations does not shed much light on how the decision
process is supposed to go. Accordingly, it is hard not to conclude
that the potential for judicial discretion to intrude into the decision
process whether to respect or overrule non-originalist precedent,
with the result that the claimed neutrality is forfeit.
Intuitively, the originalist position that we should commit
to a neutral approach to constitutional interpretation and decision
is very engaging. After all, verbal communication appeared to
work pretty well in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and it
is reasonable to anticipate that we can figure out what the
provisions of the Constitution adopted in those centuries (among
reasons offered for respecting otherwise questionable precedent. It is precisely because of
the deontological nature of originalism and its failure to endorse prudential and doctrinal
arguments generally that its account of stare decisis is at once so critical, and so difficult.
214. Id. at 158.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 158-59.
217. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 159.
218. Cf. Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 45 (criticizing potential reliance upon
public opinion in judicial decision making).
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others, of course) meant. To the extent that this account
misunderstands the nature of the original communications, the
optimistic premise behind originalism may be flawed. That could
be the case, for example, if the communicative strategy of the
Constitution were not to anticipate and answer such questions, but
merely to provide broad concepts and an institutional structure for
future consideration and resolution of more specific questions.219
Under those circumstances, it would seem that asking the judge
to interpret the meaning of the terms of the Constitution, and thus
the meaning of the Constitution itself would be a relatively simple
decision procedure. So discretion ought to be limited at the least,
and eliminated at best. But the point that originalism glosses over
or, perhaps, obscures, is that the methods that originalism must
introduce to determine the principles that underlie and inform the
provisions of the constitution and to determine when and how to
accommodate non-originalist precedent are complex. Moreover,
the kinds of judgment that those methods call for a judge to make
require determinations that are anything but the application of
only logical reasoning from the constitutional text, even
supplemented with historical exegesis. As a result, the intuitive
appeal of originalism to offer an interpretive theory that dispense
with the complexities that may result in, or be mistaken for,
discretion, has not been easily realized in practice.

3. Neutrality, Originalism, and Stare Decisis
Justice Scalia defends his deference to the principle of
stare decisis as a pragmatic exception to originalism.220 That
defense, however, raises some important questions, because of the
extent to which originalism would appear to depart from
established constitutional doctrine, unless non-originalist

219. See generally Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469
(1980) [hereinafter Dworkin, Forum], reprinted in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 13,
at 33 (challenging the linguistic and social theory underlying the originalist project).
220. The demand that originalists alone “be true to their lights” and forswear
stare decisis is essentially a demand that they alone render their methodology
so disruptive of the established state of things that it will be useful only as an
academic exercise and not as a workable prescription for judicial governance.
Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 139; see also id. at 140.
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precedent is accorded a very substantial place.221 Thus, when we
examine the accommodation that stare decisis provides for the
status quo against the fundamental changes that a strict
originalism would require, it creates a more substantial set of
exceptions than Justice Scalia’s language might suggest.222 A
critic might (and many have)223 conclude that the deference to
stare decisis is the deus ex machina that saves originalism from
the consequences of its own principles. It is not entirely clear, of
course, whether those consequences would be particularly
troubling for most originalists. To the extent those consequences
follow from the theory and to the extent that theory is presented
as the sole legitimate foundation for judicial review in a
democratic republic, it is hard to avoid them. Yet it must be
acknowledged those implications could create a fundamental
political problem for originalism.224
With respect to the impact of the role of non-originalist
precedent in weak or non-exclusive originalism, it would appear
that the claim to free judges from the meretricious appeal of
discretion is highly problematic. The kinds of factors that Bork
would introduce to determine the precedential weight to be given
to such prior non-originalist decisions would appear to reintroduce the kinds of judgments that present the hazards of
discretion that Bork purported to avoid. It must also be
acknowledged that Bork, at least, never gave an express account
of the role of discretion in originalism.225 Even when describing
221.
Sunstein suggests that originalism would, among other things, result in
constitutionalizing state bans on the purchase and sale of contraceptives, holding key
provisions of the Clean Air Act, Federal Communications Act and the Occupational Safety
and Health Act unconstitutional, permitting state establishment of churches, and striking
down even modest gun control laws. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 1-3. More
recently, he has also suggested that racial discrimination by the Federal government would
be permitted and that the right to privacy would be entirely eliminated. ORIGINALISM, supra
note 59, at 292-94.
222. See SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 76. (“[Justice Scalia] describes
himself as a ‘faint-hearted originalist.’ His faintness of heart is a frank recognition that taken
seriously, [originalism] would lead in intolerable directions.”).
223. See, e.g., Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 13, at 82-83.
224. See LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism, supra note 54, at 685-87 (discussing
Sunstein’s arguments against originalism and explaining why they miss the mark).
225. The closest Bork came is when he acknowledged the rare gaps in the historical
understanding of the constitutional text, as in the case of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause and the Ninth Amendment. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 180-85.
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the factors that an originalist judge should consider (which carry
with such terminology an implicit concession that a judge must
adopt a decision process that takes such factors into account in
some, non-deterministic manner), Bork never suggests that we
have reached the stage at which judicial discretion may be
deployed. In light of the enormous attention that judicial
discretion has received in mid-twentieth century jurisprudential
theory,226 this gap is surprising. It would appear that the failure
to acknowledge the place of judicial discretion, even in originalist
decision theory, arises from an unwillingness to confront the
qualification that such recognition imposes on the claim to
neutrality. In the case of Justice Scalia, the most he could do was
to articulate the cryptic concession that originalism does not
inoculate against willfulness or discretion.227 Buried in that
concession is a tacit acknowledgment that the originalist claim to
neutrality still needs a foundation and a defense.
Originalism’s critics have recognized some of these flaws.
For example, the critics have asserted that the approach of the
Warren Court can be criticized and the scope of its novel
constitutional jurisprudence rejected without a commitment to the
bolder originalist claims.228 They have shown that whatever the
provenance of originalism, it is unnecessary for a more restrained
constitutional jurisprudence.

4. Conclusion
Despite the central place of originalism’s claim to
neutrality in the defense of classical originalism and in the critics’
response, the debate over this claim shows little progress or signs
of imminent resolution. Originalists continue to assert the
argument from neutrality. Their critics continue to dismiss it.
226. See Scott Hershovitz, The End of Jurisprudence, 124 YALE L.J. 1160, 1162
(2015) (“For more than forty years, jurisprudence has been dominated by the Hart-Dworkin
debate.”); Noel B. Reynolds, Dworkin as Quixote, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 574, 574-76 (1975).
But see Brian Leiter, The End of Empire: Dworkin and Jurisprudence in the 21st Century, 36
RUTGERS L.J. 165 (2005) (denying that Dworkin’s analysis of judicial discretion was a major
jurisprudential contribution).
227. Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 140.
228. See Sunstein, Five Theses, supra note 52, at 313 n.12 (criticizing the Warren
Court’s decisions in Griswold and, amazingly, Brown).
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Originalists have made scant progress defending either classical
versions of the claim or more modern versions like Solum’s
fixation thesis.229 The fixation thesis measures neutrality by
reference to the constitutional meaning allegedly fixed at the
earlier time. Neutral interpretations articulate that earlier
meaning.230 Originalism’s critics reject those arguments from
neutrality.231 Their criticisms that the originalists have not
defended their concept of neutrality nor their arguments from it
generally have some force.
Originalism’s critics have been less successful in
articulating their competing non-originalist accounts and
defending them against originalist criticism.232 The radical
challenge to the concept of neutrality by Critical Legal Studies
theorists or by Stanley Fish appears to face a powerful, practical
response that there is far more agreement about the neutral
interpretation and application of the Constitution than such
theories would recognize.233
The strong claims of
indeterminateness sometimes made by critics234 lose sight of the
constraints on constitutional argument and decision.235 The
indeterminacy objection to neutrality is mistaken. But neutrality
can be questioned without need to rely on a claim that legal
argument is indeterminate (rather than merely underdetermined).
229. See Solum, Constitutional Construction, suora note 103, at 456 (asserting that
originalism commitments to the meaning of the Constitution that was fixed at the relevant
time of its adoption or amendment).
230. Id. at 459 (Solum does not, however, expressly articulate this claim as a matter
of neutrality); ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL
ORIGINALISM 36-63 (2011).
231. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609
(2008) [hereinafter Tushnet, New Originalism] (arguing that the New Originalism relies on
the same evidence and sources as the old originalism); Tushnet, Following the Rules, supra
note 24, at 804-06.
232. Thus, few originalists have renounced their originalism in response to their
critics’ arguments.
233. See, e.g., Nussbaum, Sophistry, supra note 85, at 130, 134-38.
234. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis, 16 QLR 339
(1996); Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987).
235. Bobbitt’s modal argument description captures important dimensions of the
constraints on the argumentation and decision in our constitutional law practice. BOBBITT,
FATE, supra note 17, at 9-119 (describing six canonical modes of constitutional argument).
Brandom describes in more conceptual Hegelian terms the constraints imposed by the
responsibility judges have with respect to their authority. Brandom, Hegelian Model, supra
note 79, at 38.
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To the extent that theories like Dworkin’s would assert
that the historical or textual statement of neutral constitutional
principle is always defeasible by moral or other philosophical
theory again appears inaccurate and implausible as a matter of the
description of our constitutional decisional practice.236 Some
originalist arguments are compelling and prove dispositive.
Finally, and most importantly, it is not clear how the
debate about substantive constitutional theory and practice has
been advanced by the focus on the nature and place of neutrality
of principle. Appeals to neutrality do not easily resolve the
tensions that have resulted in complex and discontinuous
constitutional doctrine and precedent or the apparent
inconsistencies between constitutional text and constitutional
decisional law. Nor do such appeals authoritatively point the way
to a path to harmonize such complexities. The focus on neutrality
is another example of how highly theoretical arguments prove
largely unhelpful in critiquing or refining our constitutional
practice.

C. Originalism’s Account of the Textuality of the
Constitution
Originalism also argues for its claim to be the only proper
method of constitutional interpretation and, implicitly, of
constitutional decision on the basis of a simple characterization of
the Constitution. The originalists claim to offer an account of the
Constitution that hews more closely to the text of the Constitution
because it reflects the textuality of the Constitution.237 That is,
originalism is a better interpretation of the written Constitution
because it recognizes and emphasizes the writtenness of that text.
The argument from writtenness here emphasizes two
features of the written Constitution: its accessibility and
transparency and the fixed nature of the text.238 Originalism
claims to correspond to the text better than all or most other
theories of constitutional interpretation. This argument is
236. See Christopher R. Green, “This Constitution”: Constitutional Indexicals as a
Basis for Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607, 1674 (2009).
237. See LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 1, at 125 n.65.
238. Justice Scalia emphasized the conservative nature of the Constitution. See
Scalia, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 40.
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content-neutral; it relies on how the Constitution is expressed
rather than what it says. It is expressed in writing, locking in the
linguistic content (as an oral constitution would do less
effectively), if not the substantive constitutional law.239
The first element of that closer correspondence is the
conformity principle, which requires that interpretations of the
Constitution ought not to be less transparent and accessible than
the text of the Constitution itself.240 Transparency is a
desideratum of constitutional interpretations. Transparency
makes the text of the Constitution more effective. The
Constitution as a whole and each provision in particular give
guidance to the citizens and to governmental officers as to their
rights and duties and the limits on their powers. If that mission is
to be performed, the text must be accessible and its meaning and
force reasonably transparent and understandable. Transparency
and accessibility is generally defined by reference to ordinary
citizens; they ought to be able to read and understand at least at a
fundamental level what the Constitution says.241 On the other
hand, constitutional law experts can certainly have a deeper,
technical understanding of our constitutional law.242
Critics have neither accepted the implicit criticisms of
their own theories nor the express claims made for originalism.
Many do not expressly accept the conformity principle itself and
articulate theories that appear to flout it.243 Some simply
disregard any suggestion that transparency is to be sought in
constitutional law. Dworkin, for example, in his theory of law as
239. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
269, 271 (2017); Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 479 (2013) (distinguishing the linguistic content of the text from the
substantive legal force of the text).
240. See André LeDuc, Evolving Originalism: What’s Privileged?, section III.A
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter LeDuc, Evolving Originalism].
241. See ALLEN, OUR DECLARATION, supra note 71, at 160-66 (exploring what the
Declaration of Independence’s claim that certain propositions are “self-evident” means).
242. See generally Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers
Know, 60 TEX. L. REV. 35 (1981) (describing the respect in which legal reasoning is
independent of other forms of practical reasoning).
243.
See, e.g., DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 6 (endorsing an account of
constitutional interpretation and decision that employs philosophical analysis and argument
as a central feature); Scott Soames, Deferentialism: A Post-Originalist Theory of Legal
Interpretation, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 597 (2013) (also introducing philosophical analysis into
judicial decision theory to better explain the meaning of legal texts).
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integrity, was prepared to construct a complex ideal for
constitutional interpretation, a model, indeed, that he
acknowledges cannot be satisfied in practice.244 Dworkin’s
rejection of the conformity principle rejected the principle on both
sides of the claimed equivalence. Not only did he deny that
constitutional interpretation should have the transparency and
accessibility of the Constitution, but he denied that the
Constitution itself has that transparency.245 The understanding
and interpretation of the Constitution, at least with respect to its
most fundamental provisions, requires a Hercules. Dworkin
never adequately explained why such a construct does not reveal
his theory of law as integrity as unworkable.246
Posner’s wealth maximizing theory of interpretation also
appears susceptible to challenge, insofar as it employs a
reasonably sophisticated economic analysis to explain how cases
should be resolved.247 Posner’s theory may be defended on the
basis that he is simply offering a deeply theoretical analysis of
why cases come out as they do, rather than defended as an express
theory of justification.
The theories of other critics appear less susceptible to such
a criticism.
For example, Sunstein’s theory of judicial
minimalism would appear to avoid such an objection.248
244. Dworkin created the mythological figure of Judge Hercules to present his theory
of law as integrity. Judge Hercules has proven to be one of the most consistent elements of
Dworkin’s jurisprudence, having made his debut in Dworkin’s inaugural lecture when he
assumed his Oxford chair. His powers and his role have not diminished with age. See
DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 264-65.
245. Dworkin and law as integrity read the Constitution as Catholicism reads the
Bible, with a complex textual exegesis informed by a large corpus of canonical interpretation
and mediated by privileged interpreters. Ironically, Justice Scalia, an observant and public
Catholic, offered a Lutheran critique of that style of interpretation with its philosophical
mumbo jumbo and its apparent dispensation of indulgences. See id. at 238-58 (describing the
task and role of Herculean interpreters of our constitutional law).
246. Dworkin defends his use of the supernatural by characterizing Judge Hercules as
the ideal. He sees no need to address a possible concern that the theory of the second best
may have something to say about the aspirations of his theory of adjudication.
247. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 60-76 (1981) [hereinafter
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE].
248. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM
ON THE SUPREME COURT 24-48 (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, MINIMALISM] (case by case
adjudication is less costly and less likely to result in error than a more sweeping decision
process, and errors that do occur are likely to result in smaller costs); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 60-61 (1996) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LEGAL
REASONING] (fundamental principles of a political society ought to be developed through
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Sunstein’s non-originalist minimalism would appear to satisfy the
conformity principle because the judicial decisions that it
endorses and the associated opinions that it advocates do not
require complex, conceptual, or theoretical agreements.249 By
recognizing implicit disagreements and the legitimacy of
conflicting values and interpretations, Sunstein’s theory allows
citizens to understand judicial outcomes.250 That is because such
judicial outcomes are to be understood based almost exclusively
on their result, rather than on the basis of a complex theoretical
derivation or justification. Reaching a narrower result for the case
at hand is easier done, Sunstein implicitly urges, than
understanding the theoretical constructs that might support
broader conclusions.251 Similarly, while Tribe is more willing to
construct bolder and broader constitutional theories, he argues
that those theories are accessible and compelling, like the
Constitution itself.252 Originalists respond that there is no
foundation for Tribe’s constitutional arguments and attendant
conclusions,253 and some originalist critics agree with that
criticism, too.254 Without those foundations, Tribe’s claim to
transparency would appear hard to sustain.
There is a second implicit thread to the originalist textual
argument. Originalists also argue that their account, by relying
on the original understanding, intent, or expectations, better
accounts for the decision to adopt a written Constitution.255
Justice Scalia makes this point forcefully: “It certainly cannot be
said that a constitution naturally suggests changeability; to the
contrary, its whole purpose is to prevent change—to embed
certain rights in such a manner that future generations cannot
democratic decision rather than by adjudication). Thus, Sunstein’s defense of minimalism
is largely procedural rather than substantive.
249. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 248, at 61; SUNSTEIN, RADICALS,
supra note 4, at 27-30 (restating the argument of Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict in
the context of the debate over originalism).
250. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 248, at 60-61.
251. SUNSTEIN, MINIMALISM, supra note 248, at 44.
252. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 19-20 (1985) [hereinafter
TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES].
253. See, e.g., Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 140-42, 142 (criticizing Tribe’s
interpretation of a changing “vagrant Constitution”).
254. See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 126-31 (2006).
255. Barnett, Originalism, supra note 27, at 617.
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readily take them away.”256 From the commitment of the adopters
of the Constitution to a policy or principle to lock in, Justice
Scalia argues that the interpretation of the Constitution should
also commit to a principle of conservation.257 Interpretation of
the Constitution should acknowledge and honor the original
commitment to bind future generations.258 To do so, Justice
Scalia argues, requires attention to, and deference to, the original
understandings and expectations.
The critics also discount this second argument from
textuality. They offer two responses. First, they dispute that the
adopters of the Constitution shared any such commitment to a
conservative interpretation of its terms.259 Acknowledging
contemporary expressions of such a conservative approach to
constitutional interpretation,260 those critics cite others, like
Thomas Jefferson, who appears to adopt a radically different
perspective.261 Second, the critics invoke the dead hand argument
against such an interpretive approach. Put most simply,
regardless of what the adopters thought or intended, the dead hand
argument urges that the dead cannot control the living, and it is
for us and our contemporaries to determine how we read the
Constitution and what it means. The dead hand argument appears
in two related forms. The first is a linguistic argument, based
upon a theory of meaning. On that version, a text must be given
contemporary meaning by a contemporary linguistic community.
A text cannot sail forward into time and impose its meaning upon
future individuals or communities.262 The second version is an
argument from political theory; there is no legitimacy in an effort
256. Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 40.
257. See id.
258. Id.
259. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent,
98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 948 (1985). But see Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding
of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77, 79 (1988) (questioning Powell’s historical
argument).
260. See Lofgren, supra note 259, at 77 n.1, 78 nn. 4-5.
261. Traditionally cited is Jefferson’s comment that the United States should adopt a
new Constitution each generation. See GARRETT WARD SHELDON, THE POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 84 (1991) (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816) in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 32-44
(Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907)) see also Jaffa, What Were the “Original Intentions,” supra
note 155 (emphasizing the natural law perspective of Jefferson and the other Founders).
262. See, e.g., BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17, at 239-40.
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by one temporal community to bind a later, otherwise unrelated
community.263
Bork made two arguments against the dead hand
argument. First, he urged that the dead hand argument is
incoherent.264 He contended that those making the argument rely
precisely on the institutions constituted by the dead hand of the
dead—the Republic’s courts—to accept their challenges to the
original understandings and expectations. Thus, he urged, such
arguments are internally inconsistent.265 This argument appears
mistaken. Its flaw is that critics of the interpretation need not rely
on the dead hand to legitimize the courts or judicial review. They
may, for example, rely upon the extant practices of interpreting
and applying our American Constitution without regard to the
original understanding. The vitality and authority of the courts is
not subject to a significant fundamental challenge. The status of
many historical understandings of the constitutional text is very
different. Moreover, if Bobbitt is correct that those practices are
themselves the bedrock legitimation of constitutional
propositions,266 there is no implicit recourse to the legitimacy of
original understandings, intentions, or expectations. It is far from
clear that Bobbitt is mistaken267 and, in any event, there was no
argument for that conclusion by Bork.
Second, Bork argued that the dead hand argument is
essentially an argument against democratic majority rule.268 He
asserted that this argument is invoked to overturn democratically
enacted legislation.269 With the argument so recharacterized,
Bork may be understood to have simply urged that nothing in the
Constitution supports such an argument. Indeed, the Constitution
asserts that it and the laws enacted to it are “the supreme Law of
the Land” without regard to when adopted or enacted.270 Bork

263. For an originalist acknowledgment of the weakness of this argument, see
BARNETT, LOST, supra note 31, at 19-22.
264. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 170-71.
265. Id. at 171.
266. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17, at 237-40.
267. See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 17.
268. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 170-71.
269. Id. at 171.
270. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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therefore concluded that these challenges should fail.271 But Bork
was not really fair to the dead hand argument.272 That argument
asserts that the Constitution should be interpreted as we
understand it today. Article VI does not shed any particular light
on the validity of the claim. Bork did not explain why such
invocations of a different reading of the Constitution should
fail.273
As noted above, Dworkin and Tribe present the strongest
criticism of this second argument. They argue that the
Constitution neither offers, nor even was originally understood to
offer, answers to all constitutional questions that would later arise
in the Republic. Thus, the argument from textuality certainly does
some work in defense of originalism, insofar as it raises serious
questions about at least a couple of the alternative theories. But
some of the critics offer theories that satisfy the conformity
condition as well as originalism. Thus, a variety of theories,
originalist and not, would appear to take the textuality of the
Constitution into account.

D. Accounting for Constitutional Flux
271. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 170-71.
272. He was not fair because the dead hand is not made as a textual argument; it is
made as an argument from political philosophy or from the philosophy of action. (Gary
Lawson recognizes the theme of ambiguity in the debate as to the nature of the claims made.
Gary Lawson, Originalism Without Obligation, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1309, 1313 (2013)
[hereinafter Lawson, Originalism Without Obligation] (“Originalism-as-interpretation is a
theory of meaning; originalism-as-adjudication is a theory of action.”). So claiming
incoherence because of a reliance on the constitutional text is unfair. Judge Bork might have
argued that critics making the dead hand argument must rely on the Constitution if they make
an argument to courts created by the Constitution. But I don’t think that claim is self-evident
either. He needed an argument that the critics cannot require the support they insist on for
the Constitution. While I think such an argument exists, made from an anti-foundational
stance that accords our constitutional practice priority, that argument is not easily made by
originalists.
273. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 171. Bork did not directly engage the
linguistic version of the dead hand argument. There are two reasons why. First, writing as
judge and lawyer, Bork took for granted that old texts have meaning; he was neither attentive
to, nor interested in, the philosophical questions that Dworkin and Bobbitt might identify,
for example. Second, to the extent that Bork had a theory of meaning, it would appear to
rebut the dead hand challenge. That is, the objective meaning of the constitutional text,
determined by the truth conditions of propositions about that text, is an alternative account
of meaning to that offered by anti-foundationalist, anti-representationalist accounts like that
defended by Bobbitt and Patterson. See generally BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17;
PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 85.
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1. The Problem of Constitutional Change
Any adequate account of constitutional interpretation and
decision must offer an account of constitutional change.274 That
the interpretation, application, and understanding of the
Constitution has changed over time appears incontrovertible.275
Constitutional change takes a variety of forms. It may also be
characterized a variety of ways. A whiggish account of
constitutional change would treat all such change as the correction
of earlier error. Such an account could assert that all precedent
that had been reversed was wrong the day it was decided.276 A
more pessimistic account, often at least hinted at by the
originalists, is that constitutional change reflects a corruption of
earlier, sound law.277 An ontologically more complex account
might treat the constitution as unchanging, confining the account
of change as only a matter of interpretation, understanding, or
application.278 But some account of change must be offered.

2. Originalism’s Reductive Approach to
Constitutional Flux
Because originalism looks to the original meanings and
intent, it accommodates constitutional change only in limited

274.
See, e.g., Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference
Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 555, 559 (2006) [hereinafter Green, The Sense-Reference
Distinction] (“I explain how distinctions of long standing in the philosophy of language can
present a compelling distinction between which of the Constitution’s attributes change and
which do not.”).
275. Thus, for example, segregated public schools were understood to satisfy the
Equal Protection Clause under Plessy but held to violate that clause in Brown. Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954). Anti-miscegenation statutes were held to violate that
clause in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
276. Such decisions are characterized in academic constitutional vernacular as “wrong
the day they were decided.” See Green, Truthmakers, supra note 80, (manuscript at 5).
277. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 161.
278.
But this account would introduce an important distinction between the
constitutional law and the interpretation of that law that few originalists would welcome.
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ways.279 That is one of its claimed strengths.280 In general, of
course, originalism has challenged281 non-originalist theories of
constitutional interpretation that embrace broader avenues of
change, usually by looking to changing extra-textual sources of
law.282 That response to other theories’ endorsement of sources
of constitutional change is consistent with originalism’s
conservatism as a theory of constitutional interpretation. For
originalism, conservatism in interpretation, in the sense of hewing
to the original understanding of the text, is a paramount virtue.283
Nevertheless, the world around us changes284 and those changes

279. I have previously explored technological progress and the changing scope of the
Fourth Amendment protection against warrantless searches. See André LeDuc, Beyond
Babel: Achieving the Promise of Our American Constitution, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 185, 19799 (2016) [hereinafter LeDuc, Beyond Babel]. Ironically, one of the most telling objections
to originalism is that it offers insufficient stability and excessive change to our established
constitutional law. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 75-76. While some
proponents of originalism urge that originalism offers the interpretive path by which we may
restore the Lost Constitution, most originalists and most critics wrestle with the problem of
saving a century or so of precedent within originalism. See BARNETT, LOST, supra note 31,
at 335-351.
280. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 139-41; Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6,
at 38-40, 46-47.
281. See, e.g., Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 38-40, 46-47. Justice Scalia
made a number of arguments, including that embedding certain rights in the Constitution
locks them in in a way that blocks further social and political evolution, on the one hand, and
that the commitment to a Living Constitution elevates majority rule to the exclusive source
of rights and obligations, on the other. Some might find these two arguments in tension, if
not inconsistent.
282. See, e.g., Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech to the Georgetown University
Text and Teaching Symposium, (October 12, 1985), in ORIGINALISM, supra note 59, at 55,
61 (“We current Justices read the Constitution in the only way that we can: as twentieth
century Americans. . . . What do the words of the text mean in our time?”); STEPHEN
BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 115-32
(2005) (arguing that the interpretive goal should be to interpret and apply abstract principles
to the modern world, informed by that world); DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 225-75
(describing construction of philosophically grounded harmonic interpretation of law as the
best reading of the law and the preferred means of establishing the integrity of law). Most
fundamentally, Dworkin’s criticism of legal positivism was a challenge designed to permit
the importation of authoritative sources of law from outside the practice (or texts) of positive
law.
283. See generally Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817 (2015) [hereinafter Sachs, Legal Change]. Of course, as
Dworkin and Sunstein, among others, have repeatedly pointed out, originalism is anything
but a conservative theory of interpretation as applied to the existing understanding and
practice of our American Constitution.
284.
See JOHN MANSLEY ROBINSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EARLY GREEK
PHILOSOPHY: THE CHIEF FRAGMENTS AND ANCIENT TESTIMONY, WITH CONNECTING
COMMENTARY 89 (1968) (assertion by Heraclitus that all is flux).
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require reinterpretation or rethinking of constitutional doctrine.285
How then does originalism accept and account for constitutional
flux? Originalism’s critics charge that the doctrine cannot
provide a coherent and plausible account of such change. To
assess this element of the debate, it is helpful to explore a general
theory of constitutional change before looking to what the
originalists and their critics have said.
Larry Lessig offers one of the most thoughtful, highly
articulated, and comprehensive theories of constitutional
change.286 He claims to offer a theory of change that even
originalists can agree with.287 That claim may be overstated.
Nevertheless, there is much in Lessig’s view of the constitution
that originalism would reject.288 But that theory may be helpful
in articulating and analyzing the problem of constitutional change
and the sources of permissible constitutional change for
originalism.
First, and foremost, Lessig emphasizes
constitutional change: “Readings of the Constitution change.
This is the brute fact of constitutional history and constitutional
interpretation. . . . No theory that ignored these changes, or that
presumed that constitutional interpretation could go on without
these changes, could be a theory of our Constitution. Change is
at its core.”289 Lessig crucially distinguishes readings of
constitutional provisions from the meaning of those provisions.290
Readings are context specific. By introducing and emphasizing
the concept of constitutional readings, distinct from the meaning
285. How one characterizes that interpretative or adjudicative response is, of course,
one of the central questions of originalism and its competing theories.
286. Lessig, Understanding, supra note 5, at 439-42 (arguing that changes in
background context of the constitutional text can explain changes in the interpretation and
application of the constitutional provisions in our constitutional decisional practice).
287. Id. at 396 (“Are these changed readings always changes of infidelity? Everyone,
whether originalist or not, agrees that they are not.”). Although Lessig asserts this point
without citation, it is surely true in at least the trivial sense that many of the changed readings
advocated by originalism would reverse unfaithful precedent, and in so doing, would restore
fidelity. Whether it is true in a stronger sense may be questioned, as explored below.
288. For example, few originalists would likely be willing to accept Lessig’s notion
that changes in uncontested views like the characterization of homosexuality could alter the
proper interpretation of the Constitution. If they did, their views on recent cases addressing
the relationship of homosexual activity and protected privacy rights would likely be very
different.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 402. Readings are applications of a constitutional provision to a particular
set of facts.
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of the constitutional text, Lessig creates the field within which
constitutional change may unfold, without committing him to the
counterintuitive proposition that the meaning of the Constitution
changes.
Lessig’s attempt to construct a theory of constitutional
change is intended to explain how the apparent discontinuity in
the Supreme Court’s approach to the Commerce Clause and the
New Deal legislation in 1937 can be legitimated without invoking
a theory like that of Bruce Ackerman that there was a de facto
constitutional amendment.291 To do so, Lessig constructs a matrix
of types of possible constitutional change.292 Those four types of
change involve changed readings of the constitutional text or
changed readings of the constitutional context.293 The key claim
that Lessig makes is that in addition to changes of factual
context—like the kinds of technological change I have already
explored—the reading of the Constitution may change with a
changed understanding of context. One of the examples that
Lessig cites of such change is the medical characterization of
homosexuality.294 What Lessig’s article contributes to our task
here is a description of fidelity as the translation of a reading in
one context as a reading in another context that preserves
meaning.295 Originalists, by contrast, often simply focus on the
unchanging meaning of the Constitution.296 Inherent in the nature
of a Constitution is stability, resistance to change. Lessig captures
some of the complexity in the project of preserving that
unchanging meaning. What, then, are the legitimate sources of
change?297
The first permissible type of constitutional change comes
in response to technological change. Perhaps the most obvious is
that the permanent Constitution must be applied in a changing
291. See id. at 472.
292. Lessig, Understanding, supra note 5, at 404-07.
293. Id. at 404.
294. Id. at 415-19.
295. Id. at 401-02.
296. See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 143-44; Scalia, Interpretation, supra
note 6, at 47. This rejection of change—or at least impermissible sources of change—lies at
the heart of the rejection of the notion of a “Living Constitution.” See generally William H.
Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976).
297.
Compare Lessig, Understanding, supra note 5, at 404-05, with Scalia,
Interpretation, supra note 6, at 41-44.
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world.298 The First Amendment299 and Fourth Amendment300
present the clearest examples in the case of originalist writings,
but the Second Amendment301 and the Sixth Amendment302
provide similar instances where originalists confront potential
new constitutional rules to respond to because they reflect the
technologically changed world. How, then is such change
accommodated? It would appear that such technological change
is incorporated into the interpretation through a two-step process.
First, a principle is extracted from the constitutional provisions.
Second, that principle—which on its face already goes beyond the
text—is applied to the new technology. I have discussed
examples of such applications with respect to the First
Amendment in Evolving Originalism.303
Beyond technological change, are there other forms of
scientific or non-scientific changes that would properly be taken
into account under originalism? The other two types of change
acknowledged by originalism, constitutional amendment, and the
correction of prior error, are not conceptually particularly
interesting.304 Are there then any other legitimate sources of
298. Technologies change, religions change, political practices change, foreign threats
change, states join the Union, States purport to secede from the Union, Federal government
roles evolve, treaty partners’ demands and expectations change, life expectancies change,
demographics change.
299. See the discussion in LeDuc, Evolving Originalism, supra note 240, at section
II.A.(5).
300. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
301. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
302. See Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 43-44 (rejecting a proposed
interpretation of the confrontation clause to permit a child who is an alleged victim of sexual
abuse to testify by live video feed).
303. See LeDuc, Evolving Originalism, supra note 240, at section II.A.(5); see also
LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel, supra note 2, at 197-204 (discussing the Court’s efforts to
grapple with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment with respect to GPS tracking
technology).
304.
A second source of permissible change for originalists is constitutional
amendment. On December 31, 1932, the sale of beer and wine was illegal in the United
States, and any court should have so held; on January 1, 1934, such sale was, at least as a
matter of United States constitutional law, not prohibited, any court should so hold. The
difference in constitutional law was a matter of the proper adoption of the Twenty-First
Amendment. That change was entirely proper under originalism. See, e.g., Meese, Speech,
supra note 156, at 80. A third source of legitimate change is the correction of prior error.
Thus, we had Brown correcting and reversing Plessy v. Ferguson, West Coast Hotel
correcting Lochner, and Crawford v. Washington apparently correcting Maryland v. Craig.
All would be examples of proper and permitted constitutional change for most originalists.
Much of the originalist corpus addresses the need to reverse precedent that is inconsistent
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constitutional change in originalism? The answer to that question
turns on the relevant version of originalism at issue. At least two
sources of law are acknowledged by certain versions of
originalism, and those sources of law may therefore be sources of
change.305 In weak originalism, precedent is accepted as a
binding source of law.306 That precedent, when applied in
conjunction with other doctrine to novel facts, may generate
change.307 In non-exclusive or moderate originalism, other
interpretive modes are also accepted, and those others modes may
be sources of change.308
With respect to the other stronger (narrower) versions of
originalism, it is less clear that there are other permissible sources
of change. Justice Scalia addressed these questions directly in his
criticism of those who would find the death penalty prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment.309 One helpful way to analyze the debate
over the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment is to ask what
kinds of change are permissible to take into account in the
interpretation of the Constitution. Technological change is
apparently relevant. To the extent that we develop new, more
humane ways of execution, those ways can make the old ways
constitutionally obsolete because they become cruel (if hardly

with the original meaning. See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 155-59 (criticizing
Roe v. Wade, and the expansion of the commerce power, but grudgingly accepting Shelly v.
Kraemer and Griswold). Such corrective change is also legitimate in originalism. It is this
type of permissible change that opens originalism up to the criticism that it is too radical a
doctrine of constitutional interpretation. Other theories do not deny the ability to correct
error; they disagree as to what constitutes error in existing constitutional law.
305. See generally BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 155-59 (acknowledging
constitutional amendment and the correction of prior constitutional error as sources of
change).
306. See LeDuc, Evolving Originalism, supra note 240, at section II.B.(12).
307. For example, once Griswold v. Connecticut was decided recognizing a right to
privacy and extending certain constitutional protection to certain sexual behavior, Roe v.
Wade was arguably a natural extension; so, too, Casey. While few originalists would endorse
these developments, an argument may be made that a weak originalist should accept these
results. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 159.
308. Thus, for example, were a non-exclusive originalist to conclude that the language
of the Eighth Amendment prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment is ambiguous, she might
follow non-originalists in looking to emerging international legal consensus against the death
penalty as a source of interpretation of the Eighth Amendment as applied to capital
punishment.
309. Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 146.
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unusual).310 But what cannot be taken into account are public
opinion,311 the views of other sovereigns,312 moral theories about
the state and the individual,313 or any other topic.314 What tells us
which sources of change are legitimate, and which sources
constitute judicial arrogations of power in derogation of the
constitutional text?315
One strategy employed by Judge Bork and Justice Scalia
is substantially the same, although articulated rather differently.
As presented by Bork, the limitation on change is classically
positivist.316 The commands of the Constitution, as the
commands of the sovereign, are to be respected as positive law.317
It would take an authoritative action to change that positive law.
Those commands may implicitly or explicitly incorporate
normative or moral choices. Those choices are to be given effect,
not because they are correct or uncontroversial, but because they
are positive law.318 Thus, having reduced the implicit moral
choice to a statement of positive law, any change in public
morality or philosophical perspective becomes irrelevant. Justice
Scalia, by contrast, emphasized the unchanging moral view of the

310. Cf. Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 45 (endorsing application of First
Amendment to protect new technologies).
311. Id.
312. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 348 (2002) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
313. Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 45 (“[Does the extraneous source of
constitutional law include] the philosophy of Hume, or of John Rawls, or of John Stuart Mill,
or of Aristotle?” That is a rhetorical question, dripping with sarcasm, to be answered in the
negative.).
314. Id.
315. The Congress could, of course, exercise its legislative function to prohibit capital
punishment; there is no apparent constitutional mandate requiring capital punishment.
316. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 177; see generally LeDuc, Paradoxes of
Positivism, supra note 54.
317. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 177.
318. Id. at 177-78; see also Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 146 (“[The founders]
were embedding in the Bill of Rights their moral values . . . .”).
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Founders, trapped as it were, in amber.319 As a historical fact, it,
too, cannot change.320
Justice Scalia’s claim that the meaning of cruel and
unusual in the Eighth Amendment cannot change may be tested
with a couple of hypotheticals. Consider the use of the guillotine
as an instrument of capital punishment. That method of capital
punishment was well-established in contemporary Western
societies at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights and was
not generally regarded as cruel or barbaric.321 Would the use of
the guillotine be permitted today as an instrument of capital
punishment, or has the guillotine joined the stocks and the lash as
an instrument of cruel and unusual punishment? If so, what has
changed? What if we discovered that all available methods of
capital punishment operate not to dispatch their victims
expeditiously, but instead impose an eternity of suffering on the
souls of those so condemned? What if we discovered that all but
one of our techniques of capital punishment had that effect?
Would either of those discoveries result in a change in our
understanding of the relationship of some or all of our techniques
of capital punishment to the prohibitions of the Eighth
Amendment? Although Justice Scalia appears to have been
denying that even such discoveries would change our
interpretation,322 perhaps a more charitable reading is that he is
simply reflecting on the current state of our law in the absence of
any such hypothetical discoveries.
With this survey of the originalist perspective on
permissible sources of change we come, finally, to the great
Princeton mink debate.323 That debate offers one of the clearest
statements of the disagreement between originalism and its critics
as to the permissible sources of constitutional flux. The exchange
319. Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 146 (“[P]rovision for the death penalty in a
Constitution that sets forth the moral principle of ‘no cruel punishments’ is conclusive
evidence that the death penalty is not (in the moral view of the Constitution) cruel.”). The
express characterization of the moral grounding of the Constitution in Justice Scalia’s
jurisprudence makes his rejection of natural law in his originalism all the more puzzling.
320. Id. Sometimes Justice Scalia states this premise in moral absolute terms, but this
does not appear essential to his argument, and when he does, he does so tentatively: “‘[M]oral
principles,’ most of us think, are permanent.” Id.
321. See id.
322. Id. at 144-46.
323. Id. at 146; Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 55, at 121.
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between Justice Scalia and Dworkin addressed sources of
permissible constitutional change. The debate hypothesized the
interpretation of a statute that both protected endangered species
and regulated the hunting of unendangered species, including, in
particular, mink.324 Dworkin explored the proper interpretation
of such a statute in the face of changing populations of mink.325
Both Justice Scalia and Professor Dworkin addressed the question
of how to interpret an endangered species act that protects
“endangered” species, as populations rise and fall and threats of
endangerment to particular species rise and fall.326 To Dworkin,
the statute should be read to respond to those changing facts in the
world;327 fidelity to the statute demands it. Moreover, for
Dworkin, that model of derivative statutory change was a model
of constitutional flux.328 So Dworkin invoked the changing
interpretation as a model of how we should, for example, interpret
the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments. Most simply, Dworkin intended his hypothetical
statute as a counterexample to Justice Scalia’s simple, oftrepeated claim329 that the mention of capital punishment in the
Constitution precludes a determination that such punishment is
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual.
Justice Scalia would apparently read the statute no differently; he,
too, would protect the newly endangered mink (or call off the
protections for newly unendangered mink).330 Justice Scalia
denied that such change with respect to the protection required
corresponds to a change in the interpretation of the relevant
statute.331 Similar changes in constitutional protections ought not

324. Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 55, at 121; Scalia, Response, supra note 20,
at 146.
325. Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 55, at 121.
326. Id.; Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 146.
327. Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 55, at 121-23.
328. Id. at 121-22.
329. Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 46. (“No fewer than three of the Justices
with whom I have served have maintained that the death penalty is unconstitutional, even
though its use is explicitly contemplated in the Constitution.” (footnotes omitted)).
330. Id.
331. Id.
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to be understood as deriving from a change in interpretation of
Dworkin’s “majestic” clauses of the Constitution.332
Justice Scalia appeared to rely on the distinction between
facts and values. Changes in animal population are changes in
facts; changes in the definition of cruel or equal or others highly
abstract terms are often changes in moral or other values. The
latter are not properly taken into account by an implicit positivist
account of law that denies such moral theories the status of law.
Thus, Justice Scalia could easily distinguish Dworkin’s mink case
to the extent he could distinguish facts from values or otherwise
rely upon a positivist account of law.333 While neither of those
foundations is free from doubt,334 neither are they suspect or
unusual in American jurisprudence. Indeed, the distinction
between facts and value is very much a traditional one. In short,
Dworkin needed to do a lot more work before the mink case
would pose a difficult challenge for Justice Scalia’s theory.
Beyond operating as a counterexample to Justice Scalia’s
capital punishment argument,335 Dworkin appeared to use his
hypothetical statute more generally as a proxy for the types of
change that must be accommodated in constitutional
interpretation. As noted, Dworkin accepted that there is a
distinction between facts and values, but he believed that values,
including moral values, evolve. That argument was not made with
the endangered mink example, however. Instead, Dworkin’s
argument that the moral values and principles inherent in the
Constitution may evolve was based upon the text of the
Constitution itself. Dworkin argued that the language of the
Constitution demonstrates a commitment to the highest and best
moral theory available to us.336
332. See Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 55, at 123 (citing RONALD DWORKIN,
LIFE’S DOMINION 145 (1993)).
333. See Hart, Positivism, supra note 148, at 625-29; see generally LeDuc, Paradoxes
of Positivism, supra note 54 (exploring the positivist character of most originalist and nonoriginalist theories in the debate).
334. See HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY AND
OTHER ESSAYS 9-10, 99, 101-02 (2002) (arguing, following Dewey, that the distinction
between facts and values does not generate a philosophically important ontological
dichotomy); Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 87, 88-99 (1996) (defending the objective truth of value judgments).
335. See Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 46-47.
336. See, e.g., Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 55, at 122-23.
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Accordingly, Justice Scalia’s originalism appears to offer
a theory of constitutional flux that acknowledges a limited array
of sources of change. The Constitution may change as technology
changes. I described the evolution with respect to the First
Amendment and the Fourth Amendment above.337 For Justice
Scalia, it sometimes appeared as if sorting out the impact of
technological change on the Constitution was not difficult.338 The
history of the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggests
otherwise. It also raises a question whether Griswold v.
Connecticut339 should be reconciled with originalism theory as a
technological change case. Just as the eighteenth-century
Constitution permitted married couples to access the forms of
contraception then available, that same Constitution ought to
permit the use of newer technologies in the twentieth century.
Other sources of constitutional change are generally not
permitted. Of particular importance, changes in community
standards or morality would not be properly taken into account.
There remain at least a few rough patches in this account. Two
examples are the criminal punishments of lashing and
branding.340 This account of Justice Scalia’s originalism still does
not explain why stocks and whipping are cruel and unusual and
thus prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. He invoked stare
decisis to avoid the implication that such punishments would not
be prohibited under the Constitution.341 The second is the implicit
reliance and the distinction between facts and values. But that
distinction is not manifestly wrong—and is certainly customary.

3. Conclusion
A powerful objection to originalism’s account of change
is that the account is inadequate. For example, Justice Scalia did
337. See supra notes 298-303 and accompanying text.
338. For example, note Justice Scalia’s discussion of the First and Fourth
Amendments’ proper interpretation in the face of technological change. See Scalia,
Interpretation, supra note 6, at 45-46.
339. 381 U.S. 479, 480, 486 (1965).
340. Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 107, at 861 (acknowledging that such penalties
would not be sustained under the Eighth Amendment by an originalist, characterizing
originalism as, in “its undiluted form, at least, . . . medicine that seems too strong to
swallow.”)
341. Id.
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not explain why stocks and lashing are prohibited, but capital
punishment is not (except as a matter of deference to nonoriginalist precedent). Nor did he explain why the First
Amendment protects broadcast television and flag burning.342
Justice Scalia asserted that the concepts of speech and press serve
as “sort of” synecdoches, but this is itself more a metaphor than
an explanation or an argument. Moreover, it is hardly an
apparently originalist claim about semantic or linguistic
meaning.343 Simply distinguishing facts and values does not
make possible performance of the task that originalism seeks to
accomplish. Our objections to stocks and lashings are rooted in
our changed values, not in any changed facts. Our protection of
flag burning, which cannot be justified by reference to original
expectations, understandings, or intentions, is similarly rooted in
changed values, understanding of democracy, and the permissible
scope of debate within the public discourse.344 The originalist
account of constitutional flux falls not from the criticisms of its
critics, but from its own inadequacy.

E. The Claim of Necessity
The final principal implication Bork drew from
originalism’s claims is that all other theories of constitutional
interpretation are impossible.345 The sense in which theories were
impossible for Bork is strong: such theories are no more possible
than a perpetual motion machine under the laws of physics.346
342. Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 138.
343. See Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 38; LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning,
supra note 1, at 138 (criticizing the casual invocation of the concept of synecdoche in
interpretation of the constitutional text—and questioning how Justice Scalia’s approach
differs from Justice Douglas’s much criticized penumbras and emanations in Griswold).
344. See Lessig, Understanding, supra note 5, at 400-01.
345. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 251. Although Douglas Ginsburg and Frank
Easterbrook do not expressly defend originalism on the basis that alternatives are impossible,
Ginsburg’s characterization of non-originalists as lawless and Easterbrook’s analogy of nonoriginalism to infant baptism sound parallel themes. See Easterbrook, Alternatives to
Originalism, supra note 36, at 479. Tara Smith dubs a related argument for the necessity of
originalism the “iron grip argument.” See SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 100, at 165
(naming the argument that interpretation must be originalist). Critics have likewise claimed
the impossibility of originalism. See, e.g., Ely, Allure and Impossibility, supra note 14, at
412-15.
346. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 251.
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Other originalists argue that non-originalist theories are erroneous
or misguided, but the modal claim about the world appears to have
been made first by Bork.347 The necessity argument makes two
turns: a positivist turn, to be restated as a claim about the absence
of legal change that could alter the original law and
understanding348 and a linguistic turn, to be restated as an
argument about the nature of interpretation.349
Bork’s argument was that moral choices are required in
our foundational constitutional law. We have to choose how we
want to live as individuals and as a political and civil society. If
a judge, following originalism, simply implements the moral
choices made by the Founders in the Constitution, that process
becomes possible. Reliance upon the express or implied moral
choices of the Constitution reduces the “ought” of such moral
judgments and choices to the “is” of the constitutional text. In
constitutional interpretation, “is” implies “ought.”350 But any
attempt to make our own moral choices to resolve hard cases
unanswered by the choices implicit or express in the Constitution
is necessarily controversial because of moral relativism. A judge
embarked on such a project becomes “at once adrift on an
uncertain sea of moral argument.”351 Implicit in that criticism is
that a debatable or controversial moral theory fails as a foundation
of legal obligation.352 (Bork quite nicely anticipates the objection
that the moral theory of the Constitution is no less controversial,
acknowledging that fact, but noting that the theory of the
Constitution is vindicated not because it is less controversial, but
because its constitutional embodiment makes it authoritative.)353

347. Id. at 251-52.
348. Baude, Our Law?, supra note 37, at 2352.
349. SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 100, at 165.
350. See LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism, supra note 54, at 634. That is, Bork relied
on the reduction of the moral judgments of the Founders to positive law to purge those
judgments of their controversial nature as moral judgments. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note
6, at 252.
351. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 252. Bork’s moral relativism is descriptive,
not prescriptive.
352. Id.
353. Id.
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Dworkin rendered this argument a little differently, with
four steps:
(1) Any method other than originalism requires “major
moral choices.”354
(2) Judges cannot show legitimate authority to make such
moral choices.
(3) Absent authority, judges must follow rules based upon
a theory that “the public would accept.”355
(4) There is no such theory.356

Dworkin challenged the second premise, arguing that belief in,
and acceptance of, such authority “is very widely accepted.”357
Dworkin offered no defense for such claim.358 That support is
probably not critical, however, because Dworkin offered his
claim about public opinion not to establish the proposition that
judges have such authority but merely to show that to the extent
one holds the view contrary to Bork’s (and thus believes that
judges have legitimate authority to make such decisions), then
such a non-originalist theory would be possible. Without
establishing the falsity of Bork’s second premise, Dworkin could
refute Bork’s argument simply by showing that Bork has not
established the truth of his premise.359
354. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 301-02 (1996) (quoting Bork).
355. Id. at 302.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. That omission is perhaps understandable or appropriate in a book review. If
Dworkin were to defend that claim, it would likely be on both empirical and theoretical
grounds. Empirically, there are wide areas of consensus in our Republic on a wide range of
moral questions. Theoretically, Dworkin is committed to the view that there are right
answers, as a matter of law and as a matter of moral theory. See, e.g., DWORKIN, TAKING,
supra note 114, at 81-130; RONALD DWORKIN, Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard
Cases?, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 13, at 119 (arguing that complete analysis
of legal doctrine and moral philosophy will provide a unique right answer to all legal
questions). See generally RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (2011) (defending
a unified theory of value).
359. Dworkin was likely correct that Bork’s second premise is questionable. A variety
of judges have claimed that power expressly or implicitly and a wide range of commentators
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Reverting to my initial rendition of Bork’s argument,
however, may put that argument in a more charitable light. First,
Dworkin asserts that judicial decision making must ultimately be
based upon moral judgments to be morally legitimate; that claim
misses the mark as a response to Bork. Bork did not deny
Dworkin’s moral theory. Rather, he only asserted the existence
of conflict among both theorists and citizens more generally over
the correct moral theory. That is, Bork’s argument need assert
only that Dworkin’s claim is contested. From the existence of that
controversy Bork argued that a controversial decision, resting on
controversial premises or arguments, is not legitimate as a
foundation for a holding of constitutional law. From this absence
of uncontested outcomes Bork first inferred an absence of
legitimacy and then inferred the failure of non-originalist theories,
including those like Dworkin’s that turn to moral philosophy for
a foundation. I think this more charitable rendition of Bork’s
argument is closer to the mark; it is certainly more interesting.
There is a plausibility that applying moral choices embedded in
the Constitution has a manifest legitimacy that other, more
avowedly interpretive theories cannot claim on their face.
Perhaps because of his vocation as a legal philosopher, Dworkin
had sufficient confidence in the power of reason that the
complexity of the analysis and argument necessary under his
theory does not appear to have caused him concerns.360
If Bork’s argument fails, it is because the first premise is
flawed. Implicit in the premise is the claim that originalism
requires no new moral choices in the interpretation of the
Constitution or the decision of constitutional cases.361 It would
not be enough to defer to the moral judgments of the Founders if
those judgments left unresolved a range of other moral choices

from Posner to Tribe and Dworkin have claimed that power for judges, too. While Bork may
have strenuously disagreed with the claim to such authority, he could claim neither that such
authority is uncontroversial nor that he had generally persuaded those who champion such
authority. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 240 at 60-61; see also DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra
note 6, at 225-75; RICHARD A. POSNER, What Am I? A Potted Plant? in OVERCOMING LAW
238-39 (1995); TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES, supra note 252, at 21-22 (1985).
360. See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 264-66 (rejecting the challenge that a
second-best account of judicial decision is to be preferred to Dworkin’s idealized but
impossible description of Hercules’s method).
361. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 252.
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that face the objections that Bork has asserted. The moral choices
inherent in the constitutional text must be complete. It must be
sufficient for originalism merely to follow the implicit moral
choices embedded in the positive constitutional text. That is a
strong claim.362 In fact, originalism itself requires moral choices,
as Dworkin and others have noted.363 Here Dworkin is on solid
ground for two reasons. First, originalism cannot escape moral
choices by relying on the language of the Constitution because
that language does not give us the answers to all of the kinds of
questions the Court must confront.364 The subjects covered by the
Constitution and the Republic governed by the Constitution are
more complex and uncertain than the Ten Commandments and
the limited aspect of human conduct that they governed.365 To
extract purported answers from ambiguous texts is both to follow
non-textual sources of law and to render that practice opaque. In
any event, moral or other choices—within a structured
constitutional practice itself—are required.366
Second, if the critics of originalism are correct that the
Constitution is not self-executing, and that its continuing vitality
and force requires the political, social, and judicial practices in
which it is imbedded, then the choice to look to the text of the
362. Having acknowledged that technological change may sometimes pose new
constitutional questions and denied that new moral questions may arise, it follows that the
originalists are committed to the claim that technological changes can generate no new
constitutional questions with a moral dimension. That seems a strong claim and hardly
obvious a priori.
363.
DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 98-101; James E. Fleming, Living
Originalism and Living Constitutionalism as Moral Readings of the American Constitution,
92 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1173-75 (2012).
364. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (wrestling with the application
of the Fourth Amendment to the warrantless installation of a GPS tracker); see generally
LeDuc, Beyond Babel, supra note 279 (exploring the exchange between Justices Scalia and
Alito as to the salience of originalist methods with respect to the dramatically different
technology of GPS tracking).
365. The Ten Commandments, after all, merely articulated a narrow set of personal
ethical requirements for a relatively homogeneous set of co-religionists. Even in the case of
the Ten Commandments, moreover, arguments may be made that difficult interpretative
questions may be imagined if that text is subjected to the same scrutiny as is routinely applied
to the constitutional text. See Sanford Levinson, On Interpretation: The Adultery Clause of
the Ten Commandments, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 719, 722-23 (1985) (conjuring up various
purported ambiguities in one of the commandments).
366. The very different but complementary accounts Bobbitt and Brandom offer are
perhaps the most helpful to understand the constraints that apply and channel decisional
choice in our constitutional decisional practice. See Brandom, Hegelian Model, supra note
79, at 38.
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Constitution as it was interpreted on adoption is to choose to
practice in a particular way.367 There are alternatives to that
original practice. One of the starkest examples would be to follow
Bork’s imperative to apply the Constitution with a single,
consistent stance but to follow the early Posner position with a
social wealth-maximizing practice. That is, we could interpret
and apply the Constitution not as if it codified Spencer’s Social
Statics, but as if it codified Posner’s early law and economics
account of justice.368 The arguments as to why that approach
would be problematic would take us far from the constitutional
text. Another approach would be that offered by Ely, to interpret
the Constitution in a manner that maximizes the democratic
features of our Republic.369 Bork, of course, would dispute the
legitimacy of those other practices. But he had no neutral,
Archimedean position from which to make that criticism. It
follows, therefore, that originalism itself must make moral
choices. In so doing, it is no different from those other theories
and practices, except insofar as it makes better or worse choices.
Will Baude makes a positivist argument for the necessity
of originalism.370 Such an argument could potentially avoid the
challenges that Bork’s argument faces. Baude argues that
originalism must be our law because, under legal positivism, there
is no source of law that would explain how the law changed from
that originally adopted or enacted.371
Baude’s argument faces three threshold objections. The
first objection comes from natural law theorists who reject the
positivist foundations of Baude’s argument.372 Natural law
asserts that the foundation for our constitutional law is natural law
and that natural law informs the interpretation of the Constitution

367. See TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 79, at 98-101.
368. See POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 247, at 60-76 (offering an early
argument that justice requires wealth maximization, a position he later abandoned).
369. See ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 59, at 73-104.
370. Baude, Our Law?, supra note 37, at 2352.
371. Id. at 2263-65.
372. Jeffrey A. Pojanowski & Kevin C. Walsh, Enduring Originalism, 105 GEO. L.J.
97, 117-21 (2016) [hereinafter Pojanowski & Walsh, Enduring Originalism] (offering a
competing, natural law account of originalism).
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and the adjudication of constitutional controversies.373 If this is
so, then constitutional and other legal change comes, not
ontologically, from a change in the underlying, unchangeable
natural law, but epistemologically, from a better understanding of
the natural law.374 As a result, the sources of potential change are
not entirely a matter of social fact—and might even include the
kinds of Herculean philosophical reasoning endorsed by
Dworkin.375 Thus, a natural law theory fatally undermines
Baude’s argument.
Second, Baude’s argument assumes that constitutional
law has an independent ontological status independent of the
arguments we make and accept in deciding constitutional
controversies. The result of this positivist account is that our
existing constitutional law has a priority over the arguments and
theories about that law. We don’t generally think we already have
an originalist constitutional law. Baude anticipates that objection
and tries to disarm it with his very creative interpretation of our
constitutional doctrine as originalist.376 That interpretation likely
strikes many—originalists and critics alike—as unpersuasive.
Baude’s account also doesn’t explain the absence of more
originalist constitutional law. Most originalists believe that a
consistent or even a stronger commitment to originalist arguments
would substantially change our constitutional law.377 Baude’s
theory does not explain all of that missing originalist
constitutional precedent and doctrine. Fundamentally, Baude’s
positivist originalism is inconsistent with our constitutional law

373. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 284-90 (2d ed. 2011)
(describing the concept of the determinatio); see generally LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism,
supra note 54, at 651 n.296.
374. I am oversimplifying here; natural law, with its concept of the determinatio,
accommodates positive law elements that may change in the manner required by Baude. See
generally LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism, supra note 54, at 651 n.296.
375. See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 355-99.
376. Baude, Our Law?, supra note 37, at 2376-86; LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism,
supra note 54, at 675 (rejecting Baude’s creative reimagining of our constitutional canon as
pervasively originalist).
377. See, e.g., Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 149 (describing the future for the
constitutional protection of individual rights); BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 69-128
(criticizing the non-originalist constitutional law of the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist
Courts); BARNETT, LOST, supra note 31, at 354-55; BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY,
supra note 23.
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and practice.378 The result is the paradox of a positivist
originalism that does not fit the social facts of our constitutional
practice.
Third and finally, Baude’s pervasive originalist
reinterpretation of our constitutional doctrine runs roughshod
over the arguments actually made for the Court’s holdings.379
Those decisions make a variety of prudential, doctrinal, structural,
and ethical arguments.380 Making the arguments for those
decisions on originalist arguments fundamentally changes those
decisions.381 As Bobbitt points out, the genius of Griswold was
its authoritative re-reading of the precedents that it cited to
support a right of privacy.382 While one may disagree with that
re-reading and even the decision of the case, it is important to
recognize what Justice Douglas’s decision does.
It changes those decisions because why we reach a
constitutional decision is generally almost as important as what
the decision is.383 The reading of a precedent or a constitutional
provision carries further inferential content that the mere holding
does not. That is part of the lesson of an inferentialist account of
the language of constitutional argument and decision.384 Thus, an
originalist restatement of the prior, self-consciously nonoriginalist decisions does not do justice to those decisions.
The final argument for the necessity of originalism is that
made with the linguistic turn and emphasizes what interpretation
378. Baude, Our Law?, supra note 37, at 2376-86 (reading the constitutional canon
creatively as originalist and rejecting arguments that key elements of the canon are nonoriginalist); LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism, supra note 54, at 644-45 (rejecting Baude’s
originalist reading of the constitutional canon).
379. Bobbitt offers a survey of the kinds of argument actually made in the opinions in
constitutional cases. See generally BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17.
380. Id. at 25-119.
381. See Brandom, Hegelian Model, supra note 79, at 38 (describing the
complementary elements of responsibility and authority in judicial decision, which are
mediated through the expressive content of the legal opinions accompanying decision).
382. BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17, at 224-25, 225 (“I must read Pierce and Meyer
differently having read Griswold and must read them all differently having read Roe.”).
383. I have qualified the claim because there may be unusual decisions, like Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) where making the decision, regardless of the nature of that
decision, is more important than what the decision is. In those rare cases what the decision
is may be of relatively little importance, and so the comparison may be less meaningful.
384. See id.; LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 1, at 168-73; BOBBITT,
FATE, supra note 17, at 224-25 (describing the implications that arise from decisions and
their accompanying opinions).
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requires.385 On this argument, only originalism satisfies the
requirements of interpretation.386 What does this claim mean?
What does it entail? The claim that interpretation requires an
originalist methodology of course assumes that constitutional
decision begins with interpretation.387 That assumption is likely
mistaken;388 leaving that objection aside, the claim that
interpretation requires originalism argues that interpretation is the
method of determining the meaning of a text.389 The argument
appears based upon a concept of communication.390
I have previously explored the role of meaning and
interpretation in the originalist debate.391 Briefly, the accounts of
meaning inherent in the claim that the nature of language and
interpretation makes originalism the only legitimate method for
interpretation misunderstands language, misunderstands the
world, misunderstands the role of truth, and misunderstands the
performative and inferential elements in constitutional texts.392
Language does not grab us by the throat to force us to be
originalists—as our constitutional decisional practice
demonstrates.
Although the argument about the necessity of originalism
has revived recently, that debate reflects the elaboration of more
scholastic and baroque embellishment than fundamental
contributions either to assessing the claims of originalism or its
implications for our constitutional doctrine and decision. Bork’s
385. Lawson, Originalism without Obligation, supra note 272, at 1311-12. But see
Sunstein, Nothing, supra note 38 (asserting that the concept of interpretation does not have
the meaning and commitments that Lawson claims).
386. See Lawson, Originalism without Obligation, supra note 272, at 1311-12.
387. See LeDuc, Interpretation and Practical Reasoning, supra note 1, at 86-92
(arguing that interpretation is not logically prior to decision and the process of constitutional
decision does not begin with interpretation); see also LeDuc, Ontological Foundations,
supra note 18, at 325.
388. Id.; Dennis Patterson, Interpretation in Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 685 (2005)
[hereinafter Patterson, Interpretation] (arguing against the priority of interpretation).
389. Lawson, Originalism without Obligation, supra note 272, at 1316 (“To interpret
a communicative instrument is to seek to ascertain its meaning. Otherwise, one simply is not
engaged in the enterprise of interpretation.”).
390. Id.
391. LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 1; LeDuc, Interpretation and
Practical Reasoning, supra note 1.
392. LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 1; LeDuc, Interpretation and
Practical Reasoning, supra note 1; LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 18; LeDuc,
Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 17.

2018

ORIGINALISM’S CLAIMS

1093

claim for the necessity of originalism is manifestly implausible.
The positivist and linguistic arguments for the necessity of
originalism, while conceptually more sophisticated than Bork’s
argument, are equally implausible. While I think it is possible to
score this particular exchange in the debate over originalism, that
assessment is hardly shared among the originalists themselves—
or their critics, who continue to engage these arguments.393

F. Can Originalism Restore the Lost Constitution?
According to the originalists, the Constitution, like China
in 1949, has been lost.394 Along with the task of determining the
culpable, originalism, unlike Republican foreign policy in the
early fifties, offers the prospect of a recovery.395 Unlike the case
of China, however, in the case of the Lost Constitution, it is not
always clear what has been lost, or when.396 At the least, it was
lost with the Warren Court’s decisions; however, it was likely lost
much earlier with the jurisprudence of the later New Deal, and it
may have been lost at the earliest stages of the Republic with the
broad scope of judicial review.397 What was lost was the
constitutional text unencumbered by such later doctrinal
development. It was a Constitution of greater States’ rights and
of more limited individual freedoms, and with a Federal
government of much lesser powers.

393. Sunstein, Nothing, supra note 38.
394. See, e.g., BARNETT, LOST, supra note 31, at 354-55, 354 (“Imagine holding up
a copy of the Constitution and seeing empty holes in the parchment where these passages
once appeared—or seeing ink blots over them.”); Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 149
(predicting that the late twentieth century constitutional law recognizing individual rights
“disfavored by the majority” faces hard times and implying that the change would be a return
to a truer Constitution).
395. See, e.g., BARNETT, LOST, supra note 31, at 354-55.
396. Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution, Not the Constitution in Exile,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 669, 669-70 (2006) [hereinafter, Barnett, Exile] (arguing that the Lost
Constitution includes the provisions that have been disregarded in the development of our
constitutional law).
397. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 20-28 (criticizing Chief Justice Marshall’s
role in the development of judicial review).
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One of the most puzzling challenges offered against
originalism is the counterintuitive claim that it fails to deliver in
its mission to reverse the constitutional history of the Warren
Court and to restore, to a greater or lesser degree, the Lost
Constitution.398 This argument against the instrumental efficacy
of originalism is dramatic. If it were true, it would cast the entire
originalist project into disarray. But it is also counterintuitive; it
asks us to conclude that the originalists fundamentally
misunderstand the nature of the interpretative arguments that they
make.
The argument was first advanced by Michael Perry399 and
has been recently renewed by David Strauss.400 According to that
argument, whatever the truth or other merits of originalism, it
cannot reverse the law made by the Warren Court or the New
Deal, or restore the Lost Constitution sought by conservative
originalists.401 The claim is counterintuitive precisely because
originalism’s mission is to restore the Lost Constitution.402
However strongly originalism’s proponents believe in the
linguistic and jurisprudential claims it makes, they generally
believe equally strongly in the substantive constitutional law that
emerges from the application of that theory.403
Critics argue that originalism cannot restore the Lost
Constitution for three reasons. First, the critics argue that
originalist arguments also support the constitutional
398. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 23 (arguing against the
Warren Court’s expansive reading of the Fourteenth Amendment on the basis that it was
inconsistent with the original intent and purpose in adopting the Amendment); see also
BARNETT, LOST, supra note 31, at 354-55.
399. MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS?
53-69 (1994) (arguing that the indeterminacy of history prevents originalism from
eliminating judicial discretion).
400. See Strauss, Why, supra note 48, at 975-76 (arguing that historical and textual
arguments privileged by the originalists can be advanced for classically liberal constitutional
positions).
401. BARNETT, LOST, supra note 31, at 354 (describing the provisions of the
Constitution that would be revived (or resurrected) by his libertarian originalism).
402. See id. at 356; see also BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6.
403. BARNETT, LOST, supra note 31, at 354. But see SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra
note 4, at 76 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s equivocation about the consequences of
originalism reveals the weakness of originalism); Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A
Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006) (arguing that Justice
Scalia ought not to disavow the implications of originalism, while conceding that he has done
so); Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 107, at 861.
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developments that the Lost Constitution would repudiate. We can
see this in Brown v. Board of Education404 and District of
Columbia v. Heller.405 Brown was not decided on originalist
terms;406 originalists, however, have sought to reinterpret that
case, perhaps not wholly persuasively, with an originalist
foundation and rationale.407 In so doing, they have offered an
originalist rationale for reversing Plessy v. Ferguson and
sustaining Brown.408 To the extent Brown stands as one of the
prime examples of the activism of the Warren Court that
originalism would abjure in its quest for the Lost Constitution,
rehabilitating the decision in Brown would not appear wholly
desirable for originalism. On the other hand, because Brown is
now the quintessential element of the constitutional canon,
originalism must rehabilitate the result in Brown if it is to be
credible.
The originalist efforts to rehabilitate Brown consider only
the task of constructing an originalist argument for its result and
fail to consider the performative dimensions of Brown. That case
not only had to strike down the laws that created segregated public
schools; it had to do that in a powerful, accessible way that could
lead the country. The performative role of the Brown decision
and opinion were to initiate a substantial change in the legal
relationship of the races in America. Would McConnell’s
reconstruction, making a subtle and controversial argument about
original understandings on the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment,409 satisfy that requirement? I don’t think so. The
lack of a compelling, emotionally engaging argument would
404. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
405. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
406. For an extensive contemporaneous discussion of the Court’s efforts to find an
originalist foundation for the rejection of the “separate but equal” construction of the 14 th
Amendment, see generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the
Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955) [hereinafter Bickel, Original
Understanding and Segregation].
407. See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81
VA. L. REV. 947, 949-53 (1995) [hereinafter McConnell, Originalism and Desegregation]
(arguing that the linguistic understanding of the Equal Protection Clause is inconsistent with
racially segregated public schools). But see Michael J. Klarman, Response, Brown,
Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L.
REV. 1881, 1883 (1995) (rejecting McConnell’s historical arguments).
408. McConnell, Originalism and Desegregation, supra note 407, at 1120-40.
409. Id.
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likely have kept any such analysis from having the same
performative role that Brown had.410
More recently, more serious problems for the originalist
project may have emerged in Heller, decided by Justice Scalia in
what some have been termed the most fundamentally originalist
case in Supreme Court history,411 was met with a vigorous and
robust originalist dissent by Justice Stevens.412 These two cases
exemplify the flexibility of originalism. Originalism, in the hands
of Justice Stevens, purports to show the ability of Congress and
the states to regulate gun ownership.413 The same point, however,
can be, and has been, made with respect to vast swathes of
precedent that was expressly decided on non-originalist
grounds.414 For example, as I have discussed elsewhere, the
Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment
admits of an originalist interpretation that would prohibit capital
punishment.415 Even originalists have applied the prohibitions of

410. But some have expressed skepticism as to the extent to which the courts can lead
the country to social change. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
411. See Tushnet, New Originalism, supra note 231, at 609-10. But see Cass R.
Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 247
(2008) [hereinafter Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism] (arguing that Heller is
analogous to Griswold in that each was a minimalist decision that struck down a statute lying
well outside the democratic consensus on the issues it governed).
412. See Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism, supra note 411, at 256. Perhaps
only a third-year law student could take that split as evidence of the differing forces of
competing versions of originalism. Fundamentally, and despite the thrust of the Heller
opinion, Justice Stevens is no originalist. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 425446, 479 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (offering an originalist
rebuttal to the Court’s argument before concluding: “In a democratic society, the
longstanding consensus on the need to limit corporate campaign spending should outweigh
the wooden application of judge-made rules.”). But see Brian A. Lichter & David P.
Baltmanis, Foreword: Original Ideas on Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 491, 493 (2009)
(arguing that Heller “illuminates the debate about the proper method of originalist
interpretation”).
413. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636-62 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
414. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965); Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954). But see Baude, Our Law?, supra note 37, at 237686 (creatively assimilating a great deal of non-originalist precedent into the originalist
canon).
415. See supra Section II.D. That argument was made most clearly by Dworkin: that
the term (or terms) “cruel and unusual” were intended and understood to incorporate our
citizens’ best understanding, rather than merely their contemporaneous meaning. See
Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 55, at 124.

2018

ORIGINALISM’S CLAIMS

1097

the Fourth Amendment to bar surveillance never anticipated in
the eighteenth century.416
Nevertheless, this argument appears ultimately
unpersuasive. The originalist promise of the Lost Constitution is
persuasive because the eighteenth century was a different world.
It was a world in which criminal defendants had far fewer rights.
Women and minorities were disenfranchised in the broadest
meaning of that term. Freedom of belief, association, and
expression were far more limited. Finally, the needs of the
economy and of the society for regulation and defense were far
simpler. Originalism aspires to that world, and the originalist
reading of the Constitution from that era is far more often
consistent with that world. Originalism can, indeed, replicate
many (if not most) of the features of that earlier world, looking
generally to the values of a world no later than the mid-nineteenth
century when the Reconstruction Amendments were adopted. It
is therefore not surprising that Robert Bork followed up his
defense with a broader critique of the culture of modernity.417
New originalists and other contemporary originalists may not
share this stance.
Second, critics assert that originalism may be unable to
protect the Constitution from further loss. Again, the concern, as
in Heller, is that originalist arguments have greater diversity—
and permit more diverse constitutional outcomes in
adjudication—than sometimes appears.418 On this account, for
example, David Strauss argues that originalism could become an
interpretive weapon in the hands of liberal theorists of the
Constitution.419 He cites McConnell’s effort to justify Brown
based upon original understandings.420 He could today just as
easily cite Justice Stevens’s dissent in Heller with respect to the

416. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6, at 169; see also United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400, 402-11 (2012) (holding that the use of a GPS tracker on a suspect’s automobile
qualified as a search that required a warrant under the Fourth Amendment); LeDuc, Beyond
Babel, supra note 279, at 197-204.
417. See ROBERT BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM
AND AMERICAN DECLINE (1996).
418. Heller, 554 U.S. at 645-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
419. Strauss, Why, supra note 48, at 975-76.
420. McConnell, Originalism and Desegregation, supra note 407, at 953-55.
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scope of the Second Amendment.421 In the face of the
indeterminacy of the original understandings or original
meanings, a doctrine that disparages precedent could be a
powerful tool for liberal jurists seeking to reverse conservative
precedent.
Two immediate cautions come to mind. First, this concern
with originalism would apply only to forms of originalism that
adopt a narrow view of stare decisis and precedent. Second,
Strauss is not embarked upon a project of strengthening
originalism.422 His goal runs in the opposite direction. His real
goal, at best, is a more candid and transparent constitutional
debate. As noted elsewhere in this article, that may well be a fair
concern.
But what Strauss’s criticism overlooks is that
originalism has proven an extraordinarily powerful tool—as strict
constructionism never proved to be—for conservatives
challenging liberal constitutional interpretation. Strauss is
effectively proposing unilateral disarmament.
The third argument against the feasibility of the project to
restore the Lost Constitution is the role of the appeal to original
understandings as a classical strategy of constitutional dissent.
Hinted at by Strauss,423 this argument emphasizes the
argumentational
strategy
of
challenging
established
interpretations by appealing to the original understanding. If the
current crop of originalists were to establish their reading of the
Constitution, we may easily imagine a liberal reaction that would
emphasize a broader reading of the rights expressed in the
Constitution to challenge that new status quo. The language and
historical record would likely be no more adequate to rebut that
reading than the current evidence is to rebut the originalists.
Evidence for that proposition can be found in the dissent in
421. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
422. See Strauss, Why, supra note 48, at 976 (somewhat brazenly characterizing
originalism’s claims as inviting “intellectual disingenuousness”). I characterize Strauss’s
criticism as brazen because he is hardly forthright in his acknowledgment of his more
fundamental rejection of originalism.
423. See DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 31 (2010) [hereinafter
STRAUSS, LIVING] (describing the effective use of an appeal to original understandings by
Justice Black to broaden the scope of constitutionally protected rights against the then
dominant doctrinal position championed by Justice Frankfurter); see also BALKIN, LIVING
ORIGINALISM, supra note 50 (adapting originalist arguments to support traditionally liberal
constitutional results).
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Heller.424 Nevertheless, in fairness to current originalism,
because the Constitution was adopted and the Reconstruction
Amendments added in a world without many of the current views,
there is a core of originalism that will likely prove difficult to
overturn.
Originalism does offer a robust constitutional promise to
the conservative constitutional theorist because it promises a
return from modernity. It offers a world before the Romantics,
before the uncertainty of quantum physics and without the
complexities of Freud. Returning to the simpler world of the
Enlightenment, originalism offers a simpler account of
constitutional understandings and meanings. Originalists are
right that it is a world without paper money or a Federal Reserve
System, still less an Environmental Protection Agency or a Food
and Drug Administration.425 That was a simpler and more
conservative world. If the originalists can resort to it as the
touchstone of constitutional interpretation, they will construct a
simpler, more conservative constitutional world. Whether that
world is one in which we are safe from international stateless
terrorists,426 or protected against global economic or
environmental crisis would appear highly unlikely. But this is a
matter of prudence, not original understanding. The suggestion
that originalism cannot perform at least a large part of the mission
assigned to it is not very plausible. The argument that historical
and textual arguments cannot accomplish the originalist mission
is perhaps only evidence of the desperation among some of
originalism’s critics—and of the stalemate that has developed in
the debate itself.427
424. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
425. Compare SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 63-65 (cataloging widely
accepted elements of our contemporary Federal regulatory welfare republic that would be
called into question or eliminated under originalism) and STRAUSS, LIVING, supra note 423,
at 12-16, with ORIGINALISM, supra note 59, at 27-39 (denying the full range of effects
asserted by Sunstein but endorsing certain substantive constitutional results under
originalism).
426. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND
THE COURSE OF HISTORY (2002) (arguing that the national state that emerged in Europe in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is increasingly obsolete as a result of economic,
technological, and ideological developments).
427. Will Baude offers a similar assessment of the debate, although his response to
rehabilitate originalism’s claims is more traditional. See Baude, Our Law, supra note 37, at
2351 (“Debates about originalism are at a standstill . . . .”).
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III. CONCLUSION
Three principal conclusions emerge from this survey of
the debate about these six central claims and implications of
originalism. First, the stalemate that I have elsewhere sketched is
equally applicable to these key questions in the debate. Second,
many of the sources of the stalemate and fruitlessness lie in the
unexamined assumptions that ground the debate—and make it
possible. Third, the moves in the debate are becoming ever more
arcane and academic—without generating any meaningful
progress within the debate itself or as the debate informs our
constitutional law. We can see the evidence for these conclusions
in more detail if we look at the debate about each of these six
claims.
Originalism’s argument from democracy faces strong
objections.428 The argument from democracy—an argument
premised on the celebrated countermajoritarian problem—has a
powerful intuitive appeal, and Judge Bork and Justice Scalia make
powerful statements of the argument for it. But I think the three
principal arguments canvassed here against that position have the
better position. In particular, the fundamental premise of
originalism that there is a countermajoritarian problem in our
constitutional practice is flawed. Judicial review is grounded not
in theoretical argument but in our constitutional decision
practice.429
Second, the claim for neutrality is probably the most fully
articulated important claim for originalism, and the intuitive
appeal of this claim is manifest. The claim for neutrality relies on
the implicit premise that there exists a neutral interpretation or
adjudication process. While intuitive, it is not clear that the
originalists have established a concept of neutrality with the

428. In an earlier, unpublished article Larry Solum has even questioned whether the
argument is “fully coherent.” See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Univ. of Ill.
Coll. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Papers Series, No. 07-24, 2008),
https://papers.ssrn.com /sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244 [https://perma.cc/746GHVYB]; see generally LeDuc, Fruitless Quest, supra note 68.
429. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 97, at 6-8 (lampooning the received
account of Marbury that treats Chief Justice Marshall as having created judicial review in a
judicial bid for power).
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specificity and transparency sufficient to perform the role
required. Neutrality is the concept that is intended to allow us to
assess interpretations and readings of the Constitution for their
faithfulness to the constitutional text.430 If that concept of
representation is unfounded or if the process of constitutional
decision cannot be reduced to constitutional interpretation, then
neutrality cannot be the measure of the legitimacy of
constitutional decision.
Despite the enormous scrutiny that Brown has received,
there is no consensus whether its holding and reasoning would
qualify as an application of neutral principles.431 Originalists, as
well as other constitutional commentators, have divided over this
issue.432 The debate over the neutrality of Brown suggests that
the concept of neutrality is itself suspect. Other less celebrated
cases are no easier to assess from a neutral perspective.433
The argument for originalism from its exclusive claim to
neutrality is thus fundamentally flawed. Originalism’s critics
often err, too, in overstating their objections to originalism’s
claimed neutrality. The critics of that claim who go on to deny
that there are constraints on constitutional argument,
interpretation, and decision also misunderstand the nature of the
real constraints that channel and inform our constitutional law and
practice. Originalism may misunderstand constitutional language
and argument when it claims neutrality, but its critics
misunderstand that same language and argument when they assert
that constitutional argument and decision are indeterminate. By
430. The New Originalists, as noted above, state their claims in linguistic terms. They
claim originalism is the only approach to the constitutional text that preserves the original
meaning of that text when it was adopted. I have explored those claims more fully in earlier
articles in this series. See LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 1; LeDuc,
Interpretation and Practical Reasoning, supra note 1.
431. Compare Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 112, at 29-30 (arguing that
recognition of special race-based protections violates neutrality) with ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST, supra note 59, at 73-104 (arguing for neutrality based upon the constitutional
principle of protecting insular minorities to enhance democracy).
432. See, e.g., Bickel, Original Understanding and Segregation, supra note 410, at 665 (arguing that racially segregated public schools were not inconsistent with the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment); McConnell, Originalism and Desegregation,
supra note 407, at 953-55 (arguing that the original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment was inconsistent with racially segregated public schools); Wechsler, Neutral
Principles, supra note 112, at 22-24.
433. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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focusing on neutrality and the specter of judicial discretion and
willfulness, the originalists and their critics distract us from more
important questions about constitutional doctrine and practice.
The third controversial implication of originalism arises
from originalism’s account of constitutional change. Originalism
purports to permit certain kinds of change to be incorporated into
its constitutional interpretation, while fiercely rejecting other
types of change and sharply criticizing alternative interpretative
theories that permit or welcome such change.434 That approach is
persuasive only if the distinction between permissible and
impermissible sources of flux can be articulated. The originalist
reliance upon a fundamental distinction between fact and value to
help distinguish permissible and impermissible sources of change
appears one of the less problematic features of the originalist
account.
Critics also argue that the originalist claim that the
meaning and the appropriate reading of the Constitution do not
change does violence to the constitutional text.435 That challenge
is harder to disarm. It is harder to disarm in light of Lessig’s
helpful distinction between meaning and readings, because it
allows us to account for changed understandings of the
constitutional text without committing to the counterintuitive
claim that the meaning of the Constitution itself changes or
morphs. The proponents of change, the critics of originalism,
have history and the world on their side, not just in the general
sense, that we recognize that the world and we ourselves have
greatly changed since the Constitution was ratified. It is also true
in the important parochial sense that there has been constitutional
change, too.436 For the originalist to repudiate those changed
434. See generally Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 6, at 41-44 (rejecting the Living
Constitution of originalism’s critics); Rehnquist, supra note 296; Baude, Our Law?, supra
note 37 (making a positivist argument that the original understanding of the Constitution
must remain law in the absence of amendment).
435. See, e.g., Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 13, at 94; Dworkin, Arduous, supra
note 74, at 1262.
436. Larry Lessig asserts this claim very strongly, but the existence of constitutional
flux appears incontrovertible, even without regard to the ramifications that have emerged
from constitutional amendments or the correction of perceived constitutional error. Lessig,
Understanding, supra note 5, at 396. But even originalists generally acknowledge the
existence of constitutional change—and endorse it. See, e.g., Scalia, Interpretation, supra
note 6, at 41-44; Green, The Sense-Reference Distinction, supra note 274. But see Peter J.
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readings of the Constitution is itself a radical challenge to our
American Constitution and to our Republic. But it is also hard for
their critics to establish this claim. It is harder for the critics
because of the intuitive appeal of the unchanging Constitution,
and our very rhetoric of constitutional interpretation. That
rhetoric as well as the substance of the debate’s arguments
generally treat the Constitution and the constitutional text as an
objective Constitution-in-the-world.437 That premise underlies
the reduction of constitutional decision to constitutional
interpretation. The critics must persuade us to abandon the simple
and initially attractive account that originalism offers.
The critics can successfully challenge originalism’s claim
to privilege constitutional arguments from the original intentions,
expectations, and original public linguistic understandings. But
they cannot establish that the other forms of constitutional
argument they generally want to emphasize are themselves
privileged. They are not. Originalist arguments from history and
text are, in certain cases, dispositive.438 They appear compelling
to the Court439 or to dissenting Justices440 and they often persuade
us.441 Originalism’s critics make the case that the originalist
arguments from text and history are not a complete account of
constitutional interpretation, argument, and decision.442 Other
non-originalist modes of argument are also dispositive in certain
cases.443 Pluralist theories make a place for originalist and nonSmith, Originalism and Level of Generality, 51 GA. L. REV. 485, 556 (2017) (arguing that
the originalist claim to neutrality is inconsistent with key decisions in the modern
constitutional canon that changed prior constitutional law).
437. LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 18, at 269-74, 306-18.
438. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
439. See, e.g., McDonald, 561 U.S. at 754-59, 768-78; Heller, 554 U.S. at 576-628;
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-53.
440. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 506 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he Court has erased the Public Use Clause from our Constitution . . . .”).
441. See Levinson, Embarrassing Second Amendment, supra note 92 (arguing that the
contemporary widespread academic hostility to the Second Amendment is unjustified and
the resulting pre-Heller constitutional doctrine difficult to reconcile with the constitutional
text).
442. BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17, at 7-8; Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 13, at
72-74.
443. See generally Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (largely disregarding the constitutional text
that tacitly limits the power of eminent domain to property taken for public use in deference
to doctrinal and precedential arguments that do not).
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originalist arguments.444
The pluralist, anti-foundational
accounts don’t explain when such arguments are dispositive.445
But those theories don’t concede that such an explanation is
necessary.446 At least as importantly, they deny that such an
account is possible.447 Thus, the pluralist theories are also
incompatible with the originalist claims of privilege (as well as
the corresponding claims of privilege by the non-originalists).
The fourth challenge, that originalism cannot
accommodate non-originalist precedent and a robust theory of
stare decisis, generates another key controversy. Some strong
originalists would avoid this challenge by denying a robust role
for non-originalist precedent.448 But most would seek to
accommodate precedent, including those versions defended on
the bench by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Judge Bork and
defended in the academy by, among others, Larry Solum.449 That
accommodation of precedent deflects Tribe’s challenge to
stronger forms of originalism that would systematically overturn
non-originalist precedent. 450
The accommodation of precedent is not easily reconciled
with other key claims of originalism, including the claim to limit
judicial discretion. Reconciling originalism with such precedent,
and harmonizing such disparate authorities, requires judgment,
not an algorithm.451
With judgment comes discretion.
444. See, e.g., BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17, at 7-8 (describing the existing modes
of constitutional argument); Green, Truthmakers, supra note 80 (manuscript at 21-22).
445. Green, Truthmakers, supra note 80 (manuscript at 28-30) (criticizing antifoundational modal accounts as incomplete); BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17, at 5-6
(acknowledging that his theory does not provide a means by which competing argument
might be harmonized or privileged); BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 97, at x-xi.
446. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17, at 5-6; BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra
note 97, at x-xi; see generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 17.
447. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17, at 5-6; BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra
note 97, at x-xi; see generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 17.
448. See, e.g., Barnett, Trumping, supra note 20, at 258-62 (arguing that nonoriginalist precedent must fall—even though originalists on the bench have not gone that
far).
449. Solum, Constitutional Bondage, supra note 20, at 205.
450. See Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 13, at 82-83 (asserting that Justice Scalia’s
constitutional decisional practice has sustained non-originalist precedent in the face of his
theoretical claims).
451.
The emphasis on judgment—and the associated, implicit acceptance of
discretion—is the source of Fried’s express repudiation of originalism. See Fried, On
Judgment, supra note 212, at 1043-46. Similar objections have been made by some
originalists to the New Originalists’ introduction of the distinction between interpretation

2018

ORIGINALISM’S CLAIMS

1105

Originalism ought to be prepared to sacrifice its claim to cabin
discretion, in the strong sense that it has claimed, to establish the
defense of a non-exclusive originalism, for two reasons. First,
non-exclusive originalism cannot prevent judicial discretion
because there remains substantial play in the joints of judicial
decision with respect to the weight to be accorded to nonoriginalist precedent and other modes of argument. Second, a
non-exclusive originalism can do the work that need be done. The
accommodation of non-originalist precedent requires substantial
discretion, as well as the departure from original understandings,
expectations, and intentions. The kinds of judgment that Judge
Bork and Justice Scalia called for requires the exercise of
discretion: judges must determine how central non-originalist
precedent has become in our constitutional doctrine and legal
practice.452 Justice Scalia’s argument that originalism has no
more trouble with precedent than other theories of interpretation
overlooked the fundamental theoretical challenge that originalism
offers to much precedent in our American constitutional practice.
Many other theories do not challenge precedent so fundamentally,
and this is the sense in which Sunstein aptly characterizes
originalism as radical.453
Fifth, the weakest argument made by the originalists is for
the necessity of originalism. The arguments made for that claim
appear implausible, for several reasons. First, if originalism be
true, it is only contingently true. At a somewhat conceptual level,
for modern Hegelians as well as pragmatists, history is
contingent. There is nothing essential or fundamental that must
necessarily be the case about how history and society evolve or
the values that are endorsed at any point in time.454 Second, it

and construction. See Richard S. Kay, Construction, Originalist Interpretation and the
Complete Constitution, U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE, Mar. 6, 2017, at 2, 7 (criticizing the
introduction of the distinction between constitutional interpretation and construction because
it reintroduces substantial judicial discretion).
452. See Scalia, Response, supra note 20, at 139-40; BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 6,
at 157-59.
453. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 26 (criticizing the far-reaching doctrinal
implications of a pervasive constitutional originalism).
454. See, e.g., CHARLES TAYLOR, THE SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE
MODERN IDENTITY (1989); ARTHUR C. DANTO, ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
(1968). The minority strand of natural law originalism would assert the ahistorical
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would be surprising if the critics of originalism were so confused
that they advocated the impossible. The protagonists in the debate
may be confused or reliant on mistaken, confused, or unhelpful
premises in the debate, but it is implausible that either side is
committed to a manifestly impossible position. By contrast, in
the face of the fruitless, stalemated debate that has unfolded over
the past half century, it seems quite plausible that the debate
reflects unproductive scholastic commitments and confusions.455
Proof that the kinds of argument endorsed by originalism’s critics
are integral parts of our constitutional decisional practice comes
directly from the Court’s decisions and opinions.456 A broader
array of authority and arguments were deployed there in central
roles in decision. The modern positivist and linguistic arguments
are no more effective.
To the extent that most of originalism’s critics would
privilege arguments made otherwise than on the basis of history
or text, those claims also appear indefensible.457 Arguments from
text and history are sometimes persuasive and determinative.458
Thus, the arguments of originalism’s critics that originalism’s
modes of constitutional argument are disfavored or marginal are
also unconvincing. The sources of the fruitless quest for both

foundations of our constitutional law. See generally LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism, supra
note 54.
455. LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel, supra note 2, at 17-31; LeDuc, Ontological
Foundations, supra note 18; LeDuc, Relationship of Constitutional Law to Philosophy, supra
note 51.
456. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2556-57 (2014) (following
structural arguments about the relationship of the Executive and Legislative Branches in
articulating the limits of the Recess Appointments Clause); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 532-38 (2012); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 687705 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (advancing prudential arguments for a limited, not
absolute, application of the protections of the Second Amendment). I discuss the role of the
originalism debate in shaping the reasoning and decision of Canning and Sebelius in LeDuc,
Beyond Babel, supra note 279 (arguing that the tacit premises and conceptual framework of
the originalism debate has distracted and weakened the analysis and reasoning in our
contemporary constitutional jurisprudence).
457. See generally SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4 (insisting on the primacy of
prudential, consequentialist arguments in constitutional law).
458. See authorities cited supra note 438; see also LeDuc, Beyond Babel, supra note
279, at 197-220; BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 17, at 9-119.
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sides in the debate include tacit, mistaken ontological
assumptions that go unstated and unacknowledged.459
Sixth, the counterintuitive claim that the originalist
interpretation of the Constitution would not yield a very different
constitutional doctrine than that which we have seems
questionable. Few critics of originalism advance this claim.460
Indeed, some, like Cass Sunstein, argue that the substance of the
constitutional law that arises under originalist theory is the most
powerful argument against originalism.461 The originalist
arguments deployed against many constitutional doctrines
grounded on prudential, structural, doctrinal, or ethical arguments
would, on their terms, do the work claimed by originalists.
Without those modes of constitutional argument, our
constitutional decisional discourse would be confined to
arguments from history and text. Originalism passes the
functional test; if originalism fails, it is not because originalist
interpretation and decision would not create the Constitution that
originalists seek. It fails to accomplish that mission only because
its arguments cannot delegitimize non-originalist modes of
argument and privilege the originalist modes.
These six central claims of originalism and their
implications capture many of the most salient features in the
debate over originalism. While it is possible to assess those
claims and arguments from within the debate, it is also possible
to step back to look at the claims and arguments of the debate
from the outside. From that vantage the claims and arguments
appear problematic. Many of the claims on both sides of the
debate appear implausible—like the claim by originalism that it
is necessarily so, the claim that our constitutional law is
systematically originalist, and the claim by the critics that
originalism, even if adopted, cannot restore the Lost Constitution.
The arguments for those claims, while often creative and

459. See LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 18; LeDuc, Relationship of
Constitutional Law to Philosophy, supra note 51 (arguing that philosophical therapeutic
argument can sometimes reveal and treat confusion in constitutional argument).
460. See, e.g., BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 50 (making originalist
arguments for untraditionally originalist constitutional conclusions).
461. See SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 15-19.
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rhetorically sophisticated, appear more often desperate or
disingenuous than persuasive.
The sources of the sterility are harder to identify, but
common threads emerge. Part of the difficulty in seeing the
problems inherent in the debate is a matter of achieving the
perspective necessary to recognize a scholastic debate and to
escape the seductive grip of its puzzles and intricate controversies.
That’s easier to do with respect to earlier debates and with the
benefit of centuries of intellectual history than in the present. But
even in the present we can be struck by the lack of progress and
increasingly Ptolemaic intricacy of the distinctions, arguments,
and strategies in the debate over these fundamental claims. We
can also be struck by the enormous gap between the theoretical
claims made within the context of the debate and our
constitutional decisional practice.
Ironically, some perspective can be gained by considering
again Justice Scalia’s oft-repeated claim that it takes a theory to
beat a theory.462
This claim reflects a fundamental
methodological error. In the case of describing our constitutional
decisional practice, it doesn’t take a theory to beat a theory. It
doesn’t even take a theory.463 Understanding here is a matter of
mastering our constitutional practice, not conceptualizing a
theoretical superstructure. Justice Scalia’s own decisional
practice reflected the primacy of practice.464 When we understand
the priority of practice, the apparent paradox of the divergence of
that practice from the proclaimed originalist theory dissolves.465
It is hard to avoid a “don’t care” conclusion as to the
increasingly sophisticated and arcane exchanges on these issues.
When we look closely at the claims and arguments that comprise

462. See Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 107, at 855 (accusing the non-originalists of
offering a compelling alternative to originalism). But see Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism
Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009) (making the overstated claim of his title).
463. See generally LeDuc, Relationship of Constitutional Law to Philosophy, supra
note 51 (arguing that philosophical theory and argument plays a very limited role in our
constitutional law).
464. Barnett, Trumping, supra note 20.
465. See Fried, On Judgment, supra note 212, at 1043-44 (suggesting that Justice
Scalia wrote his strongest opinions when he paid the least attention to the constraints of his
originalist theory).
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the debate we see a controversy that appears more misdirected
and confused than vital and robust.
Finally, it is valuable to consider what may be
productively winnowed from the chaff of the debate over
originalism. It is not clear that there is an important argument that
has convinced an opponent on either side of the controversy and
so advanced the debate. But there are insights into the nature of
our constitutional law that are valuable. Justice Scalia’s
reminders that rights of individuals may adversely impact the
interests of the majority or even the society as a whole and that
philosophical argument generally lacks the finality that we need
in our constitutional argument and decision is valuable. Ely’s and
Black’s argument that the meaning of particular clauses of the
Constitution are affected and informed by the meaning and import
of other provisions of the Constitution is also important. But
salvaging those insights leaves us very far from a commitment to
the value of the debate—or a need to carry the debate forward.

